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ABSTRACT
In recent years economists have been giving increasing atten­
tion to the problems associated with water resource development. Quite 
lo g ic a lly , most o f the work has been done in areas where very large ex­
penditures have been involved--in  studies of flood control, navigation, 
ir r ig a tio n  and hydro-electric projects. Usually the projects studied 
involved expenditures by the federal government.
Expenditures on water resources a t the local level have been 
largely neglected, and when they have been examined the viewpoint has 
not b v .e n  that of the local community i t s e l f .  Rather, the studies have 
taken the national view, hence the decision rules which have been used 
are those which have been developed to evaluate federal projects.
The major objective of this research has been to devise an 
economic model fo r use in deciding among alternative  local ground­
water basin projects from the point of view of the local community 
i t s e l f . A subsidiary goal has been to examine the e ffe c t on national 
welfare of the local community's use of the decision-making model.
The economic model incorporates benefit-cost analysis. The 
relevant cost of any local water project proposal is the present value 
unit cost obtained by discounting the costs incurred over time by the 
community's cost of ca p ita l. Benefits are measured by the costs 
avoided by undertaking the pro ject, thus, i f  the a lternative  to the 
project is inaction, the benefits are the costs of inaction.
ix
As an a lternative  to a community project private water-using 
companies may undertake projects to secure th e ir  own water supplies. 
Then the benefit to use in evaluating the community project is  the 
present value un it cost of the corporate project determined by dis­
counting costs incurred over time by the corporate cost of ca p ita l.
The results of a hypothetical comparison between a corporate 
project and a non-profit community project show th at, with constant 
returns to scale and equal costs of c a p ita l, the present value unit 
cost of water is less fo r the corporate project than for the community 
project. The benefit-cost ra tio  w ill favor the* community pro ject, 
however, because the a fte r-ta x  cost fo r a corporation purchasing water 
from the non-profit project is lower than the present value un it cost 
of the corporate project. I t  is therefore to the advantage o f the 
community to undertake the non-profit project. This conclusion is 
very unlikely to be overturned by e ither differences in costs of 
capital or by diseconomies of scale.
The community decision-making model is found lik e ly  to be non* 
optimal from the national welfare viewpoint. This is large ly  a result 
of the corporate income tax structure, and correction of resultant 
misallocations would require changes in the tax laws.
A case study of ground water-imported water conjunctive use in 
the Los Angeles area reveals several economically in e ff ic ie n t practices. 
Ad valorem taxes are used to finance ground-water variable costs, 
thus, fo r a ll practical purposes, transforming them into fixed  costs
x
even in the long run. This results in misallocations of ground water. 
Simultaneously, some water users are using imported water which costs 
them more than the unit ground-water cost. This is a fu rther vio lation  
of economic effic iency conditions. The cost d iffe re n tia ls  persist be­
cause the market in ground-water rights is imperfect.
I t  is concluded that economic e ffic iency could be improved in  
the study area by eliminating certain ad valorem taxes and including 
the costs they now cover in user charges, and by elim inating adjudi­
cated water righ ts , instead allowing anyone to pump any desired quan­
t i t y  of water. Pumping charges would be assessed to bring the marginal 
cost of ground water up to the cost of the imported water substitute.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Scope 
In recent years a great deal of attention has been devoted to 
the development of water resources at the federal leve l. Investments 
in water resources at the state and local le v e l, however, have been 
largely ignored. When local projects have been investigated the ana­
ly t ic a l procedure which has been adopted has been much the same as 
that used to analyze federal projects. H irsh le ife r et a l . (1960), fo r  
example, study the problems of New York City and Los Angeles using the 
approach that they deem appropriate fo r the budgeting of funds for  
federal water projects. While th e ir  analysis may shed much lig h t on 
the welfare effects of local projects from the national point of view, 
and while i t  may also show that "poor" water investment decisions are 
being made a t the local le v e l, the model that is used fo r choosing
among alternatives does not actually  re fle c t how the community i ts e l f
might look a t the problem.
I t  is  the primary objective of th is study to develop an eco­
nomic model which may be used in deciding among alternative  ground­
water basin control measures. The point of view adopted is th at of 
the lo c a lity  i ts e l f .
A secondary goal is to examine the e ffec t on national welfare
2of using the local decision-making model in choosing among a lte r ­
native water projects. An analysis is presented of the factors which 
may cause local water projects to be selected that are not optimal 
fo r the nation, but no attempt is made to suggest policy measures 
which would close the gap between the local and national in terests.
A hypothetical numerical example is  u tiliz e d  to illu s tra te  
how a local community might use the model. Parameters are then varied 
to demonstrate the model's s e n s itiv ity  to factors which cannot be pre­
cisely  determined. These s e n s itiv ity  tests show that ignorance of the 
exact parameter values is not a serious problem. Under normal condi­
tions the model w ill point unambiguously to the decision which is op­
timal for the local community.
A case study of ground-water basin control measures is under­
taken to il lu s tra te  the problem that one municipal water d is tr ic t ,  
the Central and West Basin Water Replenishment D is tr ic t of Los Angeles, 
has encountered in establishing a ground water-surface water conjunc­
tiv e  use system. A number of economically in e ff ic ie n t practices are 
noted, and corrective procedures are suggested. I t  is not the intent 
of th is  study, however, to recommend that the D is tr ic t make changes in 
its  operations. Rather, the purpose of the case study is to demon­
s tra te  the importance of considering economic effects in the manage­
ment of ground-water basins.
3Sources
A search of the rapidly growing body o f water resources 
lite ra tu re  indicated that certain problems which s ig n ific an tly  a ffe c t 
local water supply decisions have been neglected. A local community 
considering an addition to its  water supply must answer the question: 
Should private firm s, perhaps including private water u t i l i t ie s ,  be 
l e f t  to augment th e ir own supplies, or should the community i ts e lf  
undertake the project? In answering the question the authorities of 
the community would have to consider three complications: (1 ) the
e ffe c t of corporate income taxes on project proposals, (2) the e ffe c t 
of differences in community and corporate costs of c a p ita l, and 
(3) the e ffe c t of economies or diseconomies of scale on project costs. 
Such problems have received inadequate attention in the lite ra tu re .
To determine the e ffe c t of corporate income taxes i t  was neces­
sary to search the lite ra tu re  in the areas of managerial economics, 
corporate finance, and taxation. The newer texts in the area of capi­
ta l budgeting and the standard reference works on taxation were found
to be quite useful.
The case study of the Central and West Basin Water Replenish­
ment D is tr ic t of Los Angeles was made with data obtained from reports 
of the D is tr ic t , publications of the C alifo rn ia  Department o f Water 
Resources, the Los Angeles County Taxpayer's Guide, and the Metropoli­
tan Water D is tr ic t Annual Report for each fis c a l year from 1938 
through 1966.
4Mixh of the background information used in the case study was 
gathered during a f ie ld  t r ip  to Los Angeles in June, 1966. A number 
of people, d ire c tly  involved in the management of the area's water 
supply, were interviewed a t that time. Follow-up interviews were made 
by telephone and la te r  in person, when several people from Los Angeles 
area water agencies traveled to Louisiana State University to p a rt ic i­
pate in a symposium on salt-w ater encroachment into aquifers.
An understanding o f existing ground-water laws was necessary 
background information fo r both the local decision-making model and 
the Replenishment D is tr ic t case study. The Louisiana Water Resources 
Research In s titu te  recently published a handbook on water law (Hardy, 
1966), and the bibliography developed for th a t study by Mrs. Leila 0. 
Cutshaw provided the basis for most of the discussion on ground-water 
law.
Study Plan
Following a b r ie f and elementary treatment o f the basic p rin ­
ciples of hydrology in Chapter I ,  the question of a llocating existing  
water supplies is  examined in Chapter I I .  The basic doctrines that 
underlie water laws in the United States, p a rtic u la rly  in th e ir  a p p li­
cation to ground water, are discussed in the context of th e ir  e ffec t 
on economic effic iency. E fficiency implications of f la t  rate water 
pricing are also b r ie fly  treated.
A model fo r choosing among local water project alternatives  
is  developed and applied with a numerical example in Chapter I I I .  The
5results of using the model are discussed from a welfare standpoint and, 
in th is connection, some of the divergent views on the social rate of 
discount are summarized.
Chapter IV is a case study of the water supply procedures of 
the Central and West Basin Water Replenishment D is tr ic t  of Los Angeles. 
Arrangements used to finance the D is tr ic t's  ground water production 
costs are c r i t ic a l ly  evaluated against the background of estimated 
average and marginal costs. Average and marginal cost calculations 
fo r imported water fo llow , and the method of pricing imported water 
is  analyzed. I t  is shown that existing pricing and financial arrange­
ments lead to an in e ff ic ie n t use of both ground water and imported 
water. The c r ite r ia  fo r e f f ic ie n t ground water-imported water con­
junctive use are then established.
Three major conclusions are lis ted  in Chapter V, the fin a l 
chapter. F irs t ,  i t  is  noted that extant water laws tend to cause 
misallocation of the nation's water resources. The establishment of 
firm  and tradeable water rights would be an improvement in most in ­
stances; however, another approach is suggested fo r  the study area 
because of uncertainty about the future costs of an imported water 
supply. Second, i t  is concluded that a community may undertake a 
project that is  optimal from its  own standpoint, but the result fo r  
the nation as a whole may be misallocated resources. Third, the in ­
e f f ic ie n t practices found in the case study are thought to re su lt, 
in part at le a s t, from the existing water laws which reward
6premature appropriation of supplies.
Ground-Water Hydrology 
Ground-water hydrology is a re la tive ly  new science. Its  de­
velopment had to await the discovery of the fundamental principles of 
geology near the end of the eighteenth century. Although water wells 
had been in use since ancient times, man's prior concept of the origin  
of ground water was a curious mixture of superstition and fau lty  deduc­
tion. In recent years the study of ground-water hydrology has advanced 
s ig n ifican tly . Its  rapid gains are not only the resu lt of extensive 
data gathering in the f ie ld  of hydrology i t s e l f ,  but they have also 
been fed by the explosion o f knowledge in botany, chemistry, physics, 
meteorology and other sciences (Jones, e t a ! . ,  1963, pp. 11-19).
The occurrence of ground water in nature can best be understood 
in the context of the hydrologic cycle—"the endless c ircu la tion  of 
water from the primary reservoir, the ocean, to the atmosphere, the 
land, and back to the ocean over or beneath the land surface" (U.S. 
Geological Survey, 1963, pp. 10-11). Accordingly, a b r ie f discussion 
of the hydrologic cycle is presented below.
The Hydrologic Cycle
Although the hydrologic cycle has neither a beginning nor an 
end, its description usually begins with the oceans which cover more 
than 70 percent of the earth 's surface. The sun's heat evaporates 
water from the oceans into the atmosphere. Normally the vapors are
7in v is ib le  as they leave the ocean surface, but under the proper condi­
tions they form v is ib le  clouds. When certain additional conditions 
are sa tis fied  the moisture contained by clouds condenses and fa lls  
back to earth as some form of p re c ip ita tio n --ra in , h a il ,  s le e t or 
snow. These various forms of prec ip itation  are co llec tive ly  called  
"water of meteoric origin" (Johnson, In c ., 1966, p. 15).
On the average about 30 inches per year of prec ip itation  fa l l  
on the 48 conterminous states of the United States. This represents 
an abundant meteoric water supply compared to that of other nations 
(U.S. Geological Survey, 1963, p. 10). But the characteristics of the 
hydrologic cycle make for a very irreg u la r d istribution  of water in
space as well as in time.
Most of the water which evaporates from the oceans precipitates
again on the oceans. That which fa lls  on land, along with some land-
derived moisture, is precipitated in response to three phenomena:
(1) the movement of large masses of warm, moisture laden a ir  into  
regions of cold a ir ,  (2) the warming of a ir  at the earth's surface 
which causes i t  to rise in large masses into overlying cold a ir ,  and 
(3) the cooling of the a ir  masses in the winds blowing across high 
mountain barriers (Davis and De Wiest, 1966, pp. 17-18).
Meteoric water occurs quite irre g u la rly  with respect to geog­
raphy. The land surfaces nearest the oceans have the greatest oppor­
tun ity  fo r receiving precip itation . In the northern hemisphere the 
prevailing winds are westerly, hence i t  is convenient to begin with
8the West Coast in generalizing about the United States precip itation  
pattern. Evaporated water from the Pacific Ocean is carried by the 
westerlies to the coast. High coastal ranges force the warm and more 
or less water saturated winds to rise and cool. As a resu lt part of 
the moisture contained in the a ir  condenses and fa lls  as some form of 
prec ip ita tion . More precip itation  fa lls  in the cooler northern states. 
Some parts of Washington, in the Coast and Cascade Ranges, receive in 
excess of 100 inches annually. But, north or south, p rec ip itation  
varies d irec tly  with the height of the mountain barriers . As the a ir  
masses move down the coastal ranges they are again warmed and the op­
portunity fo r p rec ip ita tion  is substantially lessened. Desert condi­
tions are found between the coastal range of Southern C alifo rn ia  and 
the Sierra Nevada.
The procedure is repeated as the winds move over the high 
Sierras. P recip itation  increases substantially on the upslope and de­
creases as the a ir  moves downward into the "rain shadow" between the 
Sierras and the Rockies. Meteoric water again increases as the a ir  
moves upward to the Continental Divide and another, less pronounced, 
rain shadow is seen to the east of the Rocky Mountains. Farther to the 
east, prec ip itation  is influenced by the P ac ific , the Gulf of Mexico 
and the A tla n tic . Lands lying closest to the warm Gulf waters receive 
the most p rec ip ita tio n , and in general more precip itation  is found 
near the Gulf and A tlan tic  coasts than fa rth er inland (U.S. Geological 
Survey, 1963, pp. 10-12). Figure 1-1 is a map showing average annual
9precip itation in the conterminous United States over a 40-year period.
The effects of mountain ranges—Coastal, S ierras, Rockies and Appa­
lachians—are c learly  seen on the precip itation  "contours".
The Complete Cycle
Of the 30 inches average of water that fa lls  on the United 
States the major portion--approximately 21 or 22 inches —is vaporized.
The remainder appears on or below the land surface (Kazmann, 1965, p. 4 ). 
Some evaporation of water, not included in the 30-inch average precip i­
ta tion  figure , occurs in the a ir  between the clouds and the land sur­
face. The remaining evaporation takes two forms: (1) d irect evapora­
tion from wet surfaces, and (2) transpiration through plants from th e ir  
leaves and stems. P recip itation adhering to trees and other vegetation, 
which is called "intercepted water," accounts fo r a large portion of 
to ta l evaporation (De Wiest, 1965, pp. 15, 37-50). C o llec tive ly , 
evaporation and transpiration are called "evapotranspiration." The 8 
or 9 inches not returned to the atmosphere in a vaporous form, except 
the evaporation from surface channels, is termed "runoff." Runoff ap­
proximates the nation's, potential available water supply, i f  conversion 
of sea water to fresh water and other recent technological advances are 
ignored. While runoff eventually appears on the surface as streams, i t  
is not solely a surface phenomenon since i t  includes ground water dis­
charge.
Ground water formation results from percolation of p rec ip ita ­
tion through permeable so il. The force of gravity moves ground water
30
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FIGURE 1-1. Average Annual Precipitation (Inches) in the United States 
fo r the Period 1899-1938 
Source: U.S. Weather Bureau.
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down-dip through a llu v ia l deposits, or through porous rock, gravel or 
sand lying between re la tiv e ly  impermeable s tra ta . Ultimately the 
ground water may reappear a t the surface in artesian springs or seeps, 
or i t  may discharge below sea level to the oceans. Much the larger 
part o f ground water discharge reaches surface streams, a fa c t which 
keeps them flowing even during dry periods (U.S. Geological Survey,
1963, pp. 10-16). The streams and riv e rs , of course, flow downhill 
into the oceans. The discharge to the oceans o f over 90% o f to ta l 
runoff completes the cycle (H irs h le ife r  et a l . ,  p. 19). Figure 1-2 
is a schematic drawing of the hydrologic cycle in its  en tire ty .
Ground Water
Ground water is becoming an increasingly important water supply 
source. I t  is a surprising fact that less than 3% of the world's 
available flu id  fresh water occurs in streams and lakes. Because we 
see and hear a great deal about large and expensive surface water 
projects, we tend to think of surface water as the largest potential 
source of supply, but 97% of the earth 's water inventory lies  under­
ground (Johnson, In c ., 1966, pp. 5 -6 ). Underground flow comprises an 
estimated 33 to 40% of this nation's to ta l runoff on the average, and 
the average is greatly exceeded in certain areas (H irsh le ife r et a l . , 
I960, p. 19). Not a ll  of the ground water is available at a currently  
economical cost, however, hence 81 percent of the present United States 
water supply is drawn from surface sources. Nevertheless, f iv e  states —
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Arkansas, Arizona, M ississippi, New Mexico and South Dakota—depend on 
ground water fo r over h a lf of th e ir  to ta l water supplies. Eight other 
states—C alifo rn ia , F lorida, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas 
and Vermont--use ground water for between 25 and 50 percent of th e ir  
water use, and in another 13 states ground water supplies 10-25 percent 
of to ta l needs (Todd, 1959, pp. 6 -8 ).
Total Water Demand and Supply
The present supply of usable water in the conterminous United 
States is roughly equivalent to the average runoff of some 1,200 b ill io n  
gallons per day. In I960 to ta l water withdrawals amounted to 270 bgd 
or 22 percent of the to ta l (U.S. Geological Survey, 1962, pp. 1-26).
Of the to ta l withdrawals, however, consumptive use accounted fo r only 
60 bgd, thus 210 bgd was returned to watercourses and available fo r  
fu rther use. In 1961, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Water Re­
sources estimated that water withdrawals would to ta l about 559 bgd in 
1980 and that consumptive use would be approximately 190 bgd. By 
2000 withdrawals and consumptive use are projected to be 888 bgd and 
253 bgd respectively. To find the to ta l quantities of "streamflow 
required" the minimum quantity needed fo r acceptable pollution abate­
ment must be added to the consumptive use figures. Thus water demand 
is  expected to to ta l 523 bgd in 1980 and 700 bgd in 2000, with ground 
water providing an increasing proportion of the to ta l supply. The 
estimated demand for the year 2000 is nearly 60 percent of the to ta l 
available supply, and the rate of increase in demand, i f  continued,
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would outstrip the available supply during the next century (U.S. 
Geological Survey, 1963, pp. 79-85).
The country's supply of water may be considered unlim ited, 
however, fo r a number of reasons. The usable water supply can be in ­
creased without l im it ,  fo r a ll practical purposes. F irs t , a large 
part of what is now considered "consumptive use" is "consumptive" only 
because the fa c i l i t ie s  do not ex is t to reclaim the water. Sewage 
water can be treated and reused. Second, evapotranspiration is now 
responsible for a s ig n ifican t amount of consumptive use of water. 
Water-loving plants, or phreatophytes, grow on the edges of water 
courses or the shores of reservoirs. Control o f these phreatophytes 
has already resulted in some reduction in water wastage. Further 
savings can be effected by controlling evapotranspiration in 
agricultural ir r ig a tio n . Much is  already known about the adaption of 
crops to water consumption constraints. Evaporation suppression on 
reservoirs, by any of a number of methods of reducing water surface 
exposure, also holds promise. Third, improved irr ig a tio n  methods can 
be applied to reduce seepage and conveyance losses. Fourth, weather 
modification may add considerably to usable water supplies at some 
future date. F in a lly , a number of methods have been developed for  
converting sea water to fresh water, although the present cost is 
s t i l l  p roh ib itive ly  high where almost any alternative source of water 
is available (Ackerman, 1965, pp. 450-67; U.S. Geological Survey,
1963, pp. 93-100).
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The Myth of Water Shortage
I t  is  frequently stated that the United States is suffering, 
or w il l  su ffe r, from a severe water shortage in the near future unless
immediate conservation measures are undertaken (Carhart, 1959,
pp. 13-29). In the preceding section, however, the opposite conclu­
sion was drawn, but to say that the supply of water is v ir tu a lly  un­
lim ited is to leave part o f the story untold. I t  must also be recog­
nized that additional supplies of water can be obtained only by putting  
increasingly large amounts of our resources into water production. 
Conversion of sea water to fresh water, which is now feasib le , could 
take care of man's water requirements forever. The un it cost of de­
sa lin iza tio n  of water, however, is presently many times higher than
the unit cost of water produced by other methods. As of 1962, the
cost of desalting seawater stood a t nearly $400 per acre-foot, or 
considerably over one do lla r per thousand gallons (Linsley and Fran- 
z in i ,  1964, p. 440). In contrast, evaporation of fresh water can be 
prevented by spreading a one-molecule thick substance, such as cetyl 
alcohol, on its  surface fo r about $40 per acre-foot or one-tenth the 
cost of desalinization (U.S. Geological Survey, 1963, pp. 93-94). At 
present, however, even th is procedure costs a great deal more than the 
normal unit cost o f producing water. In Chapter IV , fo r example, i t  
is shown that average to ta l cost o f Colorado River water, delivered 
through a 242-mile long aqueduct and then softened and f i l te r e d , has 
recently been fu lly  covered by charging no more than $40 per acre-foot.
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And this source is probably among the most expensive being used in 
the United States today.
In summation, while i t  may be said that there can be no such
thing as a "shortage" of water, i t  must be recognized that water w ill
become more costly as future demands increase. This nation can obtain 
a ll the additional water which its  people may desire, as long as its
people are w illin g  and able to pay the rising cost.
Glossary and Measurements 
I t  should be h e lp fu l, a t this point, to define some technical 
terms and to provide some measurement conversions which appear in the 
chapters to fo llow .(M iln e , 1968, pp. 143-44; Jones et a l . ,  1963, 
pp. 33-35).
Acre-foot. The volume of water required to cover one acre to a depth 
of one foot.
Alluvium. Soil or earth material that has been deposited by running 
water or floods.
Aquifer. A s tra ta , formation, or group of formations, which are
porous, permeable, and water-bearing and have hydraulic continuity. 
Artesian (o r Pressure) Aquifer. A confined aquifer in which the water 
is under a pressure that is s u ffic ie n t to cause the water to rise  
above the bottom of the overlying and impervious confining bed.
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Fault. A fracture or fracture zone in the earth along which strata  
are displaced. The displacement may result in an aquifer being 
cut-o ff from the water source.
Forebay. An area containing unconfined ground water and which has 
hydraulic continuity with the ground surface.
Ground Water. Subsurface water that occurs in , and moves through, 
an aquifer.
Ground-Water Basin. A ground-water storage area.
Hydraulic Gradient. The line joining the elevations to which water 
would rise in wells that are screened in the confined aquifer.
Hydrology. The applied science concerned with the waters of the
earth's hydrologic cycle of p rec ip ita tion , storage, in f i l t r a t io n ,  
evaporation, runoff and disposal of water.
Percolation. The movement, under hydrostatic pressure, of water 
through the pores of rock or s o il .
Permeability. The a b i l i ty  of a material to transmit a f lu id  through 
i ts  pores under given conditions.
Piezometric Surface. An imaginary surface that everywhere coincides 
with the s ta tic  level of water in an aquifer or artesian basin.
I t  is the surface to which the water in the aquifer or basin would 
rise i f  afforded the opportunity to do so.
Pressure Area. A ground surface area underlain by an aquifer contain­
ing confined ground water.
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Transmissibi l i t y , Coefficient o f . The amount o f water in gallons per 
day which w il l  pass through a one-foot wide vertical s tr ip  of the 
aquifer under a hydraulic gradient of one foot per foot.
Selected Water Measurement Values
Area:
1 acre = 4.356(10^) sq. f t .
1 sq. mile = 640 acres.
Volume:
1 million gal. = 3.07 acre -ft .
1 thousand gal. = 3.07(10”^) ac re -ft .
1 m illion a c re -f t .  = 3.259(10®) m illion gal.
1 ac re -ft .  = 3.259(105) gal.
Discharge:
o
1 ac re -ft .  per day = 2.26(10 ) gal. per min.
1 ac re -ft .  per day = 3.26(10*^) m illion gal. per day.
1 a c re -f t .  per day = 5.05(10"^) cubic f t .  per sec.
Miscellaneous:
1 ft .w ater = 0.4335 lbs. per sq. in.
To l i f t  1 gal. water 1 f t .  requires 3.15(10"®) kilowatt-hours.
CHAPTER I I
ALLOCATION OF EXISTING SUPPLIES
Water is an economic good or resource which exhibits the essen­
t ia l  qualities of a ll  other economic goods or resources. I t  is quite 
clear from the facts presented in Chapter I that water exists abun­
dantly in nature. Nevertheless i t  is also clear that water supplies 
can be obtained for human use only through the application of varying 
amounts of scarce resources. Like the production of other economic 
goods water production must eventually obey the law of diminishing 
returns. For any given location and fo r any given state of water 
production technology, increased water output is ultimately associated 
with increasing marginal and average costs. One lo ca lity  may experi­
ence fa l l in g  costs for production from one source but resorting to new 
sources results in rising marginal and average costs in the long run 
(H irsh le ife r  e t a l . , 1960, pp. 95-96). Society may develop additional 
water supplies, i f  i t  desires, but only by paying higher unit costs.
I f  scarce resources are diverted to additional water production, 
society w ill  gain only i f  i t  values the additional water more than i t  
values the production of the other economic goods foregone as a result 
of the resource diversion.
I t  may seem t r iv ia l  to point out that water is l ik e  other eco­
nomic goods, yet h is to rica lly  this fa c t has apparently never been
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clearly  understood. Indeed, economists themselves have not always 
recognized the relationship between water and other economic goods. 
Furthermore, there is ample evidence that today's professionals who 
are charged with obtaining or allocating water supplies, feel that,  
somehow, "water is d iffe ren t."
The misunderstanding probably springs from two bits of knowl­
edge: (1) that water is_ in abundant supply, and (2) that man cannot
survive without a source of water fo r drinking and other purposes.
These observations evidently prompted Adam Smith to distinguish be­
tween "value in use" and "value in exchange" in the famous "diamond- 
water paradox" passage from his Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776, 
p. 28). Smith supposed diamonds to have market value but no value 
in use, and water to have a high value in use but no value in the mar­
ket place. The second fa c t ,  that man cannot l ive  without water, has 
been largely responsible for laws which have elevated water above 
other economic goodsJ
The objectives of this chapter are threefold. F irs t ,  a b r ie f  
exposition of existing water laws is presented with emphasis placed on 
state laws as they pertain to ground-water production. Second, the 
conditions for optimal allocation of water resources are discussed, 
and some of the present water laws are shown generally to violate
Vhe U.S. Supreme Court's recognition that "water is a valuable 
resource and essential to l i f e "  underlies i ts  acceptance of state 
regulation of water resources (Boerschinger, 1965, p. 128).
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these conditions. I t  is shown further that the practice of se lling  
water on a f l a t  rate basis also mi sallocates resources. Third, im­
provements in existing water laws and practices are implied and con­
clusions are drawn which bear importantly on the chapters to follow.
Water Law in the United States
The Riparian Doctrine
In general, water law in the United States can be divided into
two d is tin c t classifications. The eastern states have tra d it io n a lly
adhered to the riparian doctrine of water law. Western states have
generally followed the doctrine of appropriation. State water laws
o
are subject to considerable variation and overlap. In particu lar,  
a number of western states have laws incorporating both riparian and 
appropriative rules (Kazmann, 1965, pp. 201-202).
The common law riparian doctrine holds that the owner of land 
bordering a stream, r iv e r  or body of water is en tit led  to take water 
fo r use upon his land (Doyle, 1950, p. 405). The water r igh t is in ­
separable from the t i t l e  to the land i t s e l f  (Davenport and Canales, 
1956, p. 283) although, as is also the case with an appropriative 
r ig h t ,  the riparian right is merely usufructuary as opposed to private  
ownership o f the corpus of the water i t s e l f  (H irsh le ife r  e t a l . ,  1960,
2
The discussion of water law in this chapter is lim ited to 
b r ie f  generalizations about existing laws. Anomalies, which may be 
found in the laws of individual states, w ill  be ignored except when 
they are considered to be of particular significance to this study.
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p. 231).
Riparian water users along a stream are said to have coequal 
r ights . The f i r s t  user of the flow of a stream gains no p r io r ity  over 
subsequent users. In theory, the riparian user may u t i l iz e  the water 
bordering his land, but must return the water to the stream in view 
of the rights of downstream landowners. In the extreme, then, there 
would be no consumptive use of water. Water would be returned to its  
original course by a l l  users until i t  flowed into the ocean. Courts 
have long recognized the great economic waste which results from such 
a position and have held that each riparian owner has a right to 
diminish the stream flow as long as the water consumed is put to 
"reasonable" use. In the event a use is contested, its  "reasonable­
ness" is passed upon by the courts. What is considered "reasonable" 
during periods of normal precipitation may be adjudged "unreasonable" 
during times of drought. Rights are not lost by non-use and reason­
ableness may be reevaluated with a change in circumstances (Trelease, 
1965, pp. 272-89).
States which hold to the riparian doctrine for surface waters 
extend i t  also to ground-water production. The legal principle of 
"reasonableness" is usually applied to any defin ite underground stream 
which is a source or continuation o f a surface watercourse. Percolat­
ing water, ground water which is not a part of a defin ite underground 
watercourse, is subject to three variations in the basic riparian
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doctrine.
F irs t ,  some states apply the English common law rule of absolute 
ownership. An owner of overlying land may make use of percolating 
waters in any manner which he deems best. He need not consider the 
e ffe c t of his withdrawals on the water supplies of his neighbors.
Second, a number of courts in the eastern United States have 
extended the principle of "reasonableness" to a l l  ground-water produc­
tion. A landowner whose water supply is adversely affected by the 
pumpage of a neighbor may seek remedy in the courts.
The th ird subdoctrine of riparian law is known as the "correla­
t ive  rights rule," which developed in the states of California and 
Utah. This rule requires not only reasonable use, but also adds the 
requirement that surface owners have equal or proportional rights in 
the common pool of ground water. Water rights are adjudicated under 
this rule. Pumpers with records of large "reasonable" use records re­
ceive larger quotas re la tive  to those with records of lesser usage 
(Kirkwood, 1948, pp. 2-4).
The Doctrine of Appropriation
In contrast to the riparian doctrine, the doctrine of appro­
priation presupposes that the r igh t to use flowing water is a right
3
The distinction between ground water and surface water is 
highly unscientific; moreover, the separation of ground water into 
two types is even less valid. P ractically  a l l  usable water is me­
teoric  (from precipitation) and seeks a level by moving e ith er  over 
or under the surface (Foley, 1957, pp. 495-96).
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apart from the t i t l e  to adjacent lands (Davenport and Canaless 1956, 
p. 283). The appropriative doctrine may be stated simply as " f i r s t  in 
time f i r s t  in r ight."  Water rights may be obtained by a person merely 
by diverting water to his use. The user need be neither a riparian  
nor a landowner (Boerschinger, 1965, p. 110). Prior appropriators 
have preference over la te r ,  or " junior," users.
The appropriative doctrine was developed and s t i l l  prevails in 
the western United States. In the humid and "water surplus" East most 
economic demands for water can be satis fied  by using the riparian  
rule (H irsh le ife r  et a l . ,  1960, pp. 232-33). In the arid western 
states i t  was only natural that a need would be f e l t  to divert water 
from its  normal watercourses to non-riparian land. The appropriative 
system developed out of this need.
Courts do not normally pass on the "reasonableness" of water 
use in the states that adhere to the doctrine of appropriation. All 
that is usually required is that the water appropriated be put to a 
"benefic ial," or non-wasteful use (Breitenstein, 1950, p. 346). A 
usufructuary right of an absolute nature is granted a prior appro- 
pria tor which allows him to consume water even at the expense of sub­
sequently sought domestic uses (Gross, 1965, p. 265). Except where 
statutes provide for regulation by an administrative agency, the use 
of appropriated water need not be "reasonable" in relation to the 
rights of others. A senior appropriative right which is put to bene­
f ic ia l  use may be taken only through a procedure of condemnation and
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jus t compensation (B ell, 1965, pp. 382-85). Prior appropriators are 
protected against junior appropriators and ju n ior users are protected 
against increased usage by senior users. In time of drought, however, 
junior appropriators may have th e ir  water supplies cut o ff completely 
while senior users continue to take their fu l l  quotas (H irsh le ife r,  
et a l . ,  I960, p. 236).
Not a l l  of the western states adhere exclusively to the doc­
tr ine of appropriation. Some states, C aliforn ia for example, hold
both riparian and appropriative doctrines. Only eight of the seventeen
4western states have e x p lic it ly  repudiated the riparian rule. In these 
eight states the appropriative rule is applied to percolating ground 
water (H irsh le ife r  et a l . , 1960, p. 233).
In terstate Regulation of Water
In terstate water rights have been established e ither through 
in terstate  compacts or by the federal government under the commerce 
clause of the Constitution. Although in tersta te  compacts have some­
times been entered into, state legislatures are usually reluctant to 
surrender rights fo r  a period of years except under the most urgent 
circumstances. In recent years the federal government has increased 
i ts  control over interstate streams and tr ibutaries  of interstate
4The eight states which have repudiated the riparian doctrine 
are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and 
Wyoming. The remaining nine states are C aliforn ia , Kansas, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Washington.
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streams. Originally federal ju risd iction  was limited to waters which 
are navigable in fact. Control has now been expanded to include any 
r ive r  even remotely susceptible of being used in navigation (Forer, 
1961, pp. 337-43).
Water Law Trends
In 1957, the leg is la ture  of Iowa established a new water 
rights act. The act decrees that a ll  uses of water must be "bene­
f ic ia l"  and prohibits the diversion or taking of water for most uses 
without a permit from the Water Commissioner (O'Connell, 1962, p. 551). 
Permits are given for short periods of time only. Other eastern 
states are beginning to follow the lead of Iowa by sh ifting toward 
administrative control of water resources.
In the West, state ownership and control of water resources—a 
trend which has arisen only recently in the East—has been accepted for  
some time. In a l l  of the 17 western states laws have declared water to 
be the property of the state or its  people (H irsh le ife r  et a l . ,  1960, 
p. 248).
Transferab ility  of Water Rights
In general, water rights cannot be transferred from one person 
to another. Riparian doctrine holds that the landowner has the r ight 
to use water which borders his land, but this right cannot usually be 
extended to non-riparian land nor can i t  be sold. Appropriative law 
is somewhat more f le x ib le . Appropriated water need not be used on
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riparian land, and some states allow, for transfer from one user to 
another. Other states, however, do not allow sale or exchange of 
rights and even prohibit transferring the water from the use for which 
i t  was orig ina lly  appropriated (H irsh le ife r  et a l . ,  1960, pp. 239-42).
The new trends, toward control of water rights by the federal
i
government or by state administrative bodies, may result in even less 
f l e x ib i l i t y  in the private transfer of water rights. The new approach 
seems to embrace the idea that private ownership of water is something 
to be avoided. Water should belong to a l l  the people, hence the a l lo ­
cation of water should be accomplished through public agencies. When 
the need arises public agencies can transfer water from "less impor­
tant" to "more important" uses.
Summary
The nation's existing water supplies are allocated, for the 
most part, under two d istinct types of state water rules—the riparian  
and appropriative doctrines. The riparian doctrine lim its ownership 
of water to owners of land contiguous to surface or "underground" 
watercourses. Under the doctrine of appropriation, water rights are 
gained by diverting water from a natural watercourse and putting i t  to 
"beneficial" use. A riparian r igh t may be lost i f  the water use is 
not "reasonable" as interpreted by the courts with domestic use usually 
receiving top p r io r ity . Appropriated water use need not be "reasonable" 
in the sense that i t  must be gauged against a hierarchy of p r io r it ie s ,  
but i t  must e ither be used "b enefic ia lly ,"  a matter also subject to
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court interpretation in contested cases, or allowed to continue down 
i ts  original watercourse.
In the main, neither of these doctrines provide firm water 
rights which may be sold in the marketplace. And the trend is not 
toward establishing tran sfe rab le  private rights. On the contrary, 
more recent water law seems to repudiate private rights in favor of 
public ownership.
Optimal Allocation of Water 
An optimal allocation of water requires (1) that the values in 
use^ to each user be equated at the margin and (2) that the common 
marginal value in use be equal to the marginal social cost. This is 
a specialization of a general theorem of welfare economics which will 
be taken without proof. I f  there is more than one source of water, 
the resource is optimally allocated when the marginal social 
costs of a l l  sources of water are equated provided, of course, that
5This study follows H irsh le ifer e t  a l . (1960, p. 37) in borrow­
ing the term "value in use" from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776, 
p. 28) to denote the value to society of a given quantity of water. I f  
social costs or revenues are equal to private costs or revenues, and i f  
perfect competition prevails, marginal value in use may be taken to 
be the demand price at a given quantity when water is a product, or the 
value of the marginal product of water when i t  is an input.
^For a proof of the general theorem see Samuelson (1958, 
pp. 229-46), and for the derivation from welfare economics of benefit- 
cost analysis applied to water resource development see Eckstein (1958, 
pp. 70-75).
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the f i r s t  condition is satisfied .
Assuming (1) that perfect competition exists in both product 
and factor markets, (2) that private demand does not d i f fe r  from 
social demand for water, and (3) that marginal private costs of water 
include a l l  social costs, a system of private ownership of rights and 
market prices w il l  bring about optimal allocation of a community's 
water resources.
Demand fo r  water is inversely related to its  price. Where 
water is used as a consumable commodity the rational consumer would 
u t i l iz e  precisely the quantity of water which equates his marginal 
value in use with the supply price of water. Additional units of 
consumption would y ie ld  less satisfaction than the ir  cost, thus calling  
fo r a reduction in use. Using a smaller than optimal quantity would 
result in marginal benefits greater than cost a t the margin, and this 
would call for additional consumption.
The factor market would operate s im ilarly . To maximize profits  
a firm would u t i l iz e  water to the point where the supply price is 
equated to the value of the marginal product of water to the firm. 
Additional units would cost more than the revenue obtained by their  
application. Using less than the optimal amount would result in mar­
ginal revenues exceeding marginal costs prodding the entrepreneur
into a greater use of the input.
Any owner of water rights would use water to the point of
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maximum satisfaction or p ro f i ts s no more and no less. One having 
rights in excess of his needs would sell his surplus rights. One 
with a deficiency, or with no rights at a l l ,  would buy water rights 
until the marginal cost of additional rights and his marginal value 
in use were equated. In a perfect market, the result would be one 
water price, for any given total usage, which would be equal to the 
marginal value in use for any user. Users whose marginal values in 
use exceed the supply price of water and hence the marginal value to 
other users, would buy additional r ights, thus bidding up the price 
of water rights. Simultaneously, other users would experience a rise 
in opportunity costs which would exceed th e ir  marginal values in use, 
hence they would se ll rights and reduce th e ir  water u t i l iza t io n  to 
the point where th e ir  marginal values in use would once more equal 
marginal cost.^
Impediments to Market Optimization
Optimum allocation may not be achieved by a system of market 
prices for several reasons. .First, firms purchasing water or produc­
ing water under conditions of constant cost may se ll th e ir  outputs in 
markets characterized by imperfect competition, in which case the
?A schematic representation of the marginal value in use- 
marginal cost equating effect of a perfect market in water rights is 
presented in Figure 4-6, Chapter IV.
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water resource may be used only up to the point where its  marginal
revenue product is equal to its  marginal cost. Here, water is under­
u t i l ize d  as the value of its  marginal product or the value of the 
incremental unit to society is greater than i ts  cost. In view of the
findings to be presented in the case study of Chapter IV, and in view
of the contention that current water pricing policies lead to under- 
pricing and over-building in water (H irsh le ife r  et a l . ,  1960, 
pp. 107-13) the imperfect competition overpricing and underutilization  
problem is worth mentioning.
A second reason why water supplies may not be optimally a l lo ­
cated by private ownership of rights and a market price system is that
marginal private costs which are relevant to producer or user decisions
do not re f le c t  marginal social costs. This has been well recognized
8in the l i te ra tu re .  Marginal private costs may understate marginal 
social costs e ither because of external diseconomies or because some 
of the costs associated with increased use are transferred to society. 
Perhaps the classic example of diseconomies is the case of the common 
ground-water pool where increased pumpage by one well owner can lower 
water levels and hence raise marginal pumping costs fo r other users, 
while his own marginal pumping cost may remain constant or even f a l l  
as a result of the decreasing power costs frequently associated with 
increased pumpage. In this instance true marginal social costs are
Q
For a discussion and l i s t  of references on external effects 
see Mishan (1964, pp. 98-154).
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not reflected in the costs of the individual whose pumpage increases. 
The marginal social cost of the production of the increment may only 
be determined by summing the added costs which are imposed upon all 
the well owners drawing from the common pool. Another type of external 
e ffe c t ,  to be demonstrated in Chapter IV , can be created by financing 
added water supplies or aquifer protection by ad valorem taxes thus 
transforming a cost which is variable from the standpoint of society 
into one which is fixed with respect to changes in water usage.
When a large water supply project incurs substantial fixed 
costs and operates with excess capacity, i f  the price is set a t  a 
level high enough to cover average total cost i t  overstates marginal 
social cost and water is underutilized. Another possible cause of 
underutilization, external economies, may cause private costs to over­
state social costs; however, this possib ility  does not seem important 
in the area of water resources.
F ina lly , for a private rights-market price system to achieve 
optimal a llocation, the market must be strong and active. A "perfect" 
market depends on perfect knowledge of prices. In the real world 
the market in rights w i l l  be weak unless adequate knowledge of a lte r ­
natives is available to prospective traders. Chapter IV discusses a 
situation where a tradeable ground-water rights system fa i ls  to operate 
e f f ic ie n t ly  because future prices of a supplementary water source can­
not be known with reasonable certainty by prospective sellers or 
buyers.
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Free Market or Administrative Control?
A system of private ownership of rights and market prices w il l  
optimally allocate water, subject to the exceptions noted above. The 
question which naturally arises is: Do the exceptions provide s u f f i ­
cient ju s t if ic a t io n  for abandoning the idea of private ownership and 
a private market in water rights? Each exception must be considered 
separately to provide the answer.
Imperfect competition, to the extent that i t  does ex ist in 
the economy, does pose a problem. A decision in favor of a free mar­
ket in water rights may or may not be in the direction of economic 
efficiency i f  market imperfections exist elsewhere in the economy 
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956-1957, pp. 11-32; McManus, 1959, 
pp. 209-22; Lipsey and Lancaster, 1959, pp. 225-26; Mishan, 1962, 
pp. 205-17). I t  seems reasonable, however, to in s is t  that this need 
not be taken as an argument against providing a free market in water 
rights; rather i t  may be considered an argument against the existence 
of imperfect competition in the economy. I f  imperfect competition is 
to be taken as a parameter which cannot be altered, there are few 
suggestions for economic welfare which may be offered in the absence 
of a complete knowledge of the social welfare function. The United 
States government, however, is committed to the elimination of serious 
market imperfections, and this analysis is based on the assumption 
that the government w i l l  be reasonably successful in this endeavor.
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External diseconomies, or marginal social costs exceeding 
marginal private costs, may be eliminated by application of a tax or 
pumpage charge levied on each unit of production. Either external 
economies or economies of scale may be handled by subsidizing each 
unit of production.
Ineffic iency created by imperfect knowledge cannot be e lim i­
nated by a free market in water rights per se. A procedure for hand­
ling a case where imperfect knowledge exists, however, is presented 
in Chapter IV.
I t  should be stressed here that nothing in this section m i l i ­
tates against a system of firm tradeable private property rights in 
water. In fa c t ,  a strong presumption exists that the best system of 
water laws would provide for private ownership and unlimited sale and 
transfer of water rights. I f  administrative control is warranted be­
cause of any of the problems raised above, i t  can probably rely on 
tax, subsidy or pricing measures and be applied in conjunction with a 
private market in rights. Failing th is , i t  can attempt to simulate the 
resource allocation effects of the free market by applying appropriate 
regulation.
An Evaluation of Existing Water Laws
Existing water laws, i t  has been noted, do not provide firm  
water rights. Riparian states usually do not allow for the sale or 
transfer of water rights. While the law in appropriative doctrine 
states is somewhat more f le x ib le ,  i t  frequently suffers from the same
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defect.
Present water laws frequently operate to misallocate the na­
tion's water resources. Owners of water r ights , i f  not limited in 
their use of water, w i l l  maximize satisfaction (or pro fits ) by using
all rights for which marginal gains exceed marginal costs. A riparian  
rights owner, however, may be forced by the "reasonable use" rule to 
curtail his use short of the optimal quantity, and the rights of an 
appropriative rights owner may be insuffic ient to satisfy  current 
demands. Furthermore, prospective users who f a i l  to gain water rights 
are l e f t  with unsatisfied wants. Water w il l  not be put into its  
highest valued use under a system which grants rights to some users 
but does not allow sale to others. Total welfare would normally be 
enhanced i f  present rights owners v/ere allowed to sell rights and 
thus sa tis fy  values in use which at the margin, exceed.their own--a 
situation that is prevented by existing water law.
The Use of Flat Rates
The use of f l a t  rates fo r  water sold to domestic consumers 
also poses a problem. Although most domestic water is now metered, 
f la t  rates may be found in a few of the largest c it ies  including New 
York and Chicago (H irsh le ife r  e t  a l . , 1960, p. 44). Instead of 
charges which may vary according to the quantity used, a f l a t  monthly 
connection charge is collected from residential users in these c it ies .
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An important virtue of the price system is its  a b i l i ty  to 
ration water in such a way that i t  is put to highly valued uses only.
A properly regulated or administered municipal water u t i l i t y  w il l  
have a price schedule which equates the marginal cost of water to 
total demand. At this point total welfare is at a maximum. Greater 
use would mean that, at the margin, the cost of water to society is 
greater than the value to society. The use of f l a t  rates has the e f ­
fect of causing a greater than optimal use. The "extra" resources 
required to produce the "surplus" water would be of greater value to
q
society i f  they were put into other uses.
Figure 2-1 i l lu s tra tes  the problem. The demand curve for a 
municipality is represented by DD'. Marginal costs are MM'. Properly 
set rates and metering of water w il l  result in the use of quantity OA. 
Since demand may be taken as a measure of marginal u t i l i t y  or marginal 
value in use, net value in use, or total value in use less total cost, 
is maximized at that point. Use of f l a t  rates w i l l  cause water users 
to use water to point D' where additional use would have zero or 
negative value. While there i_s_ a price being paid for the water 
under f la t - r a te  pricing, i t  causes consumers to use water as i f  the 
price were zero, for the f l a t  rate w il l  be paid no matter what quantity
Flat rates on water, however, have long been ju s t i f ie d  with a 
social revenue argument. I t  has been held that f la t - r a te  pricing w il l  
benefit public health, since i t  w i l l  promote personal cleanliness 
among the masses (Sleeman, 1955, pp. 231-45).
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FIGURE 2-1. The Effect of Charging Flat 
Rates for Water
38
is taken. I t ,  therefore, behooves consumers to use a l l  units of water 
which have positive value to them. This results in an economic loss 
to society which may be measured by the triangle CBD'J®
Summary of Chapter
Misconceptions about the nature of water are common. I t  has 
been a primary in tent of this Chapter to dispel the mistaken notion 
that water is "something special." Water, i t  is held, is quite like  
any other economic good or resource. The decision of whether or not 
additional supplies of water should be sought depends on the valuation 
of these additional supplies re la t ive  to the value of alternative  
goods which could instead be obtained with the same amount of sacri- 
f  i ce.
An analysis of water laws makes i t  clear that water is given 
a special place among resources. Two doctrines of water law, appro­
pria tive  and r iparian , prevail in the United States. Under these 
doctrines the r ig h t to water is generally treated as an untradeable 
commodity, though appropriative doctrine does allow for some trading 
and is probably better suited as a basis for improving water laws 
(Trelease, 1957, pp. 301-22). The current trend, however, is toward
This assumes, of course, that each potential customer is 
w illin g  to pay the f la t  rate, or to put i t  another way, the area 
under each individual demand curve must represent a total value in 
use per unit of time that is greater than the f l a t  price charged for  
the same period o f  time.
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more, not less jud ic ia l and administrative control of water.
The goal of optimal allocation of water resources can usually 
be best served by ordaining and maintaining a system of tradeable 
private water rights. When any of the previously enumerated problems 
occur they can be corrected by superimposing certain measures, such 
as charges or subsidies, upon the basic tradeable rights-market price 
system.
Existing water laws tend to misallocate resources because 
they do not result in water's being put to i ts  highest valued uses. 
Further misallocation of present water supplies results from the now 
diminishing practice of charging f l a t  rates for residential water.
The e ffec t of this practice is an over commitment of resources to 
water production. The indicated correctives would be to begin 
treating water like any other economic good--making i t  subject to 
unconditional ownership, allowing i t  to be purchased or sold at w i l l ,  
but taking measures to assure that the price of water reflects its  
marginal social cost.
In the following chapters i t  w il l  be assumed that the existing  
legal barriers to economic efficiency can be eliminated. In particu­
la r  i t  w i l l  be assumed, in Chapter I I I ,  that the community as a whole 
has no legal advantage over individuals in obtaining additional water
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1 1supplies. The analysis of Chapter IV incorporates the assumption 
that the elimination of existing water quotas in West and Central 
Basins of Los Angeles poses no insoluble problem of leg a lity  or con­
s t i tu t io n a l i ty .
The fac t that the community does have at least one advantage, 
the r ight of eminent domain, only strengthens a major conclusion of 
Chapter 111--that a community project is l ik e ly  to be chosen over a 
corporate a lternative . Any such legal advantage, however, is excluded 
from the model which considers cost advantages only.
CHAPTER I I I  
DECISIONS TO AUGMENT EXISTING SUPPLIES1
Water w il l  be e f f ic ie n t ly  allocated i f  a sound legal framework 
and an e f f ic ie n t  pricing system have been established. The e f f ic ie n t  
allocation of existing supplies is a condition necessarily precedent 
to rational decisions regarding the development of additional water 
supplies. Otherwise i t  w ill  not be clear when demand is - increasing at 
a rate that warrants investment in new water-producing f a c i l i t ie s .  New 
sources may be prematurely developed under water laws which do not allow 
trading of rights or under pricing policies which cause overutilization  
of water.
A community's increasing water demands may prompt i t  to con­
sider investment in new supplies. Decisions regarding additions to , 
or replacement o f, existing ground-water supplies involve costs that 
occur over time. On the one hand, a decision to undertake a project 
supplying water commits the community to an investment of resources 
not only in the present but a.lso over the l i f e  of the project. A de­
cision to take no action, on the other hand, may postpone large ex­
penditures but such a decision is not without costs.
The costs attached to inaction represent increased pumping
^uch of the material in this chapter has been drawn from two 
papers (Falk and Stober, 1966; Stober and Falk, 1967, pp. 328-35).
Direct references to these writings have been omitted from the text.
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costs as water levels are reduced by pumpage in excess of natural re­
charge, costs associated with a reduction in water use, costs occa­
sioned by land subsidence, or costs of privately undertaken supply 
projects. These costs accrue to industry in the form of an increase 
in the price of water, an input, and to the community in general in 
the form of lost satisfaction or, in the case of land subsidence, in 
the form of property damage.
Water is both an input to industry and a commodity to residen­
t ia l  consumers. The demand for industrial water is a function of its  
marginal productivity. A profit-maximizing firm w ill use water to the 
point where its  cost is equated with its  marginal revenue product which, 
under the assumption of perfect competition, is the value to society of 
the marginal product. As the demand for a firm 's product increases, 
the demand for water increases ceteris paribus, or, what is equivalent, 
society places a higher value on a given quantity of industrial water.
Residential demand for water is a function of i ts  price, as 
well as population, income, and the prices of other commodities.
Other things equal, growing incomes and population increase the res i­
dential demand fo r  water. Again, this signifies that society places a 
higher value on any amount of water devoted to residential consumption.
The benefits or net returns of a project to provide an addi­
tional supply of water are thus the costs that are associated with 
the fa i lu re  to take action. Or, to put i t  another way, the costs of 
fa i l in g  to act are the benefits foregone as a result of inaction.
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The increased demands of society call for additional water when the 
marginal cost of a new supply is less than the marginal value placed on 
i t  by the community.
An increase in the community's demand for water may prompt an 
investigation of available alternatives. The questions which should 
be answered are: (1) Is inaction the least-cost a lternative , and
(2) what is the least-cost alternative of developing additional sup­
p lies , i f  additional supplies are clearly warranted? I t  is the primary 
objective of this chapter to answer these questions by specifying an 
economic model for the determination of benefit-cost ratios for a local 
community. A secondary purpose is to discuss the welfare implications 
of this model, since i t  produces d iffe ren t results from one which mea­
sures benefit-cost ratios for the nation as a whole.
C riter ia  for Choice
Benefit-Cost Ratios
Water projects have trad it io n a lly  been evaluated on the basis 
of benefit-cost ratios where both future benefits and costs are dis­
counted by some "appropriate" in terest ra te . A project is ju s t if ie d  
only i f  the ra t io  of its  benefits to its  costs exceeds unity, and 
among competing projects the one with the highest such ra tio  is con­
sidered "best" (Eckstein, 1958, pp. 47-70). That the benefit-cost 
ratio  of a project should be greater than one is clear. This is 
merely a requirement that a project should not be undertaken which
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costs more than i t  is worth. But i t  does not necessarily follow that 
projects competing for public funds should be ranked by the ra t io  and 
that the order of such ranking should determine budgetary p r io r it ie s .  
Errors may result from such an approach.
F irs t ,  in the selection between mutually exclusive projects, i t  
is net benefits (benefits minus costs) which are important. For ex­
ample, a project with expected benefits of $2,000 and total costs of 
$1,000 has a benefit-cost ratio of 2, but i t  would not be preferable 
to one yielding $1,500,000 in estimated benefits at a cost of 
$1,000,000, although the benefit-cost ra tio  of the second project is 
only 1.5. To forego an estimated net gain of $500,000 in preference 
to one of only $1,000 would be unreasonable. Second, benefit-cost 
ratios can be ambiguous; benefits expressed net of a portion of costs 
may produce ratios which d i f fe r  from those derived by including a l l  
benefits and costs. To i l lu s t r a te ,  i t  may be convenient to express 
the benefits of a project net of a part of the costs, e. g. ,  $1,000 
less $600 in one type of costs yields $400 in net benefits. I f  the 
basic expenditure is $200 a benefit-cost ra t io  calculated on this  
basis is 2. However, i f  total costs and benefits are included the 
ra t io  would be $1,000/$800 = 1.25. The proper c r ite rio n  fo r rating  
projects would be benefits minus costs, which in this example would be 
$200 whichever way the calculation is made (McKean, 1958, pp. 107-16; 
H irsh le ife r  et a l . ,  1960, pp. 137-38). Moreover, subtraction of costs 
from benefits shows the net gain in present value and i f  the proper
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costs, benefits and discount rates are used, any project with positive 
net benefit should be undertaken. In the event this is not possible, 
i . e . ,  i f  "capital rationing" is necessary, the problem becomes more 
complex (H irs h le ife r  et a l . , 1960, pp. 169-74); discussion of this 
aberration, however, w il l  not be covered since i t  is not pertinent to 
the problem at hand.
Despite these shortcomings, the benefit-cost ra tio  w i l l  be 
used as the c rite rion  throughout this study. In the context within 
which i t  is used, the benefit-cost ra tio  w il l  give the same results as 
the net benefits cr ite rio n . The reason is a consequence of the way in 
which benefits are measured--as the cost of the best a lternative  
course of action. Under this approach only one course of action w ill  
yie ld  a benefit-cost ratio  in excess of unity , and only that course of 
action w i l l  y ie ld  positive net benefits.
Application of Benefit-Cost Ratios
The measurement of benefits and costs is an extremely d i f f ic u l t  
problem in appraising the fe a s ib i l i ty  of a large multiple purpose water 
project. Total benefits are appropriately measured by the entire  areas 
under the pertinent demand curves for a l l  outputs of the project, 
including consumers' surplus, and total costs should consider the en- ■ 
t i r e  value of the product lost in the private sector due to the diver­
sion of resources to the water project. A simple price times quantity 
calculation does not correctly measure benefits, and in the case of 
cost measurement such a calculation w i l l  be inadequate i f ,  as a
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consequence of the project, resource prices are changed or i f  the in ­
puts are bid away from firms operating in imperfectly competitive 
product markets (Dunn, 1967, pp. 337-42; Stober, Falk, and Ekelund, 
1968, pp. 563-68). Moreover, estimation is particu larly  d i f f ic u l t  
for benefits which are not marketed, e .g . ,  recreation provided by a 
reservoir project (Knetsch and Davis, 1966, pp. 125-42). The alloca­
tion of the costs of multiple purpose projects to individual purposes 
is another d i f f ic u l t  problem (H irsh le ife r  et a l . ,  1960, pp. 93-94). 
Fortunately, the problems which must be faced in measuring benefits 
and costs for single purpose projects a re .fa r  fewer.
This presentation is limited to such a single purpose project, 
and the approach considers only d irect benefits and costs to the lo ­
c a lity .  Diversion of resources to the project is assumed to be mini­
mal. Nevertheless one remaining d i f f ic u l ty ,  the problem of uncer- 
tanty in benefit and cost streams, is ignored en tire ly  in this study. 
The reason for this omission is that there is ,  as ye t, no completely 
satisfactory solution for the handling of uncertainty in water re­
source system design. Although advances are being made in this area 
and some tools now exist which would be of value in local water project 
studies (Dorfman, 1966, pp. 129-58), these developments have not been 
used because they would complicate the analysis to the extent of ob­
scuring several important points.
As noted above, the benefits derived from any community water 
project may be measured by the costs of the best alternative to the
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action contemplated, since they are the costs avoided by undertaking 
t hat project. I t  is possible, of course, that the best a lternative is 
simply fa i lu re  to act. The benefits of the action are thus the costs 
of inaction, or, more precisely, the discounted stream of future costs
and benefits foregone as a result of fa i l in g  to replace or augment the
ground-water supply. I f  the benefit-cost ra tio  for the best possible
action proves to be less than unity, a decision in favor of inaction
is optimal.
The choice between any two possible community projects, A and B, 
may be made in the same manner. I f  the benefit-cost ratio  for project A 
is greater than unity, given the costs of its  best a lternative , B, then 
A should be undertaken. I f  A's ra t io  is less than one, its  reciprocal, 
the benefit-cost ratio for B, is greater than one and project B should 
be chosen.
F in a lly , a fter  selecting the "best" possible community project 
a lternative , the community s t i l l  has the option of le tting  private  
firms undertake the ir  own projects as an alternative to the community 
project. The benefits for the benefit-cost ra tio  used in making this 
decision are the costs associated with the private projects. The costs 
in the denominator of the ratio  are, of course, the costs which would 
be incurred by the community project. A procedure for measuring and 
comparing these benefits and costs is presented in the following 
section.
48
The Measurement of the Costs and Benefits 
of Community Action
The Present Value of Future Costs
Costs that are incurred at d iffe ren t points in time have d i f ­
ferent values when viewed from the present. To i l lu s t r a t e ,  le t  CQ be 
a cost arising at the present time and le t  Ct  be a cost arising t  
years in the future. I f  CQ could be postponed for t  years, and the 
consequent saving invested a t the rate of r% compounded annually, i t  
follows that a f te r  t  years the original sum CQ w i l l  have a value of
CQ(1 + r) . Thus to put the costs CQ and C^  on an equal footing C^. 
must be equal to CQ(1 + r ) * \  A lte rn ative ly , the present value of a 
cost incurred in year t  is defined as
c° ' pvc^ i r r V -  ^
The present value of a future cost (PVC) may be interpreted as the 
amount that i f  set aside now and invested with an annual rate of 
return of r% would provide a sum ju s t su ff ic ien t to meet the cost 
when i t  is incurred.
In general, the present value of a stream of yearly  costs, C^ ., 
is given by the formula
n n C.
PVC » I  PVCt  = I   i - r  . ( 3 -2 )
t=l 1 t=l (1 + r)
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Since cost in year t  is discounted for the entire year t ,  as well as 
fo r  the preceding t-1 years, this formula treats costs as being in­
curred on the las t day of the year. Thus annual discounting w il l
2
understate the present value of future costs.
Immediate cash outlays, such as in i t ia l  costs of construction, 
should not be discounted. Thus to encompass immediate cash outlays in 
the general formula i t  is necessary to sum from zero to n, where costs 
at time zero, CQ, represent immediate cash outlays. Formula (3-2)
then becomes
n C. n .
PVC = I  -------^ - p =  I  C .( l + r )  . (3-3)
t=o (1 + r) t-o
Now, the present value unit costs for both a non-profit com­
munity project and private alternatives can be calculated by an adapta­
tion. of the above method. Let Xp represent the unknown present value 
unit cost of v/ater from a community project which is assumed to remain 
constant over the l i f e  of the project, and le t  qt  represent the quan­
t i t y  of water produced in year t .  Then total cost for the project in 
year t  w il l  be Xpq^ .. S im ilarly , i f  xc (also assumed to be constant)
2
In lieu  of discrete annual discounting, continuous discounting 
might have been used, in which case e"r t  would replace (1 + r ) " t  as the 
appropriate discount factor and the defin ite  integral would replace the 
summation sign. Although continuous discounting is more consistent 
with the view that output is a continuous flow over the course of the 
year and that costs are incurred at monthly and weekly in terva ls , for 
expository purposes the more fam iliar discrete discounting method is 
employed. The difference in the present value of costs is not great 
and in no way affects the comparisons to be made.
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represents the unknown present value unit water cost of q'^ units of 
water in year t  for the private alternatives, the alternative cost in 
year t  w il l  be xcP 't - I t  follows that for a community project with a 
l i f e  of n years the sum of present value costs w il l  be equal to the 
sum of quantities produced in each year multiplied by the present 
value unit cost and discounted by the appropriate factor. Symboli­
ca lly ,
I  PVC. = I  (x q.) (1 + i ) _ t , (3-4)
t=o t=o H
where i is the rate of discount appropriate to the community project. 
Since xp is a constant i t  may be factored out of the summation and 
upon dividing both sides by the sum of discounted quantities we have
n
I PVC,
y = t=o 1 (3-5)
p n ’
I  qt O + i )
t=o 1
I f  k is the appropriate discount rate for the private a lternatives, 
the present value unit cost associated with the fa i lu re  o f the com­
munity to take action is
I pvct
xc -  *=®----------------------   . (3-6)
I  q' , 0  + k)_t
t=o x
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I t  may be helpful to take a somewhat d iffe ren t approach and to 
view the present value unit cost as an internal price which must be 
charged for water. When so interpreted, this internal price multi­
plied by quantities produced in each year generates a revenue stream 
which, when discounted, is equal to the present value of a l l  costs.
Thus this internal pHce (present value unit cost) is a price just  
su ffic ien t to cover a l l  costs associated with the project. Moreover, 
the rate of discount can be interpreted as the rate of return over 
cost, or simply the net rate of return, on the investment outlay.
This la t te r  interpretation may seem rather strained since the discount 
rate must be selected f i r s t  and once selected determines (together with 
the cost and quantity streams) the present value unit cost of water. 
However, this in terpretation does serve to elucidate the fac t that 
the rate of discount must bear some relationship to the net rate of 
return that a f irm  expects to realize on alternative investment pro­
jec ts . But to say simply that the discount rate used to calculate 
present value un it cost must re f le c t the net rate of return on a l te r ­
native investment projects is fa r  too vague.
Appropriate Rates of Discount
The rate of discount for the community project is the cost of 
capital to the sponsoring body. The cost of capital fo r  the non­
p ro f i t  community project is simply the in terest rate a t which the 
project is financed. The rate of discount to be applied to the private
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alternative, however, presents substantially greater d i f f ic u l ty .  I f ,  
as w il l  be assumed, the private alternative is an increased cost of 
water to industrial firms and municipal waterworks, the relevant rate 
of discount is the corporate cost of capita l.
The concept "cost of capital" as applied to a profit-making 
corporation raises several theoretical issues that have as yet not 
been s a tis fac to r ily  resolved (Modigliani and M il le r ,  1958, pp. 251-97; 
Durand, 1959, pp. 639-55). While an attempted resolution or even a 
complete treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this study, 
a b r ie f  discussion of some of the problems is necessary.
As a starting point, i t  should be noted that a corporation 
has a number of a lternative sources of funds; i t  may, fo r example, re­
tain earnings, u t i l iz e  depreciation allowances, borrow from financial 
in s titu tions , issue short- or long-term debt, or issue new shares of 
either common or preferred stock. Each of these sources has a d i f fe r ­
ent objective cost. Since a water replacement project w i l l  be long- 
lived only four of these alternative sources of funds need be con­
sidered; issuance of new shares, long-term borrowing, issuance of 
preferred stock, and internal sources (retained earnings and deprecia­
tion allowances).
Normally, the cost of equity capital is calculated e ither as an 
expected earnings per share/price per share ra t io  (Dean, 1951, p. 43), 
or by some variation of a current dividend/price ra tio  with allowance 
made for expected dividend growth (Bierman and Smidt, 1960, pp. 141-48).
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The cost of borrowed capital is uniquely dependent on two factors: the
effective  rate of in terest at which the corporation can borrow and the 
corporate income tax rate. Inasmuch as in terest payments are expenses 
deducted from revenue in arriving at taxable income, the cost of bor­
rowed capital is not the fu l l  amount of the effec tive  in terest ra te ,  
but rather the in terest rate reduced by the marginal tax rate m ulti­
plied by the interest rate. In short, the cost of debt capital is 
obtained by multiplying the effective in terest rate by one minus the 
marginal tax rate. The effective rate of in terest is readily  
calculated as the current y ie ld  to maturity on the corporation's long­
term debt, adjusted, when necessary, for underwriting costs associated 
with a new debt issue. The cost of obtaining capital by the issue of 
preferred stock is s im ilarly  determined by the current y ie ld  on pre­
ferred stock.
The cost of capital from internal sources requires more detailed  
treatment. I t  might seem at f i r s t  glance that since in terna lly  gener­
ated funds require no e x p lic it  cash outlay th e ir  cost is zero. This, 
however, is not the case. The alternative to retaining earnings and 
using these funds to finance an investment project is the payment of 
dividends. I f  the financial well-being of shareholders can be taken 
to be the overriding concern of corporate directorships, then the de­
cision of whether to retain earnings or to pay dividends should hinge 
on the e ffe c t that each of these alternatives has on the net worth of
54
the shareholder. Spec ifica lly , an investment project financed by in ­
ternal funds should be undertaken only i f  i t  increases the market value 
of corporate shares by an amount at least as great as the dividend 
foregone. Since the market evaluates shares on the basis of expected 
earnings, the increase in the market value of shares w i l l  be greater 
than the investment outlay only i f  the expected net rate of return on 
the investment outlay is greater than the ra t io  of expected earnings 
to the price of shares, i . e . ,  the cost of equity cap ita l. Thus the 
cost of equity capital is also the appropriate cost of capital to be 
applied to internal sources. Moreover, although the argument has been 
couched in terms of retained earnings, the same argument applies to 
depreciation allowances. I f  the use of such funds does not provide a 
rate of return at least as great as the cost of capital then such funds 
should not be retained (Cohen and Robbins, 1966, pp. 749-51).
To restate the argument symbolically: le t  E represent expected 
annual earnings; M, the to ta l market value of the corporation's shares; 
then r ,  the cost of ca p ita l ,  w il l  be equal to E/M. In a perfectly  
functioning capital market, the cost of equity capital may be taken as 
a constant with respect to a change in expected earnings, because an 
increase in expected earnings w il l  lead to an increase in the price of 
shares, as the market discounts the expected increase in earnings.
Thus we may write
AM = ~  . (3-7)
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Let Al represent the increase in investment outlay (foregone 
dividend) and le t  AE1 represent the resulting increase in expected 
annual earnings on the investment outlay which, for purposes of expo­
s it io n , is assumed to be a perpetual flow, then
Al = , (3-8)
where i is the expected rate of return on the investment outlay. Now, 
i t  can be seen that i f  knowledge of the investment project is communi­
cated to the market and the market evaluates earnings expectations in 
the same way as corporate management (AE = AE '), AM > A l, only i f  i > r. 
In words, the change in the market value of the corporation's outstand­
ing shares is greater than the investment outlay, or foregone dividend, 
only i f  the rate of return on investment is greater than the cost of 
c a p ita l.
One is now tempted to conclude that the cost of capital w il l  
depend upon the method of finance. I f  an investment outlay is f i ­
nanced by equity capital or from internal sources one rate would seem 
applicable, i f  by long-term debt or preferred stock s t i l l  other rates 
seem applicable. Again, this is an unwarranted conclusion. The 
method of financing an investment project w il l  have an e f fe c t ,  even i f  
only a minor one, on the capital structure. Internal or equity financ­
ing w il l  lower the debt/equity ra tio  and conversely debt financing w i l l  
raise i t .  Under the assumption that each corporation has an optimal 
capital structure that i t  seeks to achieve and maintain, investment
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outlays must be financed in such a way as to leave the capital struc­
ture unaffected. In other words, i t  is argued that the decision to 
a lte r  the capital structure is a separate decision. This leads to the 
conclusion that there is but one cost of capital which must be a 
weighted average of the cost of equity and senior capital (Donaldson 
and Pfahl, 1963, pp. 438-40). Moreover, i f  one assumes that the cor­
poration has achieved its  optimum capital structure, or what i t  con­
ceives to be its  optimum capital structure, the appropriate weights 
are the current percentages of the corporation's capital provided from 
debt and equity sources. Thus, although a particu lar project may be 
financed by the issue of debt, for example, maintenance of the desired 
capital structure w i l l  require that other projects be financed by 
equity capita l.
In the preceding paragraphs i t  was shown that the cost of 
capital that is applicable as the rate of discount for a long-term 
investment project is a weighted average of the costs of equity and 
senior capita l. I t  should be recognized that this conclusion rests 
on several arb itrary  assumptions. F irs t ,  i t  was assumed that the 
overriding objective of the corporation is the maximization of the 
net worth o f  i ts  shareholders. The second assumption was that share­
holders are in d ifferen t between an equal increase in dividends and in 
the market value of shares; an assumption which because of d ifferen­
t ia l  tax rates on income and capital gains is not l ik e ly  to be rea­
lized (Gordon, 1962, p. 131). Third, i t  was assumed that there exists
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an optimum capital structure for any corporation which the corporation 
achieves and seeks to maintain. Even i f  these assumptions are accepted, 
the cost of equity capital depends upon expectations with respect to 
earnings. Thus a cost of capital can only be calculated by making
arb itra ry  assumptions with regard to earnings or dividend expectations.
Consequently, there emerges no uniquely determined single rate that may 
be taken to represent the "true" cost of cap ita l.
One way'out of this dilemma is to make the necessary assump­
tions regarding expected earnings, calculate the expected 
earnings/price ra t io ,  determine the cost of debt ca p ita l,  apply the 
appropriate weights, and call the resulting figure the cost of cap ita l.  
Another a lternative  is to compute a range of ra tes , representing a 
confidence in te rv a l ,  so to speak, for the "true" cost of capital. Both
approaches can be combined advantageously; f i r s t  a point estimate is
made of the cost of capital based upon the trend of earnings and 
earnings/price ratios in the recent past. Second, tests are made of 
the s e n s it iv ity  of present value unit costs of water to a range of dis­
count rates. The "cut-o ff point" that the corporation employs in de­
ciding whether or not to undertake an investment project w il l  serve as 
an upper bound fo r  this range, since this is the rate below which, 
risk considered, the corporation feels that a given investment would 
be detrimental. The cu t-o ff  rate of return may be regarded as the 
corporation's own im p lic it  estimate of i ts  cost of cap ita l, perhaps 
in f la te d  by a risk premium. The current y ie ld  to maturity on the
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corporation's long-term debt reduced by the corporate income tax ra te ,  
i . e . ,  the cost of its  debt ca p ita l,  may be taken as the lower bound.
This use of a broad range of rates to represent the cost of 
capital has a d is tinct disadvantage, both in comparing alternative  
projects within the same corporation and for benefit-cost analyses of 
community projects having as benefits the discounted costs of the best 
private corporate a lternative. F irs t ,  fo r two alternative company 
projects, one involving high construction costs but low operating and 
maintenance costs, and the other involving a smaller in i t i a l  expense 
but higher costs in subsequent years i t  is quite possible that dis­
counting by the highest rate w i l l  y ie ld  the lowest present value unit 
cost for the second project, whereas discounting by the lowest rate 
may reverse the ranking. In such cases, the economist may take some 
comfort in the fact that ultimately the decision between the two 
projects must be made by corporate management. Moreover, in deciding 
between the two projects corporate management not only provides the 
economist with what i t  considers to be the best a lternative , but also 
narrows the range within which i t  regards i ts  appropriate cost of capi­
ta l to l ie .  In the absence of a decision by management, the economist 
is ju s t i f ie d  in placing more confidence in rates of discount lying 
closer to the upper than to the lower bound.
I f  the single rate representing the cost of capital for the 
community project results in a net community cost per unit (to be de­
fined la te r )  that lies outside the range of present value unit costs
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calculated for the corporate project, the resultant benefit-cost ra tio  
is unambiguous; i t  is e ith er  greater than one, favoring selection of 
the community project, or less than unity , prompting rejection. I f  the 
net community cost per unit lies between these l im its , a problem does 
indeed e x is t ,  for the benefit-cost ra tio  would be shown as both greater
than one and less than one, depending on which company discount rate is
used. No a priori rule can be offered for resolving this problem; i f  
such a problem arises i t  can be resolved only by a careful examination 
of the circumstances peculiar to that particular case. The analysis 
contained in the following sections strongly suggests, however, that 
this problem is not l ik e ly  to be encountered in practice.
Present Value Unit Cost: Community Project
The to ta l cost (C^) associated with a water project in any 
year t  may be divided into three categories: construction cost ( K^),
cost of operation and administration (At ) ,  and maintenance cost (M^).
In addition there may be some cost offsets such as salvage value (S^)
e ither  of f a c i l i t ie s  made unnecessary by the project or, more commonly, 
of the assets of the project i t s e l f  at the end of its  useful l i f e .
Only the la t te r  type of salvage value w i l l  be considered in the calcu­
lations of this study; however, the reader w i l l  recognize that other 
offsets could be accommodated in the basic model. Total cost in any 
year t  is obtained by summing the three types of cost and deducting 
cost offsets. Symbolically,
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(3-9)
The present value of a l l  costs of the community project is
obtained by discounting cost in each year by the cost of capital and 
summing over the l i f e  of the project. Present value unit cost is then 
obtained by dividing through by the sum of discounted quantities.
Thus discounting (3-9) by the cost of cap ita l, summing to obtain the 
present value of costs and substituting the result into (3-5) gives 
(H irsh le ife r  et a l . ,  1960, p. 276)
Present Value Unit Cost: Corporate Alternative
Computation of the present value cost for a private under­
taking is ,  however, not so straightforward. A cost incurred by a 
profit-making corporation reduces revenue by an amount equal to the 
cost, but, and this is the important point, i t  also reduces the cor­
porate income tax l i a b i l i t y .  Thus the relevant cost figure for the 
corporation is not the fu l l  amount of the cost, but only that part 
of the cost that reduces a f te r  tax revenue, which shall be referred to 
as the net cash outlay resulting from the cost. For operation cost 
(A’ t ) and maintenance cost (M 't ) the reduction in a f te r  tax income in
j (Kt + At + Mt - St) (1 + i)_t 
t “  0 ______________ ___ (3-10)
P n - t
I  qt (1 + i)
t=0
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year t  w i l l  be A 't  + M't  - Tt (A 't  + M't ) which is equal to 
(1 - Tt ) (A 't  + M't ) ,  where Tt  represents the marginal corporate 
income tax rate in year t .  But, assuming that the estimated salvage 
value at the beginning of the project l i f e  is realized exactly by sale 
of assets at the end of the project l i f e ,  salvage value (S 't ) w il l  
enter into the calculation unaltered, since i t  w i l l  have no e ffec t on 
taxable income.
Construction costs (K1 .^) are treated d iffe ren tly . In that such 
costs must be capita lized and then depreciated over the l i f e  of the 
asset, i t  is appropriate to include the fu l l  amounts of construction 
costs in the year, or years, in which they are incurred. In subsequent 
years an allowance for depreciation (Dt ) occasions a cost offset.
Since the allowance fo r  depreciation permits the company to write down 
i ts  taxable income by an equivalent amount, the resulting reduction in 
the tax l i a b i l i t y  is ( T^)( D^). Combining the results of this and the 
preceding paragraph, the net cash outflow in year t  is then
C't  = K‘ t  + (1 -  Tt ) (A 't  + M‘ t ) -  S 't  -  (Tt )(Dt ) .  (3-11)
Present value unit cost of water for the company project is now ob­
tained in the same manner as fo r the community project; discounting 
(3-11) by the cost of capital and summing to obtain present value cost
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3
and then substituting the result into (3-6) to obtain
I  [K 't  + (1 - Tt ) ( A ' t  + M*t ) - S 't  - (Tt )(Dt ) ]  [(1 + k )- t ]
X c =  tzo-----------------------------------------------------------------------------   .
t=0 q , t  ^  + ^  3^“12)
For purposes of comparison the i n i t i a l  assumption is made that 
private water users w ill  be forced to take action and that the action 
w il l  involve a cost stream identical in timing to that of the com­
munity a lternative . In deriving a benefit-cost ra tio  for a community 
project two additional assumptions w i l l  be made: f i r s t ,  that the
management of the community project is neither more nor less e f f ic ie n t  
than the managements of the best corporate a lternatives; and second, 
that there are constant returns to outlay in the production of water. 
The f i r s t  assumption requires no comment. The second is necessitated 
by the fact that the community project, supplying water to a group of 
water users, w i l l  be larger than any single corporate project. Under
3
The currently effective 7% federal investment tax cred it is 
omitted from the analysis of this chapter. The credit has been used 
by the government both as an incentive to investment and as a counter­
cyclical tool since its  introduction by the Revenue Act of 1964 (Cook, 
1967, pp. 227-33). In 1966 i t  was suspended as an in fla t ion  com­
batting measure; orig ina lly  the suspension period was to run from 
October 10, 1966, through December 31, 1967 (P.L. 89-800), but i t  was 
reinstated e a r l ie r  than planned, on March 9, 1967 (P.L. 90-26). Since 
the credit is a d irect o ffset to taxes, i t  can be taken as a deduction 
in costs during the year of construction. This can be accomplished 
easily by replacing in expression (3-12) by 0.93 K .^ No other 
changes need be made; the credit does not a ffec t the depreciation basis.
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the assumption of constant returns to outlay, corporate projects may be 
viewed in one of two ways. F irs t ,  they may be thought of as one large 
corporate project composed of a number of individual projects providing, 
in to ta l ,  the same quantity of water as the community project and hence 
having the same costs. A lternatively , the corporate project may be 
viewed as the project of only one water user, but being identical to 
the community project reduced by an appropriate scale factor. I f  the 
second view is adopted then, although each cost for the corporate 
project w i l l  be smaller, the output w i l l  be reduced proportionately.
Thus in e ither case, the primes in formula (3-12) can be eliminated.
I f  we make the further in i t ia l  assumption that the cost of capital is 
the same for the community as for the corporate project (i = k ), then 
formula (3-12) becomes
I  [Kt  + (1 - Tt ) (At  + Mt ) - St  -  (Tt )(Dt ) ] [ ( l  + i ) - t ]  
x<_ = i ; o ------------------------- _--------------------------      .
t J 0 ^  (1 + 1> t  ( 3 " , 3 )
Formula (3-13) would be the numerator of a community project 
benefit-cost ra tio  expressed in unit costs and benefits, given id en ti­
cal corporate project and community project costs--including costs of 
cap ita l. However, formula (3-10) for Xp, project unit cost, is not 
the fu l l  expression required for the denominator of the benefit-cost 
calculation. For this we must calculate the "net community cost per
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unit.." I f  companies purchased water from the community in lieu  of pro­
viding th e ir  own water supplies they would have to pay the community Xp 
to cover a l l  the project costs including interest. But i f  the marginal 
tax rate is constant over time, the net community cost per unit would 
be only {1 - T)xp, since the purchases are expenses deductible from 
gross income for tax purposes. Hence both sides of formula (3-10) are 
m ultiplied by (1 -  T) to form the denominator, and noting that the 
discounted quantity streams cancel out the benefit-cost ratio  becomes
I  (Kt  + At  + Mt -S t ) ( l  + 1 )_t -  T I  (A +M +D )(1 + i p
t=o t=o  ,
(1 -  T)x P (1 - T) I  (Kt  + At  + Mt  - St ) ( l  + i )  
t=o
- t (3-14)
and assuming construction costs to be incurred at time zero
C _ 1Ti -t)x„ " ’nrry 1 -T
n . , - t  nI  (A + M ) ( ] + 1) - *  + I  D ( l + i )  
t=o r  L t=o
- t
n A t + M J O + l T 4 + K -  Sf ( l  + i) 
t=o o c
-•\-t
(3-15)
Now, i t  is clear that Y D. = K -  S„ = K -  S .,  i . e . ,  the
t=0
to ta l depreciation allowed over time is equal to the in i t ia l  capital 
outlay in year 0 less the salvage value in the fina l year n. With a
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positive rate of discount, however,
Ko '  St (1 + i ) _ t  > I  Dt  (1 + i ) _ t j  (3_16)t=o
since is discounted and net of S^ .. I t  follows, then, that the 
expression within the square bracket of (3-15) is less than one, and 
thus the benefit-cost ratio  would be greater than one even, as is 
unlikely, i f  the corporate cost of capital is as low as the community 
borrowing rate.
To repeat, the benefit-cost ra t io  must always be greater than 
one when returns to scale are constant and when the costs of the two 
projects are discounted by the same in terest rate. The absolute magni­
tude of the ratio  w il l  depend upon the tax rate, the l i f e  of the 
project, the timing of capital outlays, the method of depreciation, 
and the rate of discount. As the marginal tax rate is increased, the 
denominator of (3 -14 ), hence (3 -15 ), is reduced by the fu l l  amount of 
the tax and the numerator by only a fraction of the tax. Thus the 
benefit-cost ra tio  is raised. An increase in the present value of 
the depreciation allowance re la t ive  to the present value of con­
struction costs w i l l  lower the benefit-cost ra tio . This may occur 
in one of three ways: the allowance, for tax purposes, of a more
4
rapid w riteo ff;  a reduction in the length of the project's l i f e ;  or,
4
In the extreme case i f  the company were allowed to write o ff  
the entire  investment at the time i t  occurred, and i f  S, = 0 for a l l  t ,t
66
given the project's l i f e  span, a postponement of capital outlays. 
Finally , an increase in the rate of discount by placing a heavier 
premium on present, as opposed to fu ture, costs reduces the present 
value of depreciation re la tive  to that of capital outlays and hence 
increases the benefit-cost ra t io .
The conclusions expressed in (3-15) can be rephrased in terms 
of re la tive  unit costs. Multiplying both sides of (3-15) by (1 -  T)Xp 
the unit cost of the corporate project is seen to be less than the 
price which the community must charge to cover its  costs. The impor­
tant point, however, is that the unit cost of the corporate project 
is greater than the net cash outlay resulting from the purchase of a 
unit of water from the community project at a price Xp. Corporate 
water users, therefore, realize a cost saving by purchasing from the 
community project.
Recall that the i 's  in the numerator in the square bracketed 
expression of the r ight hand term of equation (3-15) represent the cor 
porate cost of cap ita l, while the i 's  in the denominator of the same 
expression represent the community cost of capita l. Note, therefore, 
that an increase in the corporate cost of capital re lative to the
j  Dt  0  + I ) ’ *  = K0 ,
t=0
and the square bracketed expression in (3-15) would equal unity as 
would the benefit-cost ra tio .
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community cost of capital reduces the numerator of the square 
bracketed fraction relative to the denominator and thus raises the 
benefit-cost ratio.
F in a lly , i t  should be observed that the currently authorized 
investment tax credit, allowing the company a tax offset of 7 percent 
of certain depreciable investments, tends to lower the benefit-cost 
ra t io . Calculations show, however, that a much larger credit would 
be required to invalidate the general conclusion that the benefit- 
cost ra t io  of equation (3-15) w i l l  be greater than unity.^
Economies of scale in the production of water strengthen the 
conclusion that the community benefit-cost ratio  must exceed unity.
I f ,  on the other hand, diseconomies of scale are important, then the 
preceding analysis has overstated the advantage of the community 
project. However, i t  is shown (Figure 3-1, p. 77 ) that diseconomies 
of scale must indeed be substantial before the basic conclusion is 
overturned.
The community project's cost of capital w i l l  almost inevitably  
be lower than the cost of capita l to the corporate project. I f  the 
community project is an arm of a state or municipal government, this  
w il l  mean that the community project w i l l  be enabled to issue tax
5
An example is given in the following section showing the e ffec t  
of the present investment tax cred it on a benefit-cost ratio  for a 
hypothetical case which incorporates the constant returns to outlay 
assumption.
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exempt bonds, and hence in most circumstances be able to borrow at a 
lower rate than the corporation. In short, the federal and state  
corporate income taxes combined with a lower cost of capital for a 
community project provide a cost advantage to the community project, 
which can be offset only by strong diseconomies of scale in the produc­
tion of water.
Community Project Benefit-Cost 
Ratios: An Example
A general method was developed for calculating benefit-cost 
ratios fo r a lternative water replacement projects. I t  now remains to 
provide an application of this method to i l lu s tra te  the significance 
of the conclusions.
Again assume constant returns to outlay; the corporate project 
may then be viewed as an agglomeration of company projects having 
to ta l cost and water output streams identical to those of the com­
munity project. Further assume that e ither project must replace a 
portion of the groundwater supply (100,000 acre-feet per year) at a 
given point in time (time zero); and that the demand for water w i l l  
remain constant a t  this level over the l i f e  of the project. Construc­
tion costs for the project, or group of projects, are treated as being 
incurred at time zero. The to ta l of such costs is $10 m illion . Fa­
c i l i t i e s  are sold for a net salvage return of $100,000 at the end of 
year 30 (the project's terminal date). Operating costs are assumed
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to be d irectly  related to output, and, at $5.50 per acre-foot, are 
$550,000 per year. Maintenance costs are treated as a constant annual 
percentage (2%) of construction costs and thus to ta l $200,000 a year.
The Non-Profit Community Project Unit Costs
Calculation of the present value unit water cost of the com­
munity project is now straightforward. Using the data from the pre­
ceding paragraph, formula (3-10) becomes
costs for rates of discount (costs of capita l) of 4, 6, 8, and 10%.
An increase' in the cost of capital from 4 to 6% raises unit costs by 
$1.48 per acre-foot while an increase in the cost of capital from 4 to 
10% raises the cost per acre-foot by $4.83. The average annual cost 
rises by $483,000 as the cost of capital is increased from 4 to 10%.
30 t
10,000,000 + I  (550,000 + 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 )(1 + i ) - t  -  100,000 (1 + i ) -30
x t=l
P 30
I  100,000 (1 + i )  
t=l
- t
(3-17)
v/hi ch reduces to
x
10,000,000 + 750,000 - 100,000 (1 + i ) -30
P (1 + i ) ^  - 1100,000 — L
i (1 + i ) (3-18)
where Xp represents the cost per acre-foot. Table 3-1 provides unit
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TABLE 3-1. Community Project: Water Costs a t Selected
Rates of Discount
Discount
Rate
Present Value 
Unit Water Cost 
Per Acre-Foot
Average Annual 
Cost
0.04 $13.27 $1,327,000
0.06 14.75 1,475,000
0.08 16.37 1,637,000
0.10 18.10 1,810,000
Corporate Project Unit Costs
Computation of units costs fo r  the corporate project are com­
plicated by the corporate tax structure. For a corporation operating 
in Louisiana and having an annual income in excess of $25,000, the 
marginal federal income tax rate of 48%, ignoring the temporary 10% 
surcharge, and the Louisiana state corporation income tax of 4% are 
applicable. Calculation of the net tax is complicated by the fact  
that each level of government allows the deduction of the tax actually  
paid to the other in arriving at taxable income. To calculate the net 
tax rate , T, applicable to a one d o lla r  increment in income, le t  F 
represent the nominal federal rate and S, the nominal state income 
tax ra te , while T  ^ and Tg are the applicable net rates for the federal
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and state governments respectively. Now
Ts = S(1 -  Tf ) (3-19)
and Tf  = F(1 -  Ts).  (3-20)
Substitution of (3-20) in to  (3-19) and (3-19) into (3-20) gives the
results
V f e - r !  (3 -2 i)
and Tf  = ( 3"22)
which upon adding yields
T = Ts + Tf  = • (3_23)
Using (3-23) the net marginal corporate income tax rate T
for Louisiana corporations is calculated to be 49.1%. The rate is 
assumed to remain constant over the l i f e  of the project. Again, no 
allowance is made for an investment tax credit.
Calculation of depreciation is complicated by the existence 
of more than one allowable method. I f  i t  could be assumed that each 
participating company employed the "straight line" method of deprecia­
tion , then annual depreciation would be simply 1/30th of construction 
costs less salvage value. This assumption, however, lacks realism. A 
more re a l is t ic  f i r s t  approximation is to assume that each company uses 
sum of the years-digits depreciation. This method yields the greatest
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present value of the depreciation allowance for projects having the 
characteristics assumed above, and given any reasonable range for cor­
porate cost of capital (Davidson and Drake, 1961, pp. 442-52; Hall and 
Jorgenson, 1967, pp. 399-400). Sum of the years-digits depreciation, 
therefore, minimizes the present value unit cost for the corporate 
project.
Table 3-2 presents computations of unit costs for the corporate 
project. The figures were obtained by substituting the data of this 
section into formula (3-12). As in the case of the community project, 
i t  is seen that unit costs are highly sensitive to variations in the 
discount rate. The average annual cost of water ranges from $766,000 
when costs and outputs are discounted at 4% to $1,214,000 when dis­
counted at 10%.
TABLE 3-2. Corporate Project: Water Costs at Selected
Rates of Discount
Present Value Average
Discount Unit Water Cost Annual
Per Acre-Foot Cost
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
$ 7.66 
9.02 
10.51 
12.14
$ 766,000 
902,000 
1 ,051 ,000 
1,214,000
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A Comparison of Costs
Comparison of Tables 3-1 and 3-2 reveals that the corporate 
project can apparently produce water at a lower unit cost than the 
community project. In fa c t, even i f  the cost of capital were 10% for 
the corporate project and only 4% fo r  the community project, the unit 
cost of water would appear to be less for the company project. As 
shown in the f i r s t  section of this paper, th is conclusion is a result 
of the tax structure.
The relevant comparison, however, is not between the apparent 
unit water cost of the corporate and 'community projects, but between 
the cost to the company of purchasing water from the community project 
and the cost of supplying i ts  own needs. I t  w il l  be recalled that the 
company's cost of purchasing water from the community project is equal 
to one minus the corporate tax rate multiplied by the price which the 
community project charges. Thus the comparison made in Table 3-3 is 
between the effective cost to the company (50.9% of the unit cost of 
the community project) and the company's own cost. I t  is to be noted 
that the corporation's cost of purchasing water is lower than its  cost 
of producing water at every rate of discount. Moreover, the difference 
between the costs of the two alternatives increases as the rate of dis­
count rises--ranging from a low of $0.87 per acre-foot at 4% to a high 
of $2.84 a t 10%. This in turn means that i f  both projects had a 4% 
cost of ca p ita l,  the corporation would save 11.9% of the to ta l cost by
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purchasing from the community project; i f  the costs of capital were 
both 10% the cost saving would be 24.1%.
TABLE 3-3. Corporation Cost of Water: Comparison between
Producing Its Own Supply and Purchasing from the
Community Project at Selected Rates of Discount
Dollar Cost of One Acre-Foot 
of Water to the Corporation
Discount
Rate
Producing
Own
Supply
Purchasing from 
Community 
Project
Di fference Percentage
Difference
0.04 $ 7.66 $6.75 $0.91 11.9
0.06 9.02 7.51 1.51 16.7
0.08 10.51 8.33 2.18 20.7
0.10 12.14 9.21 2.93 24.1
The e ffec t of d iffe ren t rates of discount, or costs of cap ita l,  
on the saving that the corporation realizes by purchasing from the 
community project rather than by supplying its  own needs is shown in 
Table 3-4. I t  w i l l  be recalled that i f  the community project is an 
arm of a state or municipal government and can issue tax exempt revenue 
bonds, the cost of capital to the community project w il l  be lower than 
that of the corporate project. Thus the more relevant entries in
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Table 3-4 are those below the principal diagonal. An effective in te r ­
est rate of less than 6°l is normal for a state or municipally spon- 
sored project, in which case columns 1 and 2 of Table 3-4 are relevant 
for unit cost comparisons; showing the cost saving per m illion gallons 
fo r selected corporate costs of capita l. I f  the cost of capital to 
the corporation is 8%, for example, and the community interest rate is 
4%, the corporation would realize a saving of $3.76 per acre-foot by 
purchasing water from the community project rather than by producing 
i ts  own replacement supply. I f  the community were forced to pay a 6% 
in terest rate , and the corporate cost of capital remained at 8% the 
advantage would be reduced to $3.00 per acre-foot.
TABLE 3-4. Corporation's Savings, in Dollars per Acre-Foot, 
Resulting from the Purchase of Water from the 
Community Project at D ifferent Rates of Discount
Corporate Cost 
of Capital
Community Cost of Capital
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
0.04 0.91 0.15 -0.67 -1.55
0.06 2.27 1.51 0.69 -0.18
0.08 3.76 3.00 2.18 1.30
0.10 5.39 4.63 3.81 2.93
^At this time, municipal bond yields are about 5.25% and 
appear to be rising (Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1969).
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The basic conclusion that i t  is less expensive for the corpora­
tion to purchase water from the community project rather than to supply 
its  own needs is incorrect only i f  the cost of capital is substantially  
lower to the corporation than to the community project. Table 3-4 
shows that only i f  the cost of capital to the community project is 
over 6 !  w i l l  a 4% cost of capital to the corporation make the cor­
poration's cost of producing water lower than the effective  cost of 
purchasing water from the community project. A lte rnative ly , with a 
6% corporation cost of ca p ita l,  the' cost of capital to the community 
project must be over 8% to make the corporate project feasible. These 
cases are indeed unlikely, and i t  may be concluded that such d i f fe r ­
ences in the costs of capital as are l ik e ly  to exist w i l l  increase 
rather than diminish the comparative advantage of the community project.
Benefit-Cost Ratios
Figure 3-1 shows benefit-cost ratios for a l l  community and cor­
poration costs of capital from 0% to 10%. The assumption of constant 
returns to outlay has been retained. The shaded area encompasses a l l  
reasonable discount rates--2% to 7% for the community project, and 6% 
to 9% for the corporate project. Every possible combination within  
this area has a benefit-cost ratio greater than unity. Again, the 
analysis shows a strong bias in favor of the community project. I f  
the community project cost of capital were 5%, for example, and the 
corporate cost of capital were 7% the resulting benefit-cost ra tio  is
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1.36. Under these conditions $1.36 in present value benefits would 
be returned to the community for each $1 in present value costs; 
building the community project would be most desirable.
Should the federal government's 7% investment tax credit be 
included in the computations, benefit-cost ratios would be lowered 
s lig h t ly . With a 7% corporate cost of capital the corporation unit 
cost would fa l l  from $9.64 to $9.08, and again taking the community 
cost of capital to be 5% the benefit-cost ra tio  would be reduced from 
1.36 to 1.28.
I t  has been noted that economies of scale, or increasing re­
turns to outlay, strengthen the comparative advantage of the community 
project. The poss ib ility  of diseconomies of scale bears some examina­
tion. How strong must diseconomies of scale be in order to overturn 
the basic conclusion? For some idea of the magnitude of diseconomies 
required le t  us suppose that the corporate project again has the $10 
m illion in i t i a l  construction cost, $750,000 per year operation and 
maintenance costs, and $100,000 salvage value. But le t  us now assume 
that the community project costs $13 m ill ion , that operating costs 
remain at $5.50 per acre-foot or $550,000, and that maintenance costs 
remain at 2% of construction costs or $260,000 per year. Again assume 
that project l i f e  in e ither case is 30 years and salvage value at the 
end of year 30 is $100,000. A benefit-cost ra tio  of unity is computed 
i f  the community project and corporate a lternative  discount rates are 
both taken to be 5.8%. A corporate project involving a capital outlay
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of $10 m illion is precisely as costly from the community standpoint as 
a community project having a $13 million capital outlay. Using the 
more re a l is t ic  discount rates of 7% and 5% for the corporate and com­
munity projects respectively would call for selection of the community 
project even i f  its  capital outlay totalled $15 m illion and maintenance 
costs were increased proportionately, for the benefit-cost ra tio  in 
this instance would be 1.08. I t  is clear, then, that diseconomies of 
scale must indeed be substantial to overturn the basic conclusion that 
federal and state corporate income tax combined with a lower community 
cost of capital provide a d is tin c t cost advantage to the community 
project.
Public Investment C riteria  and 
National Economic Welfare
The l i te ra tu re  on public investment optimization has been con­
cerned only with the e ffec t of public capital expenditures on national 
welfare. The principal concern has been with federal level expendi­
tures while investment by state and local government has received 
scant consideration. The tools which have been developed to analyze 
federal expenditures remain generally applicable, but the local prob­
lem has been shown, in the preceding sections, to be s u ff ic ie n t ly  
d iffe ren t to require modification. I t  appears that th is situation  
would be at least a l i t t l e  disquieting to welfare economists. But the 
question which was to be answered was: how should a local community
choose between alternative water projects? Existing in stitu tions form
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the framework within which the answer must be formulated. Only the 
viewpoint of the lo c a lity  has been given consideration, but i t  is ev i­
dent that the community project is not optimal from the national wel­
fare standpoint i f  i t  requires a commitment of resources considerably 
in excess of the corporate a lternative .
In an example in the preceding section a $15 million community 
project was found to be preferable, from the community viewpoint, to a 
$10 million corporate a lternative . There is no doubt that the national 
benefit-cost ra t io  would be less than unity, but how much less hinges 
on the appropriate discount rate which would be used to discount the 
costs of both the community and corporate projects. The social dis­
count rate, however, has been the center of much controversy.
I f  both the community and private projects involve the same 
commitment of resources, at every point in time, the benefit-cost 
ratio reflecting national welfare is unity. The ra tio  would be less 
than unity i f  a community project were selected over a corporate 
project requiring a smaller sacrifice  of resources. Thus, the com­
munity decision rule may well lead to an in e ff ic ie n t  allocation of 
resources.
The Appropriate Social Discount Rate
The social rate of discount is a crucial factor in the selec­
tion among alternatives from the viewpoint of the nation as a whole. 
Normally, the heaviest costs associated with a water project are ex­
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perienced early in the project l i f e .  These are the in i t ia l  capital 
costs. When the greatest costs occur in the f i r s t  few years and bene­
f i t s  are produced in la te r  years, a high discount rate w i l l  tend to 
lower the benefit-cost ra t io .  The project w il l  be rejected i f  the 
rate is su ffic ien tly  high. Lower discount rates may y ie ld  benefit-  
cost ratios greater than unity and lead to acceptance.
Selection of the proper discount rate is much more crucial in 
choosing among alternative projects when the cost streams are dis­
s im ilar over time. A rate which is e ither "too low" or "too high" w i l l  
produce an erroneous benefit-cost ratio  which may result in an improper 
decision. Benefit-cost ratios may vary d irectly  or inversely with 
changes in the discount rate . I f  the time shapes of the cost streams 
d i f fe r  the relationship may be an inverse one. To i l lu s tra te  both 
cases by contrived examples take f i r s t  a case where benefits are 
$100,000 per year for ten years and total costs are capital costs of 
$7.36 m illion incurred at the beginning of the project l i f e .  At a 
6% discount rate the benefit-cost ratio is unity. Any higher rate w i l l  
produce a ra tio  less than one making the project unacceptable from a 
national welfare standpoint. Any lower rate w il l  call fo r acceptance. 
This is probably the typical situation for water resource projects.
Now, however, take the problem of deciding between two a l te r ­
native projects. The benefit stream—the cost of project A --is  com­
posed of an in i t ia l  outlay of $9 million and subsequent costs of $3.3
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m illion per year for 3 years. The cost stream for alternative B has 
an in i t i a l  outlay of $10 m illion and subsequent outlays of $1 m illion , 
$3 m illion and $5 million in years 1, 2 and 3 respectively. A social 
rate of discount of 11 w il l  produce a benefit-cost ratio  of unity, but 
a higher discount rate produces a benefit-cost ra tio  greater than one 
while a lower rate yields a ra tio  which is less than one. The decision 
procedure is reversed. A high discount rate calls for acceptance; a 
low rate calls for rejection. Although this may not represent the 
usual case, i t  would apply to selection among some multi-stage 
water project alternatives.
I t  w i l l  be recalled that the corporate income tax structure 
and the normal divergence between community and corporate discount 
rates lead to the conclusion that there exists a strong bias toward 
selection of a community project, over i ts  corporate alternative.
Precise knowledge of appropriate discount rates, therefore, w ill  
usually be unnecessary from the point of view of the lo c a lity . The 
decision w il l  normally remain unaffected over wide ranges of discount 
rates. Moreover i t  is clear that the appropriate discount rates are 
the community borrowing rate and corporate cost of capita l.
The results of benefit-cost studies of federal investment 
alternatives are more l ik e ly  to be in error for there is no unanimity 
of opinion as to the level of the social rate of discount. Further­
more, analyzing local water projects from the national welfare view­
point may lead to mistaken results. A social rate of discount which
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is "too low" may overstate or understate the benefit-cost ra tio  as 
may a rate which is "too high," and, unfortunately, the experts not 
only disagree on the precise social rate of discount but they even 
disagree on its  theoretical underpinnings. As a result federal 
agencies use discount rates ranging from 3% to 12% (Whipple, 1968, 
pp. 37-45).
The following paragraphs contain a cursory examination of the 
existing controversy over the social rate of discount. Although only 
a few of the many conflicting views are presented, they should be 
su ffic ien t to indicate the scope of the problem.
Market Rate of In terest
I f  there were no imperfections in the capital market, and i f  
no divergences existed between social and private benefits and costs, 
the discount rate fo r  public investment would be the same as the 
market rate of in terest (Arrow, 1966, p. 14). In a world unaffected 
by uncertainty and r isk  there would be but one rate for loans of a 
given term. This rate would, reflect both consumers' preference for 
a do llar today to a do llar in the future and the marginal productivity  
of investment. Abstracting further to a world where taxes play no 
part in the private decision, firms would optimize by investing to 
the point where the (decreasing) marginal productivity of capital 
equaled the (r is ing ) marginal rate of time preference. . Under these 
ideal conditions the resultant market rate of in terest would operate
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as the rate to use as a norm for public investment. I f  the marginal 
public investment exhibited a higher rate of return, additional public 
investment would be indicated. To achieve the optimal state of social 
welfare, marginal productivity in the private and public spheres 
should be equated. The "social opportunity cost" of public investment 
would be the private return foregone (H irsh le ifer  e t a l . ,  1960, 
pp. 116-48). McKean argues in favor of using the market determined 
in terest rate in the absence of capital rationing (1958, pp. 76-81).
The Conservationist Viewpoint
Other views would perhaps allow for public investment to be
carried beyond the point dictated by the market rate of in terest in
order to conserve resources for future generations. The argument 
given is that the government is the guardian of the interests of 
unborn generations as well as the present generation. The government 
should therefore exhibit a lower marginal rate of substitution of 
future for present consumption, i . e . ,  its  marginal rate of discount 
should be lower than the marginal rate of time preference of the in ­
dividuals comprising today's society (Pigou, 1962, pp. 23-30).
Dual Individual Time Preference Rates
Akin to the authoritarian argument of the preceding section
is one which is based on the time preferences of individuals of the
present generation. I t  hypothesizes two rates of time preference for  
the normal individual and is grounded on a b e lie f in the individual
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consumer's desire to provide fo r  future generations. An individual 
cares fo r future generations, so the argument goes, but his personal 
time preference rate is such that he w i l l  give up l i t t l e  present con­
sumption to provide for them. However, i f  other individuals offer to 
make the sacrifice too, he w ill  be w il l in g  to give up a greater 
amount. Thus the individual time preference rate differs  from the 
collective time preference rate , and the market rate of interest loses 
i ts  significance as a norm (Baumol, 1952, pp. 91-92; 1965, pp. 131-32; 
Sen, 1961, pp. 479-96; Marglin, 1963, pp. 95-111).
To use Sen's example suppose individual A cares for future 
generations but not enough to give up one unit of present consumption 
for three units of consumption fo r  the generation liv ing  twenty years 
hence. I f ,  however, another indiv idual, B, offers also to reduce his 
consumption by one unit for three in the future, A maybe w illing  to 
make the one unit sacrif ice , because now the future generation w il l  
receive a total of si_x units of consumption. This does not mean, 
however, that A is concerned with the welfare of unborn individuals 
while he is completely unconcerned with the sacrifices of his liv ing  
neighbor B. Actually A may consider one unit of consumption of 
future generations to be worth 0 .3  units of his own present consump­
tion, and he may feel B's sacrifice  of one unit to be 0 .7  as unplea­
sant to him as a sacrifice of one of his own. Saving together then 
the two men produce six units fo r  the future having a present value 
to A of 1.8 units. A's calculation of the present value cost of this
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measure, however, is only 1.7 units--one unit representing his own 
sacrifice  and 0.7 units representing the loss he experiences because 
of B's one unit sacrifice . He, therefore, feels the total present 
value gain exceeds the total present value cost and is thus w il l in g  
to give up the one unit of consumption--something he would not have 
done by himself.
This "paradox" has been c r it ic ize d  by Tullock (1964, 
pp. 331-36) as requiring strange individual u t i l i t y  functions. For 
today's society to desire to provide for tomorrow's undoubtedly richer 
society is the analog of desiring to tax the poor to support the rich. 
I t  is much more l ik e ly ,  says Tullock, that individual preferences w ill  
gravitate toward supporting today's poor, or, perhaps through founda­
tions, tomorrow's poor. I t  is unlikely, he fe e ls ,  for the individual 
to wish to support a l l  people of the future generation.
Other Views on the Discount Rate
K ru t i l la  and Eckstein (1958, pp. 78-130) calculate a social 
opportunity cost of federal capital by considering the impact o f  
alternatives to federal water projects. For instance, tax reductions 
are hypothesized as alternatives and investment rates of return 
available to groups receiving the reductions are weighed into the 
social opportunity cost. The rate calculated with 1955 data was 5-6%.
Eckstein (1958, pp. 81-90) expresses a d iffe re n t  view in  his 
own work. He begins with the riskless market ra te  of interest and
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makes allowances for risk in three ways: (1) primarily by adding a
risk premium of 0.5 to 1% to the pure in terest ra te , (2) by shortening 
the period of analysis, and (3) by incorporating safety allowances in 
the cost and benefit streams.
H irsh le ife r  (e t  a l . ,  1960, pp. 116-21, 139-48) begins with 
the pure market rate of in terest estimated to be about 4% in A pr il ,  
1960, but without doubt considerably higher at present, and modifies 
i t  by considering r is k , equity financing and the corporate income tax 
to obtain a rate s lig h t ly  over 10%. The argument given is that, for  
optimal resource a llocation , the public discount rate should be equal 
to the return demanded by the private market on u t i l i t y  investments.
I f  the rate used by the government is lower, better investment oppor- 
tunites exist in the private sphere. Total productivity, hence bene­
f i t s  to society, would be enhanced by reducing public and increasing 
private investment. H irsh le ife r  e t a l . feel the rate resulting from 
time preferences (and productivity) exhibited by the present genera­
tion need not be modified for the claims of posterity. I f  a disparity  
does ex ist between the market rate of in terest and the rate which 
would properly satis fy  the claims of the future, i t  would be better  
fo r  the government to take appropriate monetary and fisca l action to 
drive them to equality than to use d iffe ren t discount rates in the 
private and public spheres. Equating the rates would prevent the 
ineffic iencies which would be caused by divergent public and private
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marginal productivities of investment (1960, p. 120).
Arrow (1966, pp. 13-32) approaches’ the problem by noting that 
there is a "natural rate of interest" associated with the "natural 
rate of growth." U til iz in g  a Harrod type growth model he derives the 
natural rate of in terest which is the sum of two terms: one the
equivalent of Bohm-Bowerk's f i r s t  reason fo r in te res t, the lower mar­
ginal u t i l i t y  of future consumption due to expected growth in wealth; 
and the other equal to his second reason, systematic undervaluation of 
future u t i l i t i e s .  Although this natural rate of in terest is the proper 
rate for public discounting, there is another rate for discounting 
returns to private investment. The rates should be d ifferen t to 
obtain maximum welfare under the condition of steady growth--a type 
of "constrained" optimum limited by existing conditions. A true opti­
mum can only be achieved i f  the government always uses the proper 
monetary and fisca l policy (including repayment of the national debt 
i f  required) to overcome divergence between true time preference and 
that observed in the market. Should this unlikely condition obtain, 
the riskless private and public rates would be identica l.
Application to Local Project Analysis
Although i t  fa l ls  fa r  short of exhausting the subject matter 
of the continuing controversy, the preceding discussion should make i t  
quite clear that the matter of the national discount rate is not yet 
settled. Should an interested observer desire to compute a national
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benefit-cost ra tio  for a local project, he would have to recognize that 
his answer may or may not indicate true efficiency or ineffic iency.  
Using a "reasonable" range of discount rates he may find that the ra tio  
always fa l ls  above or below unity; however, he might well discover a 
ra tio  less than one fo r  some rates and greater than one for others. 
Should this occur he could only guess as to which answer is correct.
Fortunately economic analysis from the local viewpoint is not 
l ik e ly  to encounter such ambiguity. The corporate income tax, which 
helps obscure the national discount ra te , can be given some credit 
for simplifying the local problem.
Conclusions
The basic proposition of this chapter has been that benefit-  
cost analysis is an appropriate procedure to use in evaluating a com­
munity's investment in water projects. Since water projects are 
long-lived, with cost and benefit streams extending many years into  
the future, costs and benefits must be discounted to obtain compara­
b i l i t y .  The cost figure relevant in the comparison was called the 
present value unit cost of water, which was viewed as an internal 
price just s u ff ic ien t to cover a l l  costs associated with the water 
project. I t  was further argued that the rate at which costs and 
outputs should be discounted is the "cost of capita l" to the organi­
zation undertaking the project. Although the corporate "cost of 
capital" has a defin ite  meaning, the d if f ic u lt ie s  involved in its
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measurement require the use of a range of discount rates to approxi­
mate the "true" cost of capita l.
Water replacement projects may be undertaken by large water 
users on an individual basis or by collective community action. Thus 
the particular comparison undertaken in this paper was between a cor­
porate project and a non-profit community project. I t  was shown th a t,
under the assumptions of constant returns to outlay and equality of 
the costs of ca p ita l,  the present value unit cost of water is lower 
fo r the corporate than fo r  the community project. This conclusion 
was seen to result from the corporate income tax structure. However, 
since the unit cost of water fo r  the corporate project was found to 
be greater than the unit cost of water for the community project re­
duced by the product of the corporate tax rate and the community
project's unit cost, the basic conclusion was that the benefit-cost
ra tio  fo r  the community exceeds unity, hence i t  is in the community's 
best in terest to decide in favor of the collective project. In other 
words, the benefits to the community, measured by the cost of the 
best corporate a lte rna t ive , exceeds the a fter-tax  costs associated 
with purchasing from the community project. Inasmuch as the community 
project w i l l  be larger than individual corporate projects, increasing 
returns to scale in the production of water strengthen the advantage 
of the community project. Decreasing returns to scale, on the other 
hand, work to the advantage of the smaller corporate project decreas­
ing the community benefit-cost ra tio . I t  was further argued that such
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differences in the cost of capital as are l ik e ly  to e x is t ,  operate in 
favor of the community project.
The method developed was then applied to a numerical problem. 
For cases l ik e ly  to be relevant--lower costs of capital to the com­
munity than to the corporate project--community benefit-cost ratios  
exceeded unity by a substantial margin. I t  was then shown that con­
struction and consequently maintenance costs for the community project 
must be a great deal higher than those of the corporate project to 
eliminate the advantage of the community project. Thus, although 
diseconomies of scale weaken the conclusion that i t  is more eco­
nomical for the corporation to purchase water from the community 
project, they must be quite strong indeed before the conclusion is 
reversed. In short, the community project is found to have an in ­
herent cost advantage resulting from the corporation income tax struc­
ture. Moreover, this advantage is l ik e ly  to be strengthened by a 
lower cost of capital fo r  the community than for the corporate 
project.
F in a lly , i t  was shown' that the community benefit-cost ra tio  
d iffers  from a benefit-cost ra tio  computed to re f le c t the national 
welfare. A project which is ju s t i f ie d  from the community standpoint 
may not be e f f ic ie n t  fo r  the nation as a whole. However, the national 
computation is more l ik e ly  to y ie ld  ambiguous results than is the 
local analysis because, as ye t, there is no consensus on the level of 
the nation's "social rate of discount."
CHAPTER IV
THE CENTRAL AND WEST COASTAL BASINS 
OF LOS ANGELES: A CASE STUDY
Population growth and industrial development have been accom­
panied by an increasing u t i l iz a t io n  of the limited resources supplied 
by nature. Water is one such resource. Although for some regions 
water has always been a scarce resource, a lack of water in potable 
form has not usually been a deterrent to regional economic develop­
ment. The grov/th process, however, has affected the re la t ive  supply 
of water in two ways: increasing population and industria liza tion
have increased the demand for water, while, simultaneously, the dis­
charge of human and industrial wastes has reduced its  usable supply.
Since the distribution of population and its  growth pattern 
has not coincided with the natural occurrence of water, some areas 
have f e l t  the pressure of population and industrial growth on limited  
water supplies while other areas have continued to enjoy a re la tive  
abundance. The South Coastal area of California generally provides an 
example of an area that quite early experienced a re la tive  scarcity of. 
water. Hydrographically, the area is isolated by high mountains that 
prevent large rivers from entering (H irsh le ife r  e t  a l . ,  1960, p. 293). 
In addition, the area is semi-arid with an annual mean precipitation of 
18 inches. Superimposed upon these desert-like conditions is a rapidly
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growing population and developing industrial complex.
The West Coast and Central Basins extend over 470 square miles
of the Coastal Plain in Los Angeles County. On the inland side the 
surface elevation of the basins is between 200 and 300 feet above 
mean sea level. There is a gradual slope of 10 to 20 feet per mile 
down to the Pacific Ocean. The two basins are geologically separated 
by the Newport-Inglewood Fault which forms an imperfect barrier to 
water transmission in the major aquifers of the basins. Most of the 
water production in the West Coast Basin is obtained from the merged 
Silverado zone of the lower and middle Pleistocene age. The "main 
aquifer" in the Central basin is equivalent to, but separated by the 
fa u l t  from, the Silverado aquifer. The Silverado aquifer consists 
o f rock formed from marine deposits of sand, s i l t  and clay, some one
m illion  years ago. The Silverado aquifer merges with the ocean floor
a short distance offshore. The Central Basin main aquifer does not 
outcrop in the ocean; however, i t  is  interconnected, in some areas, 
with overlying aquifers which do merge with the ocean floor (Milne, 
1968, pp. 127-31).
The experience of Southern California is important in that  
some areas have recently begun to experience, and s t i l l  more areas in 
the near future w il l  begin to experience, the types of water problems 
th a t have faced Southern California for many years. An economic 
evaluation of the measures undertaken by Southern California in deal­
ing with its  water problems, therefore, is of value as a guide to these
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other areas. To survey, in d e ta il ,  measures taken by the entire area, 
however, is fa r  too large a task for such a limited study. Instead 
this study focuses on only a part of California 's  South Coastal area. 
Specifica lly  examined are the measures taken to protect and supplement 
the water supply of the Central and West Basin Replenishment D is t r ic t  
of Los Angeles County (Figure 4-1). Approximately 2.9 million people, 
or some forty percent of the population of metropolitan Los Angeles, 
reside within the D is tr ic t  which has been an area of rapid population 
growth and industria lization .
Water use within the D is tr ic t  has increased steadily , rising  
from about 395,000 acre-feet in 1950 to approximately 560,000 acre- 
fe e t during the water year ending on September 30, 1965. The water 
supply consists of ground water extracted from the two Basins that 
underlie the D is tr ic t  and give i t  i ts  name and, in recent years, im­
ported r ive r  water. As the demand fo r  water has increased i t  has been 
met by an increasing reliance upon imported water. In 1950, fo r  
example, the direct use of imported water amounted to only 74,000 
acre-feet, but by 1965, 287,000 acre-feet of imported water, or 
s lig h tly  more than 50 percent of the to ta l used, was delivered 
d irec tly . Moreover, imported water has been an important source of 
recharge for the ground-water basins.
Currently, the West and Central ground-water basins y ie ld  an
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annual production of 280,000 acre-feet of ground water. As natural 
recharge is  not suffic ient to sustain production at this leve l, large 
amounts of imported water, local runoff and small amounts of reclaimed 
sewage are spread in the forebay, or non-pressure area and jo in  the 
body of ground water in the aquifers of the seaward pressure area. 
However, the location of principal well f ie lds in the pressure area 
at some distance from the forebay has meant that spreading alone has 
not been su ffic ien t to prevent intrusion of ocean-water at existing 
levels of production. As a consequence, two fresh-water injection  
barriers have been constructed and these serve as an additional source 
of recharge.
Direct delivery of Colorado River water via the Metropolitan 
Water D is t r ic t 's  Colorado River Aqueduct is the principal source of 
imported water. In addition, about 25,000 acre-feet of water is ob­
tained through the Whittier Narrows from the Upper San Gabriel Valley. 
F ina lly , that part of the D is tr ic t  that lies  within Los Angeles proper 
also receives Owens River-Mono Basin water from the Sierra Nevada 
mountains which is commingled with ground water from the San Fernando 
Valley and delivered through the Los Angeles Aqueduct (Central and 
West Basin Water Replenishment D is tr ic t ,  1966, pp. 25-29).
The hydrographical characteristics of the Replenishment D is tr ic t  
combined with its  high population density and industrial base have led 
to a high cost of water. Bookman and Edmonston (Central and West Basin 
Water Replenishment D is t r ic t ,  1967, pp. 12-14), Consulting C ivil
97
Engineers for the Central and West Basin Water Replenishment D is tr ic t ,  
estimate that the capital investment in local water fa c i l i t ie s  in the 
D is tr ic t  totals $423 million (reproduction cost-new). The annual 
total cost of ground-water well production, including cost of opera­
tion , maintenance and amortization for the wells as well as for the 
spreading and barrier f a c i l i t ie s  is approximately $51 m illion . To 
this must be added a $14 million yearly cost of purchasing imported 
water, a basic M.W.D. tax of $9 m ill ion , which does not include special 
"back taxes" which are paid by areas of the D is tr ic t  annexed to the 
M.W.D. subsequent to its  inception, and approximately $3 million in 
yearly earnings of private water companies. The resulting total cost 
of $77 million divided by the current annual use of about 600,000 
acre-feet yields an average cost approximating $130 per acre-foot.
Averages, however, may be highly misleading and the average 
cost quoted fo r  water in the Replenishment D is tr ic t  is no exception.
The purpose of this case study is ,  f i r s t  to examine in detail average 
and marginal costs of water both to individual users and to the Dis­
t r i c t  as a whole. E ff ic ien t u t i l iz a t io n  of water requires that the 
limited supply be allocated in such a way that the value of an incre­
ment be the same in each use and be equal to its  cost to society. A 
second purpose of this study is to determine to what extent existing  
arrangements e ither aid in or hinder e f f ic ie n t  allocation. To these 
ends an analysis is f i r s t  made of the average and marginal costs of 
ground water to ground-water producers and then private and social
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costs of ground-water production are compared, drawing implications 
fo r  economic effic iency. Next, the cost of imported water is examined 
and the pricing practices of the Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t  of Sou­
thern California are analyzed. F inally , the question of the conjunc­
t ive  use of water is explored, and the rationing of ground-water through 
quotas is compared with a pumping assessment a lternative .
Ground Water
The Central and West Coast ground-water basins are fed natu­
r a l ly  by percolation in the forebay areas located in the northeastern 
part of Central Basin. O rig inally , water moved through the aquifers 
to the south and west in a seaward direction. About 10,000 acre-feet 
per year flowed across the Newport-Inglewood fa u l t ,  which separates 
the two basins, into the West Coast Basin. Some water also flowed 
from the Central Basin into the ground-water basins of Orange County 
to the south. Fresh water from the basins f in a l ly  moved into the 
Pacific  Ocean a t  points of aquifer outcrop.
From modest beginnings late in the las t century, ground-water 
production increased u n t i l ,  in the 1930's, withdrawals began to exceed 
to ta l recharge. As water levels in the West Coast Basin declined, the 
movement across the fa u lt  from the Central Basin increased to its  
present level of 20,000 to 25,000 acre-feet each year. Further, in ­
creased production in the Central Basin has reversed the flow across 
the Orange County line so that now approximately 29,000 acre-feet of 
water moves annually from Orange County into Central Basin. Of more
significance, pumpage in excess of natural recharge reversed the 
natural seaward gradient and sea water began to move into the aqui­
fers along the coast l in e , causing the abandonment of some wells in 
coastal communities and threatening contamination o f much of the re­
mainder of the ground-water basins (Ostrom, E., 1965, pp. 110-112).
Quite early , private water companies, county waterworks dis­
t r ic t s ,  c i t ie s ,  industrial plants, and concerned private citizens  
became involved in efforts  both to preserve and to supplement the 
existing water supply (Ostrom, V . , 1953, pp. 116-122). The execution 
of each scheme occasioned the formation of some new agency or the as­
signment of new responsibilities to existing agencies. No existing  
agency was given overall authority nor was any new agency created with 
such powers. Despite this p ro life ra tion  of agencies and division of 
responsib ilit ies , however, the handling of the basins' water problems 
has been well coordinated through voluntary agreement among the 
agencies (Bookman, 1967, pp. 5-22).
Four principal measures have been taken to protect the ground­
water supply. F irs t ,  fa c i l i t ie s  were constructed fo r the capture and 
spreading of local runoff fo r percolation into the principal aquifers. 
During the period 1938 through 1966, an annual average of 27,000 acre- 
fee t of runoff was conserved and spread. Currently runoff conserva­
tion is averaging about 38,000 acre-feet per year (Milne, 1968, p. 139). 
The wide variation in prec ip itation  and hence in the a v a i la b i l i ty  of 
local runoff prompted the D is tr ic t  to seek a supplemental source of
TOO
water for spreading. Thus, a second measure which has been taken is 
the purchase of water fo r spreading. In recent years an average of 
approximately 130,000 acre-feet has been purchased for spreading in 
the forebay areas. Most of this has been Colorado River water pur­
chased at special off-peak rates from the Metropolitan Water D is t r ic t ,  
but some 15,000 acre-feet of reclaimed sewage also is spread each year 
(Central and West Basin Water Replenishment D is tr ic t ,  1966, p. 54).
Another measure was the adjudication of ground water rights, 
f i r s t  in the West Basin and then in the Central Basin, in an attempt 
to f ix  maximum production levels and to ration the existing supply.
An interim agreement executed on March 1, 1955, voluntarily  restricted  
pumping in the West Coast Basin. On October 1, 1961, l i t ig a t io n  was 
completed and adjudicated water rights were established totaling  
64,137.55 acre-feet per year. An agreement to re s tr ic t  production in 
the Central Basin became effective on October 1, 1963, and f in a l  
judgment was rendered e ffec tive  October 1, 1966, lim iting to ta l water 
pumpage to 217,400 acre-feet per year. Current annual extractions 
closely approximate the total adjudicated rights fo r  the two basins 
(Milne, 1968, pp. 133, 139).
The fourth and most recent measure has been the construction 
o f two fresh-water in jection barriers at points of salt-water in tru ­
sion. The f i r s t  barr ier  project, ultimately an 11-mile string of 
injection wells now (11969) about 70 percent complete, b u i l t  to pro­
tect the West Basin, u t i l iz e s  about 45,000 acre-feet of Colorado
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River Water, while 5,000 acre-feet are injected in the one-mile Ala­
rm* tos barr ier  project, protecting a portion of the Central Basin 
(Bruington, 1968, p. 162). In addition, a th ird barrier project has 
been proposed to protect the West Coast Basin at Dominguez Gap 
(Central and West Basin Water Replenishment D is tr ic t ,  1966, p, 20). 
Despite the measures taken to protect existing ground water supplies, 
i t  has been necessary to meet the D is tr ic t 's  growing demand fo r  water 
by importing increasing amounts of Colorado River water.
Each of these undertakings involve costs and, with the excep­
tion of adjudication, the costs are covered by annual payments in the 
form of ad valorem taxes, pumping assessments, or d irect payments for  
purchased water. The cost to any user must be determined by adding 
ad valorem taxes to the direct cost of producing or purchasing water.
Costs to Water Users
Direct Costs to Ground-Water Users
The d irect cost of ground water to an individual producer in ­
cludes: (1) capital costs associated with d r i l l in g  and well comple­
t io n , (2) pumping costs, and (3) the Central and West Basin Water Re­
plenishment D is tr ic t  pumping assessment. Capital costs per acre-foot 
produced are affected by a number of variables, depth and diameter of 
the w e ll ,  type of pipe and appurtenances and, most important, the 
extent of u t i l iz a t io n .  Thus any estimate of average capital recovery 
costs is quite arb itra ry . A figure of $2.80 per acre-foot has been
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taken as representative fo r  a firm producing between 1,000 and 1,400 
acre-feet of ground water per year.^ Pumping costs have been e s t i ­
mated at about $7.00 per acre-foot on the basis of data obtained from 
the Los Angeles Flood Control D is tr ic t .  The Replenishment D istric t's  
pumping assessment is based upon the annual replenishment needs of 
the basins. For the water year 1966-67, the assessment was $6.20 per 
acre-foot (Central and West Basin Replenishment D is tr ic t ,  1966, p. 63). 
Thus, the average producer of ground water with completed wells bears
a direct cost of $16.00 per acre-foot of which $13.20 per acre-foot 
represents short run variable costs.
Indirect Costs to Ground-Water Users
Several special ad valorem taxes provide revenue to finance 
the D is tr ic t 's  water program. Since these taxes are levied on property 
values, the amount of tax paid is independent of the amount of water 
used by individual consumers and may be treated as a fixed cost that 
varies only when tax rates or assessed property valuations vary.
This is important: I t  means that a substantial portion of the cost
of water is made independent of water use and is borne by the property 
owner.
V o r  a quite d iffe ren t and higher estimate see Bookman and Ed- 
monston (Central and West Basin Water Replenishment D is t r ic t ,  1967, 
p. 10). The estimate in this study is based upon figures obtained 
from the Los Angeles Flood Control D is tr ic t  in 1966.
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An ad valorem tax is levied to support the Los Angeles Flood 
Control D is tr ic t 's  benefit Zones I and I I ,  which together encompass 
most of the Replenishment D is tr ic t. Receipts from this tax are used 
to purchase replenishment water and to finance the construction of 
barrier  projects. In fiscal 1967, the rate was $0.05 per $100 of the 
assessed valuations of land and improvements. The Flood Control Dis­
t r ic t 's  fund is also supported by an ad valorem levy, and a part of 
this revenue is used to finance spreading operations. That portion of 
the general fund levy used for spreading was estimated to be $0.00369 
per $100 of assessed valuation of land and improvements in fiscal 
1967.2
The Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t  also levies property taxes to 
meet a portion of the current and expected future cost of importing
3
water into the area. In fiscal 1967, the rate was $0.14 per $100 o f  
assessed valuation on a ll  taxable property, including "personal 
property" as well as land and improvements. In addition, a special
2The rate is calculated as follows: the cost of spreading
130,000 acre-feet of purchased water, including sewage, is estimated 
to be $1 per acre-foot. Estimated cost of spreading the current 
average of about 38,000 acre-feet of runoff is $10 per acre-foot.
Thus the to ta l cost of spreading operations including amortization of 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  is approximately $510,000, representing 2.46 percent of 
the $20,736,944 collected from the fu l l  general fund levy, or 
$0.00369 of the $0.15 per $100 total tax rate.
3
The balance is paid d irec tly  by the West Basin and Central 
Basin Municipal Water D istricts which function as wholesaling agen­
cies. These d is tr ic ts  in turn receive payments from users.
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assessment for "back taxes" is collected from those parts of the 
basins that were annexed to M.W.D. subsequent to i ts  in i t ia l  deliveries  
of Colorado River water to the Los Angeles metropolitan area. These 
"back taxes" vary widely within the D is t r ic t ,  now ranging from zero to 
$0,13 per $100 of assessed valuation on a l l  taxable property, and w i l l  
continue for some years into the future: In the o rig inally  annexed
portion of the West Coast Basin until 1978; in the Central Basin 
original area until 1984.
Finally the Central and West Basin Water Replenishment D is tr ic t  
i t s e l f  levies a property tax to cover the administrative costs con­
nected with the D is tr ic t 's  replenishment a c t iv i t ie s ;  the rate for f i s ­
cal 1967 was $0,002 per $100 of assessed valuation (Los Angeles County, 
1967, pp. 49-76). The average ratio  of assessed value to actual value 
or selling price for residential property is about 20 percent in Los 
Angeles County. I t  is believed that the assessment ratio  for indus­
t r ia l  property is considerably higher— in the v ic in ity  of 45 percent 
of market value. The assessment ratio  fo r public u t i l i t i e s  is thought 
to be close to 50 percent. By 1971, however, the state plans to have 
a ll  assessments equalized at 25 percent of market value (personal con­
versation, Mr. Frank T h i l l ,  California Taxpayers'Association).
.Average Total Costs of Ground Water
Estimated average to ta l costs fo r  ground water production are 
shown in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 for companies with market values of $10,
50, and 100 million and for selected annual pumping rates from 50 to
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TABLE 4-1. Average Total Water Costs to Ground-Water 
Producers--M.W.D. Tax $0.14 per $100 
(Dollars per Acre-Foot)
Yearly Ground 
Water Production 
(Acre-Feet)
Plant Valuation--Market Value.
$10,000,000 $50,000,000 $100,000,000
50 193.16 837.48 1,642.88
100 103.18 425.34 828.04
500 33.09 97.52 178.06
1,000 24.18 56.40 96.67
5,000 16.58 23.02 31.08
10,000 15.68 18.91 22.93
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TABLE 4-2. Average Total Water Costs to Ground-Water 
Producers--M.W.D. Tax $0.27 per $100 
(Dollars per Acre-Foot)
Yearly Ground 
Water Production 
(Acre-Feet)
Plant Va1uation--Market Value
$10,000,000 $50,000,000 $100,000,00C
50 310.16 1,422.48 2,812.88
100 161.68 717.84 1,413.04
500 44.79 156.02 295.06
1,000 30.03 85.65 155.17
5,000 17.75 28.87 42.78
10,000 16.27 21.83 28.78
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10,000 acre-feet. Detailed methods of calculation are presented in 
the Appendix, Example 1. For s im plic ity , the effects of corporate 
income tax on a fte r -ta x  costs are ignored; however, no qualitative  
changes would result from their inclusion in the analysis of this 
Chapter.
The calculations in Table 4-1 use the minimum or normal M.W.D. 
levy, while those in Table 4-2 use the maximum rate of $0.27 per $100 
of assessed valuation. A comparison of the tables indicates that 
location within the D is tr ic t  makes a substantial difference in unit 
costs of water. For example, a user with a $50,000,000 plant produc­
ing 1,000 acre-feet per year, but located in an area not paying "back 
taxes" to the M.W.D. had a cost of $56.40 per acre-foot, whereas the 
cost per acre-foot for a comparable plant located in an area subject 
to the highest M.W.D. levy is $85.65.
The rea lly  important point demonstrated by Tables 4-1 and 4-2 
is that the e ffective cost of ground water per acre-foot varies in ­
versely with ground water production. Again, the reason is that a 
not ins ign ificant part of the cost is borne in the form of ad valorem 
or property taxes and is thus independent of water use. What this 
means is that property owners who do not use ground water, in e ffe c t,  
subsidize ground-water users. Such an arrangement raises questions of 
both equity and economic efficiency. On equity grounds the heavy re­
liance on ad valorem taxes has been ju s t i f ie d  "by those who made the 
decision on the assumption that the land value had increased as a
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result of the assurance of a firm water supply." In e f fe c t ,  i t  was 
"assumed that a positive externality  had been created of benefit to 
the taxpayer which was as large or larger than the tax burden"
(Ostrom, E . , 1965, pp. 570-71). No attempt is made to appraise this  
equity argument; at best i t  appears questionable.
The most important critic ism  of the extensive use of ad valorem 
taxes is that i t  leads to an in e ff ic ie n t allocation of resources. Con­
sider f i r s t  the direct cost of producing an additional acre-foot of 
ground water to the water user. Provided his wells are being operated 
at a level below capacity, the cost to him of producing an additional 
acre-foot of water is the sum of the pumping cost and the D is tr ic t 's  
pumping assessment or $13.20 per acre-foot. This figure may be taken 
as representative of what the economist refers to as short-run marginal 
cost--the cost of increasing production by a small amount. By consid­
ering the short-run marginal cost to be constant up to well capacity, 
this study neglects the e ffec t of increased pumping on water levels 
and hence upon pumping costs. A ju s t if ic a t io n  for doing so is that 
given a high coeffic ient of aquifer transm issib ility , small incremental 
increases in pumping by one producer w il l  have negligible effects on
4
water lev e ls .
^Contrast this to H irshle ifer e t a l . (1960, p. 65) who consider 
the case of an individual producer whose pumping does draw down his own 
water levels , generating a rising marginal cost curve. Here fa l l in g -  
water levels also a ffec t his neighbor's cost pushing marginal social 
costs above marginal private costs. This poss ib ility  is not included 
in the analysis of this Chapter. Moreover, the assumption is made
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Once the total capacity of a producer's wells is reached, he 
can increase production only by expanding the existing capacity of his 
well f ie ld .  The cost of producing a small increment of water thus 
rises sharply at the capacity level or, as the economist would put 
i t ,  marginal cost is discontinuous at the capacity output. Decisions 
to expand capacity or fo r that matter to maintain capacity in tact in ­
volve a consideration of capital costs. Capital costs per unit vary 
immensely with the level of production between well additions, reaching 
a minimum of $1.64 per acre-foot as an existing well f ie ld  is used to 
capacity. Thus, the minimum capital recovery cost that must be con­
sidered in decisions to a lte r  existing capacity is $1.64 per acre-foot. 
Addition of this figure to short-run average variable, or marginal, 
costs yields the minimum long-run average variable cost of $14.84 per 
acre-foot to the individual producers of ground water. In practice, 
however, well fie lds w i l l  not be operated at fu l l  capacity so that the 
unit capital recovery cost w i l l  exceed $1.64 per acre-foot. Using an
that marginal pumping cost is the same for every pumper. I t  is recog­
nized that this assumption is incorrect to the extent that there is 
variation in well depths measured from the land surface to the well 
water levels.
5
This represents the unit capital recovery cost fo r a 2,420 
acre-feet per year well used to capacity. Calculation has been made 
-in the manner of Example 1 in the Appendix.
®In the usual case no distinction would be made between long- 
run average total and long-run average variable cost. The distinction  
must be made here because the ad valorem taxes in the costs do not 
vary with output e ither in the long or short run.
no
estimate of capital recovery cost of $2.80, an estimate of long-run 
marginal private cost would be approximately $16.00 per acre-foot.
To summarize the findings with respect to private costs: an
important part of the total cost of ground water is fixed, or indepen­
dent of the amount produced by the individual producer, in both the 
short and the long run. Consequently, average total costs of produc­
tion vary inversely with the level of production. Average variable 
cost and hence marginal cost is constant in the short run, and for  
levels of output below capacity, can be represented as the sum of pump­
ing costs and the pumping assessment, or $13.20 per acre-foot. F i­
n a lly , in what the economist refers to as the long run, capacity is a 
variable that can e ither be expanded by the addition of wells or con­
tracted by fa i l in g  to replace depreciating equipment. Thus in the 
long run capital recovery costs must be included. The figure of
$16.00 has been taken, somewhat a r b i t ra r i ly ,  as an approximation of
long-run average variable and marginal cost. The relationship between
long-run average to ta l and marginal cost is depicted in Figure 4-2.
Social Cost of Ground Water
As noted e a r l ie r ,  the e ffec t of financing part of the costs of
protecting and supplementing the water supply by ad valorem taxes is to 
.transfer costs from water users to property owners generally. A second
and more important e ffec t is to cause a divergence between private and
social costs. What is rea lly  s ignificant from the standpoint of eco­
nomic efficiency is the resulting discrepancy between marginal social
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cost and marginal private cost. I t  is  now appropriate, therefore, to 
calculate the marginal social cost of ground water, to compare i t  with 
the marginal private cost, and f in a l ly  to draw efficiency implica- 
t i  ons.
Receipts from three of the ad valorem taxes are used to de­
fray costs that, from the D istric t's  standpoint, are variable. The 
costs of ground-water replenishment and barr ier  construction are va­
riable in the sense that they depend upon the level of ground-water 
production. The e f fe c t  of financing these costs by ad valorem taxes 
is to convert them in to  costs that are fixed from the standpoint of 
water producers. A computation of estimated total and average varia­
ble social cost of ground-water production is presented in Table 4-3. 
The calculated figure is $25.39--substantially higher than the $16.00 
long-run average variable private costs.
The relationship between average variable social cost and 
marginal social cost is  more tenuous than the relationship between 
average and marginal private costs. In the la t te r  case, average and 
marginal costs could be treated as constant and hence equal in both 
the short and the long run. In the former case, however, such an 
assumption is unwarranted. Increased production in the basins leads 
to reduced water levels and, as a re s u lt ,  higher pumping costs to a l l  
producers. Moreover, higher production levels intensify the problem 
of salt-water intrusion. A rising average variable social cost for  
ground-water implies that marginal social cost lies above average
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variable cost. Thus, although the estimated average variable cost of 
$25.39 is used as a proxy for marginal social cost, i t  must be recog­
nized that this figure may be well below the "true" marginal social 
cost.
TABLE 4-3. Total and Average Variable Social Cost of
Ground Water in the West and Central Basin
Replenishment D is tr ic t
Pumping Cost, 280,000 acre-feet,
at $7.00 per acre-foot $1,960,000
Pumping Assessment, 280,000 acre-feet,
at $6.20 per acre-foot 1,736,000
Capital Recovery Cost, 280,000 acre-feet,
at $2.80 per acre-foot 784,000
Zone I or I I  Ad Valorem Levy 2,019,000
Los Angeles Flood Control General Fund Tax--
portion financing spreading 510,000
West and Central Basin Water Replenishment
D is tr ic t  Tax 100,000
Total Variable Social Cost $7,109,000
Average Variable Social Cost $25.39 per acre -foot
As previously stated, efficiency in resource allocation re­
quires that the value of an additional unit of a resource, i ts  margi­
nal value in use, be equal to i ts  marginal social cost, or the cost 
to society of an additional unit of that resource. The marginal value 
in use of a given quantity of water is determined by the price that 
users are w ill in g  to pay to obtain that quantity. The demand curve
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fo r water, in other words, is a relationship between its  marginal 
value in use and the quantity consumed. For the ultimate consumer, 
the demand for water depends upon his subjective valuation or tastes, 
income, and the re la t iv e  prices of other goods. The industrial 
demand is a derived demand--it depends upon the demand for the out­
puts of the productive process. The shape and level of the business 
firm 's demand schedule is also influenced by the state of technology 
and the prices of other resources or inputs. The essential point is 
that the quantity of water demanded is a decreasing function of the 
price that must be paid, e ither by consumers or by business firms.
Put another way, the marginal value in use declines as quantity is 
increased.
This argument is given a diagrammatic representation in 
Figure 4-3. Let the curve labeled MVU represent the demand curve of 
any individual user of ground water, the curve MCp is the marginal 
private cost (estimated to be $16.00) and the curve MCg is the m arg i ­
nal social cost, which is at least $25.39. The individual user has 
incentive to increase his use to the point where the marginal cost to 
him is equal to his marginal value in use. At smaller quantities, the 
value of an additional unit of water is more than its  cost to him.
For greater quantities, however, the cost of additional units 
exceeds th e ir  value and the user would gain by diminishing his use. 
Thus, the quantity Qq represents the optimal quantity to the individual 
producer. At this level of use, however, the marginal social cost is
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greater than the marginal value in use to the individual user. I f  
the marginal value in use to the individual user reflects the marginal 
value in use to society, then cost to society of an incremental unit 
of water exceeds its  value to society. In short, too much water is 
used. The e ffec t of sh ifting a portion of the variable cost from the 
user to the property holder is to encourage an overuse of ground-water. 
More e f f ic ie n t  u t i l iz a t io n  of the existing ground-water supply would 
be achieved by transferring part of the costs of replenishment from 
ad valorem taxes to the pumping assessment. As the cost to the in d i­
vidual user is increased, the amount, pumped w il l  be reduced. Reduced 
pumping w i l l  raise water levels and diminish marginal social cost.
Imported Water
The Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t  which was formed in 1928 to 
bring Colorado River Water to the South Coastal Area of California  
serves an area extending from the Santa Monica Mountains, jus t north 
of Los Angeles, to the Mexican border. Deliveries through the 242-mile 
long aqueduct, constructed at an in i t i a l  cost of $181 m ill io n , began 
in 1941. I t  was not un til 1948, however, that the West Coast Basin 
was annexed to the Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t ,  and M.W.D. water was 
not u t i l ize d  in the Central Basin until 1955 (Ostrom, E . , 1965, 
pp. 292, 494). M.W.D. delivers water to the Replenishment D is tr ic t  
selling the water to the West Basin and Central Basin Municipal Water 
D istric ts . These agencies, in turn, act as wholesalers, se lling  to
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municipal and private water companies, as well as to industrial 
firms, at the M.W.D. price plus a charge of $0.50 per acre-foot by the 
West Basin Municipal Water D is tr ic t  and a charge of $1.00 per acre-foot 
by the Central Basin Municipal Water D is tr ic t .
Throughout i ts  early history, the Colorado River Aqueduct ope­
rated well below capacity. Indeed, until 1962 deliveries never ex­
ceeded one million acre-feet. Prices that covered fu l l  costs would 
have been prohibitive so ad valorem taxes were imposed to finance the 
d e f ic i t  between costs and sales revenue. In fiscal 1965-66, for ex­
ample, the Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t  collected over $35 m illion in 
ad valorem taxes while to ta l revenue from water sales was only $28 
m illion . In addition, the M.W.D. has apparently followed a discrimina­
tory pricing policy, charging lower prices to agricultural users and 
for water used for replenishment; however, to some extent at least, 
th e ir  price differences may be due to cost differences. The rates 
charged by M.W.D. throughout its  history are presented in Table 4-4.
I t  should be noted that rates have risen substantially since 1948, a 
factor which combined with a .rising quantity has meant that sales 
revenue has been more than su ffic ien t to cover fu l l  cost during the 
three-year period ending June 20, 1966 (M.W.D., 1966, p. 193).
Despite these surpluses, i t  is anticipated that ad valorem 
taxes w i l l  not be reduced and that M.W.D. water prices w il l  continue 
to rise. By 1972, the M.W.D. w il l  begin to handle deliveries of 
Feather River water from Northern California at an estimated cost of
TABLE 4-4. Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t  Rate History 
(Dollars per Acre-Foot)
Date Normal Agriculture & Replenishment
From To
Softened & 
Filtered Fi 1 tered Untreated
Softened & 
F i1tered F i1tered Untreated
12-20-1940 6-30-1948 $15.00 $8.00
7-1-48 6-30-50 18.00 8.00
7-1-50 11-30-54 20.00 10.00
12-1-54 4-30-55 18.00 8.00
5-1-55 10-31-55 22.00 10.00
11-1-55 11-30-55 18.00 8.00 -------- --------
12-1-55 4-30-56 20.00 10.00 $18.00* $ 8.00*
4-30-56 6-30-57 20.00 10.00 -------- --------
7-1-57 6-30-58 22.00 12.00 _ _ — -----
7-1-58 6-30-60 25.00 15.00 22.00 12.00
7-1-60 12-31-60 23.00 15.00 20.00 12.00
1-1-61 12-31-61 25.00 17.00 20.75 12.75
1-1-62 12-31-62 27.00 19.00 21.50 13.50
1-1-63 12-31-63 29.00 -------- 21.00 22.25 14.25
1-1-64 6-30-64 32.00 $29.00 24.00 23.00 $20.00 15.00
7-1-64 6-30-65 34.00 30.00 25.00 24.25 20.25 15.25
7-1-65 6-30-66 37.00 33.00 28.00 25.00 21.00 16.00
7-1-66 6-30-67 40.00 36.00 31.00 26.00 22.00 17.00
7-1-67 6-30-68 43.00 39.00 34.00 27.00 23.00 18.00
7-1-68 (Scheduled Rates) 46.00 42.00 37.00 28.00 24.00 19.00
^Special prices during specified period covered sales of water for surface and underground storage.
Source: Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t  of Southern Californ ia , Annual Reports for the Fiscal Year
1940-1965.
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$65 per acre-foot for new water (H irsh le ife r  and Milliman, 1967, 
p. 175). Past history suggests that the rising cost of imported 
water w il l  be met by some combination of increased price and ad valorem 
taxes.
Cost to Water Users
The d irect cost of imported water to the user includes the 
price that he must pay to the municipal water d is tr ic t  which, for  
softened and f i l te re d  water in fiscal 1967, was $40.50 per acre-foot 
in the West Basin and $41.00 per acre-foot in the Central Basin. In 
addition, the user of M.W.D. water must in i t i a l l y  pay for a connection 
to a M.W.D. feeder which for a typical industrial plant located in a 
feeder area would cost between $30,000 and $50,000 (personal con­
versation, Clinton Milne, Los Angeles Flood Control D is t r ic t ) .  I f  
the plant is not located in a feeder area, i t  must also bear the cost 
of a line from the feeder to the plant. Furthermore, the user of im­
ported water may need to provide storage s u ff ic ie n t to temporarily f i l l  
his needs in the event of a line breakdown. Thus the industrial water 
user has capital recovery costs as well. Of course, the user of M.W.D. 
water also pays the same ad valorem taxes that the ground-water users 
must pay.
Estimated average to ta l costs for imported water in the West 
Coast Basin are presented in Tables 4-5 and 4-6 for plants with market 
values of $10 m illio n , $50 m illio n , and $100 m illion at selected use 
levels between 50 and 10,000 acre-feet per year. A sample calculation
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TABLE 4-5. Average Total Costs of Imported Water to 
West Basin Water Users--M.W.D. Tax $0.14 
per $100
(Dollars per Acre-Foot)*
Yearly Water 
Use--Acre-Feet
Plant Valuation—Market Value
$10,000,000 $50,000,000 $100,000,000
50 257.58 901.90 1,707.30
100 149.04 471.20 873.90
500 62.21 126.64 207.18
1,000 51.35 83.57 123.84
5,000 42.67 49.11 57.17
10,000 41.58 44.81 48.83
*For Central Basin add $0.50 per acre-foot fo r  the additional
charge of the Central Basin Municipal Water D is t r ic t .
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TABLE 4-6. Average Total Costs of Imported Water to West 
Basin Water Users--M.W.D. Tax $0.27 per $100 
(Dollars per Acre-Foot)*
Yearly Water 
Use--Acre-Feet
Plant Valuation--Market Value
$10,000,000 $50,000,000 $100,000,000
50 374.58 1,486.90 2,877.30
100 207.54 763.70 1,458.90
500 73.91 185.14 324.18
1,000 57.20 112.82 182.34
5,000 43.84 54.96 68.87
10,000 42.17 47.73 54.68
*For Central Basin add $0.50 per acre-foot fo r  the additional
charge of the Central Basin Municipal Water D is t r ic t .
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is provided in the Appendix, Example 2. The only difference between 
Tables 4-5 and 4-5 is that in the former the minimum M.W.D. levy of 
$0.14 per $100 of assessed valuation is used, while the la t te r  is based 
on the highest rate of $0.27 per $100. The differences within rows of 
either table , reading from le f t  to r ig h t ,  indicate the e f fe c t  of 
property values on imported water costs, whereas differences within 
a given column indicate the inverse relationship between use and 
average cost attributable to ad valorem taxes. Comparison of an 
entry in Table 4-5 with the corresponding entry in Table 4-6 indicates 
the e ffec t of location within the basin and hence the level of the 
M.W.D. ad valorem tax on unit cost. F ina lly , a comparison of Table 4-5 
with Table 4-1 (page 105) or Table 4-6 with Table 4-2 (page 106) reveals, 
as indeed has much of the previous discussion, the large d if fe re n tia l  
between the cost of ground water and the cost of imported water.
Social Cost of Imported Water
The short-run marginal social cost of M.W.D. water to the Cen­
tra l  and West Coast Replenishment D is tr ic t  is fixed by the pricing  
policy of the M.W.D. and for normal use was equal in fisca l 1967 to the 
short-run marginal private cost of $41.00 in the Central Basin and 
$40.50 in the West Basin. Long-run marginal social cost must take into  
account the construction of Additional feeders and connections to feed­
ers. To the extent that these costs are borne by water users e ither in 
the forms of increased prices or in i t ia l  capital outlays long-run
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marginal private costs accurately re f le c t  social costs. To the extent 
that construction of new feeders by the M.W.D. are financed by ad 
valorem taxes, however, long-run marginal’private costs f a l l  below 
long-run marginal social costs. Discrepancies between social and 
private marginal costs of imported water, i f  such ex is t, are not of 
the magnitude of those between the marginal social and private costs 
of ground water and may, for e l l  practical purposes, be ignored.
A more fundamental question concerns the pricing policy of 
the Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t .  Does the price, or l i s t  of prices, 
charged by the M.W.D. correspond to the marginal social cost of im­
ported water? This question is not easily answered. One may f i r s t  
question the timing of the construction of the Colorado River Aqueduct. 
Economic ju s t if ic a t io n  would have required that the total a fte r -ta x  
present value unit cost of Aqueduct water, delivered to the South 
Coastal Area be no higher than the a fte r -ta x  unit cost of the existing  
supply at the time deliveries f i r s t  began. The Aqueduct operated well 
below capacity for many years a f te r  deliveries began, despite the f i ­
nancing of the major portion of i ts  cost by ad valorem taxes. This, 
coupled with the fact that M.W.D. prices alone.have exceeded ground­
water costs fo r many years, is evidence that construction of the Aque­
duct was premature, and that capacity was overbuilt. In short, the 
marginal social cost of Colorado River water greatly exceeded its  mar­
ginal value in use.
Once the Aqueduct was in operation, however, the costs of its
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construction became irrelevant for pricing policy. Provided that the 
Aqueduct is operated at less than capacity, the marginal social cost of 
delivering an additional acre-foot of water to southern California is 
simply the addition to operating costs plus the cost of such additional 
feeders and other fa c i l i t ie s  as may be required. An attempt was made 
to estimate this marginal cost from data taken from the annual reports 
of the Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t  from 1946 to 1965. Since annual 
sales consist of sales of both softened and f i l te r e d ,  and untreated 
water, an output index was constructed by weighting each type of water 
by its  average price, the underlying assumption being that price d i f ­
fe rentia ls  reflected cost d i f fe re n t ia ls .7 Second, to compensate for 
changes in the price le v e l,  a ll  costs, except depreciation and in teres t,  
were deflated by an index of earnings in contract construction in 
Californ ia . A scatter diagram relating deflated cost figures to output 
was then plotted (Figure 4-4).
The scatter of points appeared approximately linear so that a 
linear estimating equation was used and the parameters were estimated 
by a "least-squares" regression of deflated cost on quantity. The re­
sulting regression equation is
7This assumption is not en tire ly  accurate. Part of the average 
price d if fe re n tia l probably resulted from price discrimination based on 
demand d iffe re n tia ls . The remaining differences between M.W.D.'s 
prices fo r  "normal" and "agriculture and replenishment use," however, 
are c learly  not due to discrimination. Deliveries through laterals  
extended into the highly populated areas are undoubtedly more costly 
than agricultural and replenishment deliveries.
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FIGURE 4-4. Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t Adjusted
Total Costs and Adjusted Output, 1946-1965. 
(Quantity, 1964-65 = 100; Price 1965 = 100)
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y = 10.25(106) + 13.76 x 
c [0.725] (4-1)
the coeffic ient of determination r 2 is 0.953, the standard error of
the regression is 1.16 (10e) ,  and the standard error of b, the marginal
cost estimate of $13.76, is $0,725.
Although application of the t  test to the slope of equation
(4-1) would lead to acceptance of b f  0 at the 0.001 level of confi­
dence, visual inspection of the data suggests that the high correla­
tion between quantity and cost might be due to serial correlation in 
the unexplained residuals. Computation of a Durbin-Watson s ta t is t ic  
of -0.0458 apparently verif ies  lack of randomness in the residuals 
(Durbin and Watson, 1950, pp. 409-28, and 1951, pp. 159-78).
The f i r s t  differences of deflated cost were then regressed 
upon f i r s t  differences of adjusted quantities to compensate for the 
auto-correlated errors (Cochrane and Orcutt, 1949, pp. 32-61). A 
scatter diagram for this regression is given in Figure 4-5. The f i r s t  
difference procedure yields the estimating equation
Ayc = 5 .338(10")  + 13.73AX. ( 4 -2 )
[3 4 .6 5 7 (1 0 " ) ]  [ 4 .4 8 7 ]
The Durbin-Watson s ta t is t ic  for the regression of f i r s t  differences is 
1.4031 permitting acceptance at the 0.02 level of the hypothesis that
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residuals are now random. The slope of the regression of f i r s t  d i f fe r ­
ences is almost identical to the slope of expression (4-1) which u t i ­
lized actual magnitudes, although the r2 value has been reduced to 
0.355 and the standard error of b has been increased to $4,487. De­
spite this large standard error the estimate of the slope b is s t i l l  
s ig n if ican tly  d iffe re n t from zero at the 0,01 leve l. And a test of 
significance of the intercept leads to acceptance of the hypothesis 
that i t  is not s ig n if ican tly  d iffe ren t from zero, as indeed i t  should
not be, at the 0.01 level of confidence.
I t  appears then that $13.73 per acre-foot, in 1965 prices, can
be taken as a reasonable point estimate of the marginal cost of M.W.D. 
water fo r the period prior to 1962 when the Colorado River Aqueduct 
was operated with excess capacity. A comparison of the marginal cost 
of M.W.D. and the lowest rate , the rate for untreated water for agri­
culture and replenishment, charged by the M.W.D. is provided by 
Table 4-7. To obtain comparability, M.W.D. rates have been deflated 
by the price index used to deflate costs, so that a l l  rates are in 
1965 dollars. Only in 1956 is the price (adjusted) charged fo r  un­
treated water lower than the estimated marginal cost of $13.73 an 
acre-foot. Since, however, the estimated marginal cost is an average 
applicable to both treated and untreated water, i t  seems reasonable 
-to believe that the marginal cost of untreated water is less than the 
$13.05 charge (adjusted) in 1956.
In summary, i t  is concluded that at the time the decision was 
made to construct the Colorado-River Aqueduct, the value of water
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TABLE 4-7. M.W.D. Rates for Untreated Water for  
Agriculture and Replenishment in 
1965 Dollars
Year M.W.D.
Rate
Price Index 
1965 = 100
M.W.D. Rate in 
1965 Dollars*
1946 $ 8.00 38.1 $21.00
1947 8.00 39.7 20.15
1948 8.00 41.3 19.37
1949 8.00 42.9 18.65
1950 8.00 44.7 17.90
1951 10.00 47.8 20.92
1952 10.00 50.6 19.76
1953 10.00 54.3 18.42
1954 8.00 56.3 14.21
1955 8.00 58.1 13.77
1956 8.00 61.3 13.05*
1957 10.00 65.2 15.34
1958 12.00 70.0 17.14
1959 12.00 73.7 16.28
1960 12.00 78.3 15.33
1961 12.75 82.6 15.44
1962 . 13.50 86.6 15.59
1963 14.25 90.9 15.68
1964 15.00 95.3 15.74
1965 15.25 100.0 15.25
*To be compared with the M.W.D. marginal cost of $13.73 in 
1965 dollars.
Source: Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t  of Southern California,
Annual Report for the Fiscal Year, 1946-1965; U.S. Department of 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor S ta t is tic s , 1967, Employment and Earnings 
Statis tics  for States and Areas, 1939-1966, p. 41. (F irs t  three 
years of price index estimated).
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was substantially below the marginal cost of the new source of supply. 
Once the Aqueduct was b u il t  and while i t  operated below capacity, the 
price charged was in excess of marginal social cost. In the early  
years of the Aqueduct's operation a more e f f ic ie n t  allocation of re­
sources could have been achieved by charging lower prices for Colorado 
River Water, but the early reliance on ad valorem taxes and the prac­
tice of price discrimination appear ju s t if ie d  on the grounds of eco­
nomic efficiency even i f  such practices do raise questions of equity.
Since 1962, however, the Colorado River Aqueduct has operated 
close to i ts  rated capacity of approximately 1,200,000 acre-feet per 
year and beginning in 1974, the M.W.D's Colorado River water rights 
are scheduled to decline gradually to 550,000 acre-feet in 1990.^
The estimated marginal cost figure of $13.73 which was applicable 
during the years that the system was operated with excess capacity 
is no longer relevant. What is relevant is the social cost of 
adding to existing sources of supply. The California Water Plan, 
undertaken to augment the water supply of Southern California among 
other purposes, involves the construction of the California Aqueduct
For a d ifferen t view see H irsh le ife r  et a l . (1960, p. 306), 
who use incremental operating costs of $15 per acre-foot in 1960 
which would amount to more than $19 in 1965 prices.
g
M.W.D. has lost entitlement to 650,000 acre-feet as a result 
of a Supreme Court decision favoring Arizona Claims (Arizona v. Cali­
forn ia , 373 US 546 [1963]). Arizona is expected to gradually exploit 
her newly gained rights, u t i l iz in g  the entire  amount by 1990.
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to bring about 2.5 m illion acre-feet of Feather River water to Southern 
California by the year 2020. Present plans call for the project, which 
w il l  cost about $2.6 b i l l io n  in capital costs alone, to begin deliver­
ies to the Los Angeles area in 1971 (C aliforn ia , Department of Water 
Resources, 1965, pp. 158-59; 192-93). The estimated cost of Feather 
River water delivered to the replenishment d is tr ic t  is $65.00 an acre- 
foot. Since the Metropolitan Water D is tr ic t is committed to the pur­
chase o f Feather River water, the marginal social cost of imported 
water is $65.00 an acre-foot. Thus, the current price charged by 
the M.W.D. fa l ls  fa r  short of marginal social cost.
In this connection, i t  is argued, following H irs h le ife r  et a l . 
(1960, pp. 295-351) that construction of the California Aqueduct is 
premature. An increase in the price charged by the M.W.D. to re flec t  
the social cost of additional water would have served as an effective  
rationing device for existing supplies—a device that might have fore­
stalled the construction of the California Aqueduct fo r  many years.
As argued e a r l ie r ,  the use of water is not insensitive to changes in 
price. Thus an increase in the price of water and elimination of what 
is probably a discriminatory price policy would have eliminated the 
use of water for purposes that have a low marginal value in use. The 
extensive use of Colorado River water for irr igation  provides a case 
in point. Moreover, many business firms in the Los Angeles area use 
water for cooling purposes on a once-.through basis, a practice that 
is economically ju s t i f ie d  from the standpoint of the producer at
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existing prices. F inally , i f  a higher value is given to water, recla­
mation of sewage and purchase of water now being used for irr ig ation  
in the Imperial Valley become feasible alternative sources of supply 
(H irsh le ife r  and Milliman, 1967, p. 176).
The real problem of overbuilding capacity and the resulting 
mi sal location of resources arises out of the fa ilu re  to take into  
account the importance of price as a rationing device. Such terms as 
water "requirements" and water "shortage" are used without ex p lic it  
reference to marginal cost but im p lic it ly  refer to current prices-- 
prices that are well below marginal social costs. In fairness to the 
California Water Plan, however, i t  should be pointed out that the 
legal doctrine of appropriation provides an incentive to overexpand 
capacity (Gaffney, 1967, p. 194). Under the doctrine of appropriation 
municipalities and other en tit ies  acquire water rights by use (Hardy, 
1966, p. B-15). The e a r lie s t user of a water source gains preference 
over other potential users. Southern California has undoubtedly been 
enticed by this doctrine to provide for its  future "needs" by laying 
early claim to Northern California water.
I t  is concluded, then, that under present conditions, M.W.D. 
water is underpriced. This results in a higher level of v/ater use 
than is economically ju s t if ie d  and provides an incentive to expand 
supplies prematurely. A corollary to this proposition is that the 
M.W.D.'s d iffe re n tia l pricing policy can be ju s t i f ie d  only insofar as 
price differences represent differences in true costs.
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Conjunctive Us’e and the Transfer 
of Water Rights
The preceding two sections discussed the private and social 
costs of the two most important sources of water in the West and Central 
Basin Replenishment D istric t-ground water and imported Colorado River 
Water. A principal conclusion is that the marginal private cost of 
ground water which was estimated to be $16.00 per acre-foot, is sub­
s ta n t ia l ly  below the $40.50 or $41.00 paid fo r  an acre-foot of M.W.D. 
water. Such a cost d iffe ren tia l can persist because adjudication, in 
addition to setting maximum production levels in each basin, has estab­
lished property rights to ground water.
Establishing adjudicated rights would provide an extremely in ­
e f f ic ie n t  allocation among users i f  i t  were not for the existence of 
some mechanism to transfer water r ights. A holder of ground-water 
r igh ts , l ike  any other user, has incentive to carry production up
to the point where his marginal cost is  equal to his marginal value in
use. I f ,  on the one hand, his rights are more than su ffic ien t to pro­
duce at this le v e l,  i t  would be to his advantage to leave some of his
rights unutilized. On the other hand i f  his rights are not su ffic ien t  
to produce at this level he would be forced to curta il production at a 
point where the marginal value in use exceeded the marginal private 
cost of an increment of ground water. Further, new firms entering the 
D is tr ic t  or those without water rights would be forced to purchase 
M.W.D. water at a greater cost and hence the marginal value of an 
increment of water to them would exceed the marginal value to those
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with access to the cheaper water. As economic efficiency requires that 
marginal values in use be equal at the margin for a l l  users, such a 
system represents an in e ff ic ie n t  allocation of water.
As demands change over time the r ig id ity  b u il t  in to  the d is t r i ­
bution of ground-water production by adjudication leads to an increas­
ingly in e ff ic ie n t  allocation. Moreover, there is a tendency towards 
underutilization of ground water as those with expanding demands 
cannot meet these demands by increasing th e ir  production of ground 
water and those with a decreasing demand simply f a i l  to u t i l iz e  the ir  
rights.
Fortunately, there does exist a mechanism fo r  the temporary 
transfer of rights in each basin in the form of an exchange pool. 
Furthermore, i t  is  possible to enter into long-term leasing of water 
rights or to purchase and se ll rights on a permanent basis. Accord­
ingly the operation of the two exchange pools are discussed separately 
below. A few comments are then added on the permanent sale of rights.
West Basin Exchange Pool
Owners of adjudicated rights in the West Basin who have access 
to imported water must o ffer  to the pool each year the amount by which 
each party's adjudicated r ight exceeds one-half of his estimated total 
required use of water in the ensuing year (Ostrom, E .,  1965, p. 340). 
The price at which the releasing party offers such rights must not
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exceed the price that he would have to pay to obtain M.W.D. water de­
livered through the West Basin Municipal Water D is tr ic t .  In addition, 
those with excess rights in any year may voluntarily o ffer  them for  
sale to the exchange pool. However, the pool purchases rights offered 
under the mandatory provision before accepting any that are volun­
ta r i ly  offered. The pool accepts offers on the basis of the lowest 
prices and sells rights at the average price of a ll  offers accepted.
H istorically  more water rights have been offered to the pool 
than have been demanded by purchasers. In the water year 1967, for  
example, ten parties offered rights to 19,777 acre-feet under the 
mandatory provision and two parties voluntarily  offered rights to 
858 acre-feet. Requests for rights, however, totaled only 335 
acre-feet. The excess supply of rights has meant that prices paid 
by the pool have been less than the cost of M.W.D. water by more than 
the cost of pumping and the pumping assessment. The average price 
for the 335 acre-feet of rights purchased in the 1967 water year was 
$13.97. Thus the purchaser of rights paying the pumping assessment 
of $6.20 and having an average pumping cost of $9.80 (including capi­
ta l recovery) was enabled to produce ground water at a cost of $29.97 
an acre-foot as compared to the cost of $40.50 for an acre-foot of 
water purchased from the M.W.D.
136
Central Basin Exchange Pool
Arrangements for the transfer of water rights in the Central 
Basin are somewhat d iffe ren t. Owners of adjudicated rights who have 
M.W.D. fa c i l i t ie s  available are required to o ffe r  a portion of the ir  
rights to the exchange pool a t a price $2 per acre-foot higher than 
the difference between the cost of M.W.D. water and the cost of ground 
water (Ostrom, E . , 1965, p. 502). In fiscal 1967, the price paid for  
rights was $26.80 per a c re - fo o t .^  Adding the $16.00 per acre-foot 
estimate of ground-water production cost, the cost of ground water 
produced by the purchase of rights in the.Central Basin was $42.80 
compared to the $41.00 purchase price of M.W.D. water. In the 1967 
water year, 25,731 acre-feet of rights were offered under the mandatory 
provision and 372 acre-feet were offered voluntarily at the same price. 
Eighty-eight parties purchased 11,624 acre-feet of these rights (per­
sonal interview with Max Bookman, Bookman and Edmonston, Consulting 
Engineers, Los Angeles).
Transfer of Rights and Economic Efficiency
To appraise the operation of the two exchange pools, assume 
that two producers A and B are confronted by identical demand curves
^This  price was calculated as follows:
Central Basin Municipal Water Dist. F iltered & Soft Water Price $41.00
Plus 2.00
Less Agreed Average Pumping Cost -10.00
Less Pumping Assessment - 6 .2 0
Net Cost of Rights Purchased from Central Basin Pool $26.80
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fo r  water and that the marginal cost to each producer is constant and 
equal to that of the other producer. Suppose further that A has 
rights to acre-feet, whereas B has rights to Qg acre-feet. This 
is the situation depicted by Figure 4-6. Producer A is forced to cur­
t a i l  his use of ground water at a point where the value to him, P^, 
exceeds the cost of an additional unit, whereas B w il l  produce to the 
point Qg1, since the value to him of additional water is less than 
i ts  cost. Therefore, B could benefit by se lling rights to Qg -  Qg' 
acre-feet of water at any price greater than zero. I t  would be to 
A's advantage in this case, however, to induce B to give up rights to 
a greater quantity of water than Qg - Qg', as adding an amount Qg -  Qg1 
would leave A at Q^1 a position where the value of an additional unit 
P^' is s t i l l  greater than i ts  cost. The e ffec t of such an o ffer  is 
to raise the marginal cost to both A and B; to A since i t  raises his 
actual unit cost and to B since i t  raises his opportunity cost. The 
common marginal cost is the original marginal cost MCp plus the unit 
price of the offer.
Given the ir  common demand curve, an optimal solution occurs
—  A^ + %when cost is bid up to MCp' and both parties are using Q = — -^----
acre-feet of water. At this point, the value in use is the same to 
each producer at the margin and the given quantity of ground water,
Qa + Qg, is e f f ic ie n t ly  allocated. In increasing production from 
Qa to Q, A has paid an amount EFGH for the purchase of rights
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from B and incurred additional pumping costs of Q^  E H Q. The value 
of the additional water to A, however, is J G Q, representing a net 
gain to A of FJG. B, on the other hand, has received HGKL fo r  the 
sale of water rights. The net gain to B is RGKL. The analysis would 
be much the same i f  B had surplus rights to a greater quantity than 
A's d e f ic i t .  However, a competitively determined price for water 
rights would be pushed toward zero and the quantity of water produced 
would be less than + Qg, the total rights of both parties.
Assume now that A has no rights to ground water but purchases 
imported water at the unit price which is higher than the cost of 
producing ground water. Further, le t  Qg represent the total quantity 
of ground water to which B has a right. Now B, as before, would pro­
duce Qg' acre-feet of ground water since at that point the value of 
an additional unit to him is equal to its  cost. A would purchase 
units of imported water at the price P^, and A's marginal value in 
use is equal to the price he pays. Although each producer uses water 
up to the point at which its  marginal value in use is equal to marginal 
cost, the value of the marginal unit of water is greater to A than to 
B.
Again, i t  would be advantageous for A to bribe B to give up 
part of his rights to ground water. Indeed, since Qg -  Qg' o f rights 
have no value to B, he should be w ill ing  to o ffe r  them for sale at any 
positive price. A, on the other hand, should be w il l in g  to purchase 
rights at any price less than the d iffe ren tia l between the price of
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imported water and his cost of producing ground water. As before, the 
marginal cost of ground water is increased to both p art ies --to  A be­
cause, in addition to the cost of production, he must pay to obtain 
rights from B and to B because the opportunity cost of retaining 
rights must be added to the cost of producing ground water. For the 
case depicted by Figure 4 -6 , a competitive solution would have A bid 
the marginal cost of ground water up to MCp", at which cost both A 
and B would produce ([' acre-feet of ground water. By purchasing 
rights to Qg - Q1 acre-feet of ground water from B, A has been able 
to satisfy his demand fo r  water by producing ground water at a lower 
total unit cost than that of imported water. Imported water would not 
be used at the price P^. Only i f  the demand for water is great enough 
or the supply limited enough so that the price of ground water rights  
w il l  be bid up to equality with the price of imported water, w i l l  im­
ported water be used at a l l .
Permanent Sale of Water Rights
I t  was previously noted that permanent sales or long-term 
leases of water rights are also allowed in the Central and West Basin 
Replenishment D is tr ic t .  The market fo r  long-term or permanent r ights ,  
however, has been quite inactive (Ostrom, E .,  1965, pp. 372-73).
A prospective purchaser should be w ill in g  to pay a total price 
no greater than his assessment of the present value of the future 
stream of net benefits that would accrue from owning the rights.
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Moreover, he should pay no more per unit than his assessment of the 
discounted future stream of costs of purchasing M.W.D. water including 
capital recovery. A potential s e l le r  should also assess the present ■ 
value to him of retaining ground-water rights. The se lle r 's  position, 
too, should depend on his view of discounted future net benefits as 
well as his forecast of M.W.D. prices.
Again, a water user with "excess" rights should be w ill ing  to 
se ll the surplus since its value in use viewed from the present is less 
to him than its  cost also viewed from the present. A user with " in ­
suffic ient" rights also should be w il l in g  to purchase rights because 
the present value of the rights to him exceeds present value costs. 
Once more trading in rights should result in a bidding up of prices 
until marginal costs and marginal values in use are equated. As be­
fore the analysis also holds for an imported water user buying rights 
from a ground-water user.
Optimal Conjunctive Use
Allowing for the transfer of rights satisfies a necessary, but 
by i t s e l f  in s u ff ic ie n t,  condition fo r  economic effic iency in the Dis­
t r i c t .  An optimal allocation requires that (1) values in each use 
or to each user be equated at the margin and (2) the common margi­
nal value in use be equal to marginal social cost. I t  follows 
that i f  there is more than one source of water, the entire supply is 
optimally allocated when the marginal social costs of both sources are
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equated provided, of course, that the f i r s t  condition is satisfied .
I f  the D is tr ic t 's  water rights markets operated perfectly, mar­
ginal values in use and marginal private costs would be equated, but 
they would not necessarily be equal to the marginal social cost. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the market for rights is quite 
imperfect, since more than one price prevails.
The deviation between marginal private and social costs is 
again b r ie f ly  discussed in this section to c la r i fy  the existing s itua­
tion. Next, market impediments in the two Basins are covered to iso­
late  the reasons why marginal costs and values in use are not now 
equated. F inally , the requirements for restoring economic efficiency  
are discussed, and the d e s irab ility  is explored of rationing ground­
water rights through adjudication vis a vis using pumping charges to 
bring about equality of marginal costs.
Social and Private Marginal Cost Discrepancy
As noted in the preceding section, trading of water rights be­
tween water producers tends to equate marginal private costs of the 
trading parties. Moreover, in a perfect market, trading would take 
place to the point where the value of each increment would be the same 
in each use. I f  the resultant common incremental cost were achieved 
•in the D is t r ic t ,  however, i t  would s t i l l  deviate from the incremental 
cost of ground water to society.
I t  was previously noted that the marginal cost of ground water 
in the D is tr ic t  exceeds marginal private costs by at least the to ta l of
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the unit variable costs which are transformed into fixed costs 
through ad valorem taxes- This disparity is not eliminated by the 
trading of rights. Trading between ground-water users tends to raise 
marginal private cost, but social cost is increased by the same 
amount or more. In the long run, the private incremental cost in­
cludes pumping cost, the pumping assessment, capital recovery cost 
and the unit purchase price. Incremental social cost includes, in 
addition, the ad valorem taxes used to meet variable costs. Moreover, 
i f  trading is s u ff ic ien t in amount to cause a noticeable drawdown in 
water levels, pumping costs must rise throughout the D is tr ic t  and 
additional replenishment and barrier protection is required. Thus 
under present financing arrangements the gap between private and 
social costs tends to widen as rights are traded. The same applies 
to sales of ground-water rights to imported water users.
Private Marginal Cost Discrepancies
I t  w i l l  be recalled that d iffe ren t marginal costs arise out 
of the procedures followed by the two exchange pools. In 1967 West 
Coast Basin rights were purchased for a one-year period for $13.97 per 
acre-foot. Addition of the pumping cost, capital recovery cost and 
the pumping assessment brings the to ta l marginal private cost of this 
exchange pool water to $29.97 per acre-foot. Marginal private cost 
fo r  exchange pool water in the Central Basin simultaneously totaled 
$42.80.
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I t  is seemingly paradoxical that water rights should sell fo r  
any price which d iffers  from the cost of M.W.D. water. A l i t t l e  re­
f le c tio n , however, might y ie ld  explanations for the discrepancy. In 
the West Basin the only probable bidders on yearly rights are those 
who have wells with excess capacity. There is no guarantee that rights 
w ill  continue to se ll at a low price. An increase in demand could 
raise the yearly rights price to the M.W.D. price level, hence users 
who regard the low cost of rights as temporary are unlikely to d r i l l  
wells. Total demand for present owners of wells with excess capacity 
is apparently in su ffic ie n t to bid the price to equality with the 
M.W.D. price o f $40.50.11
A d iffe ren t situation exists in the Central Basin, where in 
1967 the cost of ground water purchased from the Exchange Pool appeared 
to be greater than the cost of the M.W.D. alternative. The cost of 
purchasing from the Pool was $26.80 per acre-foot. Pumping costs, 
capital recovery and the pumping assessment raised the to ta l marginal 
cost to $42.80. This exceeded the M.W.D. price by $1.80 per acre-foot. 
A plausible explanation fo r  this situation is that the Central Basin 
Pool purchasers do not have connections to M.W.D. laterals or they 
would not buy the more expensive ground water.
^The West Coast Basin requirement that mandatory provision 
rights be sold f i r s t  also impedes economic efficiency. The time may 
come when users subject to the mandatory provision w ill  have higher 
values in use than the maximum price. Requiring them to se ll  f i r s t  
represents a waste i f  other users desire to sell lower valued rights 
but are prevented from doing so by the regulation.
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Central Basin water users can depend on being able to purchase 
ground water from the Pool at a price equal to the M.W.D. rate plus 
$1.80 per acre-foot. The decision of whether or not a user would buy 
Pool water rather than M.W.D. water would depend, then, upon his cost 
of connecting to M.W.D. A decision to purchase from the Pool, L 
uncertainty aside, requires that the present value of a connection 
exceed that of the future quantity evaluated at $1.80 and reduced by 
the complement of the marginal corporate income tax rate (T^). In 
the notation of Chapter I I I ,  Pool purchases w il l  be made, i f  fo r  a 
user having a cost of cap ita l,  k,
I [K0 + (1 - Tt )(At  + Mt ) -  St  -  Tt Dt ] (1 + k )_t 
t=0
n (4-3'
> 1 0 -  Tt ) $1-80 (Qt ) (1 + k) \  
t=o
where KQ is the i n i t i a l  cost of a l ine  to M.W.D., A^ . operating and 
M.j. maintenance cost in year t ,  S^ . salvage value, D^. the depreciation
i , L
allowance fo r  the line in the t  year, and Qt  the quantity of water 
used in year t .
Economic efficiency could be improved by competitive bidding. 
Very l ik e ly  some unpurchased offers of water in 1967 had re la t iv e ly  
low values in use to prospective sellers and the specified Pool price 
prevented th e ir  sale. Both prospective sellers and purchasers could 
have gained from transactions at prices lower than the agreement
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12stipulated price of $26.80. The existing regulation does not lead 
to the equating of marginal values in use or marginal costs of ground 
water.
A strong long-term rights market would tend to equate marginal 
private costs and values in use even i f  the Exchange Pools fa iled  to 
do so. Since the market in long-term rights is quite inactive, how­
ever, i t  apparently does l i t t l e  to establish these efficiency condi­
tions. A plausible explanation for the in a c tiv ity  is that future 
M.W.D. prices are shrouded in uncertainty. Although i t  is known that 
future M.W.D. prices w i l l  be considerably higher, this in i t s e l f  is 
probably in su ffic ien t to establish the firm basis required for long­
term investment in ground-water rights.
Requirements for Efficiency Restoration
Assuming no change in adjudicated rights, among the changes 
that would have to be made to restore economic efficiency to the 
D is tr ic t  are (1) the recovery of certain variable ground-water costs
12Again, social costs would be raised i f  additional water use, 
in a quantity su ffic ien t to lower water levels, were to result from 
the bidding. The added social costs would have to be considered in 
overall efficiency calculations.
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13through the pumping charge instead of ad valorem taxes, (2) the de­
letion of the West Basin Exchange Pool requirement that rights be sold 
f i r s t  under the mandatory provision, (3) a provision allowing bidding 
among prospective purchasers of Central Basin Exchange Pool water, 
which, of course, would require deletion of the agreement stipu lated  
price and (4) receipt of a firm M.W.D. future price schedule upon 
which a long-term rights market could be based.
The above changes, however, would not suffice. I t  would remain 
to devise some method of adjusting ground-water production to levels  
that would equate marginal social costs of ground water and the M.W.D. 
imports. Figure 4-7 demonstrates the loss to the D is tr ic t ,  at any 
point in time, resulting from production of a quantity of ground-water 
either greater or less than the optimal amount.
The horizontal line MCS represents the marginal social cost 
of the supplementary supply of water purchased from M.W.D. The margi­
nal social cost of ground water rises with production, for reasons 
previously outlined, and is represented by the line MC6. Aggregate 
demand, or marginal value in use, fo r the D is tr ic t is shown as the
13I t  should be recognized that M.W.D.'s current and back taxes 
on property would remain in force. I t  w i l l  be recalled that M.W.D. is 
.now covering the average to ta l cost of Colorado River Water by its  
direct pricing. Upon completion of the California Aqueduct the ad 
valorem taxes being paid w i l l  l ik e ly  be used to subsidize de liveries  
of Northern California water. No attempt w i l l  be made in this study 
to determine how existing and future California Aqueduct costs should 
be financed, hence consideration of the e ffec t of current M.W.D. taxes 
on economic efficiency is beyond the scope of this study.
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negatively sloped line MVU.
Maximum efficiency is achieved when to ta l water use is carried 
out to quantity Qq, OQ^  of which must be ground water and Q-jQq the 
to ta l purchases of M.W.D. water. To see this suppose the amount of 
ground-water production to be set too high, say at quantity Q2 - ^
M.W.D. water would then be purchased in the amount Q2Q0 j and total 
costs to society would be depicted by the areas under the MCG curve 
from 0 to Q2 and under the MCS curve from Qg to Q0. This would occa­
sion a loss to society equal to the triangular area BCD, since when
the optimal rate of ground water is produced the social cost is only 
OABQ-j plus Q^ BEQq.
Now suppose that the allowable ground-water production is set 
too low, for example at the quantity Qg. The resultant loss to society 
is described by another triangular area G FB , for total social cost 
would now be OAGQg plus Q3FEQq .
Several aspects of the previous analysis should be made clear
The amount Q-jQ2 is produced at a social cost greater than an 
equivalent M.W.D. purchase; however, users would favor ground water 
over M.W.D. water at aggregate output Q2 because marginal private cost 
follows the dashed line MCGp, which lies  below the marginal social 
.cost curve MCG.
Note that the marginal private cost is shown to rise with out­
put, but that this does not co nflic t with Figure 4-3 which shows mar­
ginal private cost to be constant. Figure 4-7 depicts aggregate demand 
and costs for the D is tr ic t  whereas Figure 4-3 describes demand and cost 
fo r  the individual who, by himself, does not use enough water to a ffec t  
water levels throughout the D is tr ic t .
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at this point. F irs t ,  the diagram assumes ground-water production to 
be set low enough to leave unsatisfied demand which can be met by 
purchasing a supplemental supply. I t  is also assumed that unre­
strained ground-water production would result in a marginal social 
cost for ground water exceeding the unit price of the supplement.
Thus, Figure 4-7 at least su perfic ia lly  describes the circumstances 
l ik e ly  to prevail in the D is tr ic t .  Next i t  may be noted that the 
analysis is s ta tic  and, as such, te l ls  an incomplete story about an 
essentially dynamic problem. A change in M.W.D.'s price would call 
for a change in the quantity of ground-water production required to 
meet the necessary efficiency conditions. Note, however, that under 
the conditions assumed, a changing demand which calls for additional 
to ta l water use does not call fo r  any change in the e f f ic ie n t  
ground-water output level. The appropriate ground-water production 
level is a function only of the marginal social costs of ground 
water and the supplementary supply. F ina lly , and most importantly, 
i t  should be noted that the marginal social cost curve for ground 
water represents a schedule of incremental costs associated with 
various quantities a t one instant in time only. This s ta tic  margi­
nal cost function can be quite ephemeral since the rate a t which
a
ground water is produced in one period determines the level of the 
cost function during the following period.
A given rate and pattern of pumpage of ground water from an 
aquifer w i l l  ultimately produce a steady-state condition, in which the
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piezometric surface is unchanging provided: (1) the rate of pumpage
does not exceed the rate of aquifer recharge, and (2) the rate of 
withdrawal does not lower the piezometric surface below the top of 
the aquifer (personal interview, R. G. Kazmann, Associate Professor 
of C ivil Engineering, Louisiana State University). I t  is clear that 
ground-water production in the D is tr ic t  does not vio late either of 
these conditions. Water levels in wells were fa l l in g  prior to execu­
tion of the interim agreements, but they have since stabilized  
(Central and West Basin Water Replenishment D is t r ic t ,  1966, pp. 35-38). 
I t  is equally c lear, however, that no single output level could perma­
nently satisfy  the necessary economic effic iency conditions. Only i f  
the M.W.D. price were to remain forever constant could one adjudicated 
output level be optimal over time.
Figure 4-8 i l lu s tra te s ,  but greatly s im plifies , the situation  
which has apparently developed in the Central and West Basin Replenish­
ment D is tr ic t .  Let Qq represent the production level in either Basin 
at a time (designated t)  during the few years immediately preceding 
the agreed cutback in ground water production. The rate Qq was causing 
water levels to f a l l ,  therefore, i f  the rate had been sustained, margi­
nal social cost functions would have shifted upward in the subsequent 
periods t  + 1, t  + 2, . . . and t  + n. Costs would have stabilized  
at time t  + n, assuming again that the two necessary conditions pre­
vailed. The curves MCG^ , MCG^ . +  ^ , MCG^  +  ^ and MCG^  + n represent 
marginal social cost schedules over the time range t  to t  + n.
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I f  each pumper were maximizing his value in use, the vertical 
height of point PQ would represent the marginal private cost at time 
t .  But ground-water users, faced with l i t ig a t io n ,  were probably over­
producing for a few years immediately prio r to execution of the in ­
terim agreement to establish prescriptive rights (Ostrom, E .,  1965,
p. 312). Hence the actual marginal private cost was some point like
15P-j at the going production rate. The marginal social cost curve
would be above P-j and rise like  MCG^ .. Thus the height of would
represent the marginal social cost at time t .  Upon achievement of a
steady-state of water levels, the marginal social cost would have been
a point such as P^  on the curve MCG^  + n. Marginal private cost would
then have been something like  P .^
While well levels were s t i l l  fa l l in g ,  hov/ever, the supplementary
supply of Colorado River water was purchased a t a constant unit price,
or marginal cost, represented by the l in e  MCS. Simultaneously, the
interim agreement cutback was imposed. The new production level is
represented by Q-j. This reduced rate would have resulted in downward
sh ifting  cost schedules until a new water level equilibrium was 
1 fireached. I f ,  by some very fortuitous circumstance, the marginal
1 5Note that, temporarily, the pumper would have considered his 
marginal value in use to be Pi instead of P0. The discrepancy repre­
sents the per unit amount he was w ill in g  to pay to establish prescrip­
tive rights fo r  the satisfaction of value in use in the future.
^Graphs of well levels in the D is t r ic t  indicate that the 
actual time lag between the cutback and stab il iza tion  of well levels 
was about two or three years (Bookman and Edmonston, 1966, pp. 35-38).
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social cost schedule associated with the rationed rate and stabilized  
state were a function l ik e  MCG' with the point Pg coinciding with the 
ground-water quantity and the marginal cost of imported water, a per­
fe c t ly  e f f ic ie n t  " f ina l"  result would have been achieved, assuming a 
constant imported water price. But before the MCG1 condition obtained 
ground water would have been over-u til ized , since marginal social 
costs during the time lapse can be represented by the vertical coordi­
nates of points like  Pg and P^  which l ie  above the cost of the supple- 
-mental supply, and which have related private marginal costs not 
exceeding the Pg level.
Once the price of the supplemental water is increased, Q-j no 
longer represents an e f f ic ie n t  output. I f ,  for example, the M.W.D. 
price were to rise to MCS', would be the e f f ic ie n t  rate of produc­
t io n , but only momentarily for this rate would now cause an upward 
s h if t  in costs. The " f ina l"  e f f ic ie n t  output would be somewhere to 
the l e f t  of say Q3 with marginal social and private costs at the 
levels of Pg and P^q respectively.
Adjudication vs. Use Charges
I t  follows from the preceding discussion that, as long as 
.M.W.D.'s prices continue to change, there is no single optimal output
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level to which ground-water rights can be ra t io n e d .^  Nevertheless, 
i t  also follows that a carefully executed program of varying the 
levels of rationed outputs could promote economic effic iency, in prin­
ciple at least. Ground-water production could be set at the precise 
level which would equate i ts  marginal social cost to the prevailing  
M.W.D. price. Perfect allocation, however, would require continuous 
adjustment of rights. Each change in the M.W.D. price would resu lt in 
a d r if t in g  ground-water marginal social cost schedule which would call 
for continual variations in output.
Alteration of adjudicated rights would pose another problem. 
Suppose a to ta l production increase of a given percentage, say 25 
percent, were to be effected. The increase in ground-water rights 
would result in an immediate e f f ic ie n t  allocation only i f  the awarding 
of rights were based on the shape of each individual demand curve. 
Granting each user an increase of 25 percent would result in an im­
proper allocation, unless there existed the most unlikely condition 
of identical demand curves. Figure 4-9 i l lu s tra tes  the problem. Let
I t  is interesting to note than an economic evaluation of 
.Los Angeles area conjunctive use by the State of California concluded 
that ground-water production should be increased to a considerably 
higher level than at present and thereafter held constant. Calcula­
tions were based on assumed stable M.W.D. prices and, therefore, are 
not inconsistent with this analysis though the assumptions seem ques­
tionable (C a lifo rn ia , Dept, of Water Resources, 1966, pp. 68-70).
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MVUg and MVU^  represent demand curves for individuals A and B respec­
t iv e ly .  I f  economic effic iency  had been achieved immediately prior  
to the event which called fo r  a 25 percent production increase, mar­
ginal values in use would be equated and A and B would be pumping 
quantities such as Q° and q£, the la tter  quantity being positive but 
measured by the leftward distance from 0 to Q^. Now i f  each were to 
produce 25 percent more than his original output, or quantities  
and Q^, marginal values in use would be no longer equal, the dis­
crepancy being measured by d on the vertical axis. Efficiency could 
be regained, but only i f  the market for ground-water rights were made 
to operate perfectly , for only then would trading take place to restore 
the necessary marginal conditions.
A simpler solution would eliminate adjudicated rights and 
ration to ta l rights by varying the pumping charges. Figure 4-10, which 
depicts aggregate production, shows how such a procedure would operate. 
I f  rights were not rationed, pumping would be carried to the point Qq 
where the marginal private cost of ground water MCG equaled the price
r
of the imported supply MCS. By assessing an additional unit pumping 
charge equal to AB pumpage would be cut back to Q-j. As a result the 
marginal private cost and the marginal social costs of ground water, 
'MCG, would be forced into equality with each other and with the margi­
nal social cost of the imported supply. I f  the supplemental supply 
were to rise in price to MCS1, changing the additional charge to CD
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FIGURE 4-10. Rationing of Ground-Water Rights by 
Variations in Pumping Charges
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1ftwould satisfy the efficiency requirements.
Of course, constant changing of the pumping assessment would
be necessary but this would be no more d i f f ic u l t  than continually
19changing assigned water rights. The assessments would have to be 
based on estimates of marginal private and social cost schedules for- 
ground water, but these estimates would have to be made even i f  the 
rationing procedure were to involve assignment of r ights. Under the 
assessment procedure any user would be able to produce a l l  the water 
he desired. No rights would be assigned, hence, no exchange pools or 
other arrangements for trading rights would be needed, and the inherent 
market weaknesses which now prevail would no longer pose any problem. 
Overall, therefore, restriction of rights through direct charges ap­
pears clearly to be the preferable procedure. In this connection 
H irsh le ife r  et a l . favor establishing quota rights as a solution to 
the common ground-water pool problem. They consider the "use-tax" 
solution inadequate because of "the problem of how to determine the
1 ftI t  should be noted that, in essence, the procedure recom­
mended in this study entails marginal cost pricing, and i t  is there­
fore subject to the existing criticisms of welfare economics. In 
particular the problems associated with the use of consumers' and 
producers’ surpluses to measure u t i l i t y  or social welfare, with 
"second-best" optima, and with interdependent individual u t i l i t y  
functions are obstacles which have not been overcome (Mishan, 1967, 
pp. 154-222).
^To be practica l, i t  would probably be undesirable to change 
the pumping assessment more than once a year. Estimates could be 
made of the appropriate levels of assessment for the beginning and 
ending dates of the water year and a unit charge could be set some­
where between the two levels.
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marginal social cost . . ." (1960, p. 66). Basically, however, their  
analysis is applicable only to the case where ground water is the sole 
water source. Once a supplemental supply exists a determination of 
marginal social costs is no less essential to the quota solution than 
i t  is to the pumping charge a lternative .
Summary
An analysis of ground-water costs in the Central and West 
Basin Replenishment D is tr ic t  discloses a s ign ificant difference be­
tween marginal private and marginal social costs. The discrepancy 
results from the existing practice of financing several variable costs 
through the use of ad valorem taxes. In e f fe c t ,  th is transforms the 
variable costs into costs which are fixed from the viewpoint of the 
individual user. This procedure for financing costs, coupled with the 
existence of a higher marginal social cost o f imported water and the 
fa i lu re  of institu tional arrangements to equate marginal costs, has 
led to misallocation of the D is tr ic t 's  water resources.
I t  is shown, fu rther, that there has also been economic in ­
efficiency associated with the D is tr ic t 's  imported supply of Metro­
politan Water D is tr ic t water. The Colorado River Aqueduct was appar­
ently undertaken prematurely; however, a f te r  its  construction, M.W.D. 
seems to have been ju s t i f ie d  in i ts  practices of price discrimination, 
charging less than average to ta l cost, and recovering the defic it  
through ad valorem taxes. Recently, though, M.W.D. has been
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underpricing its  water. Deliveries have increased to a rate approach­
ing the aqueduct capacity, and M.W.D. has contracted fo r  Northern C a li­
fornia water which w il l  cost s ig n if ican tly  more than i ts  present 
supply. The cost of the new import is now the marginal cost which 
should be used as the basis for pricing the supplemental supply, but 
i t  is unlikely that much water would be sold a t the very high price 
which would then result. Los Angeles has fa iled  to make use of the 
price system for rationing its  water, and, perhaps largely as a result  
of the appropriative water law doctrine, i t  has turned to a very expen­
sive source of water when cheaper alternatives were available.
An optimal conjunctive use system, one with ground water and 
imported water marginal values in use equated with a marginal social 
cost common to both, is suggested for the D is tr ic t .  This would require 
the elimination of adjudicated rights , and depend instead on assessment 
of pumping charges which would vary with changes in the M.W.D. price.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The basic problem of economics is the problem of allocating  
society's scarce resources to the production of i ts  unlimited wants. 
The economic "problem" associated with water production is merely a 
subset of the overall problem. Water is frequently treated as i f  i t  
were "something d iffe ren t,"  but i t  is in no way d ifferent from other 
economic goods or resources. While water is ,  fo r a l l  practical pur­
poses, in unlimited supply, additions to present supplies for ir r ig a ­
t io n , industrial or residential uses are subject to the laws of d i­
minishing returns and increasing costs. Any p o lit ic a l subdivision 
may increase its  supply of usable water, but only i f  i ts  people are 
w ill in g  to pay the accompanying increasing costs. The higher costs 
of producing water are reflected in the increasing quantities of 
scarce resources that must be devoted to the production of constant 
unit increments of water.
Economic effic iency requires: (1) that present water supplies
be allocated in such a way as to make the maximum contribution to 
social welfare, (2) that no new water projects be undertaken unless 
■they are warranted by the demands of society, and (3) that such new 
supplies as are obtained be taken from the least costly among a ll  
available alternatives. I t  has been the objective of this disserta­
tion to determine whether or not these requirements are, or can be,
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met, in l ig h t of existing lav/s and practices. To this end, the a l lo ­
cation of existing ground water was examined. A decision rule for  
community action was then devised and some of its  welfare implica­
tions were discussed. F inally the results of a case study of ground 
water-surface water conjunctive use were presented. The major f in d ­
ings of the dissertation are outlined in the remaining sections.
Allocation of Existing Water Supplies
Water law in the contiguous United States may be placed in 
two c lassifications. The f i r s t  basic legal form is called the "ripa­
rian doctrine." Essentially , this doctrine holds that a landowner 
may use water which flows over, under or adjacent to his land, provided 
his use is "reasonable" as determined by the courts. The riparian  
doctrine is adhered to in the eastern United States. The second type 
of water law is called the "appropriative" doctrine. Here an in d i­
vidual, or p o lit ic a l e n t ity ,  gains a usufructory right to water 
merely by appropriating i t  to his use. Senior water rights develop 
from the e a r lie s t use; junior rights accrue to la te r  appropriators. 
Appropriative water rights need not pass the test of "reasonableness" 
although the use of these rights must be considered "benefic ia l."
The appropriative doctrine is widely used in the western United States.
In general, i t  may be said that neither the riparian nor 
appropriative doctrines provide fo r  firm water rights which may be 
sold in the marketplace. Moreover, the trend is not toward private
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ownership and tradeable water rights. Rather i t  is toward public 
ownership and administrative control of water.
Assuming perfect competition, and in the absence of external 
economies or diseconomies, a system of private ownership of rights 
and market prices w ill  properly allocate a community's water resources. 
Under such conditions marginal social costs w il l  be equated and equal 
to marginal social values in use for a l l  uses, and the optimal condi­
tions w il l  be satisfied .
A number of factors, however, may prevent a system of private 
ownership of ground-water rights and market prices from bringing 
about the optimal situation. Imperfect competition, to the extent i t  
may ex is t ,  would raise the spectre of "second best," and render the 
problem insoluble. Other possibilit ies include problems of economies 
of scale and external diseconomies, but these may be corrected by 
applying appropriate subsidies or charges to simulate the perfect 
market results. These subsidies and charges may be superimposed on 
a private ownership-tradeable rights framework. Thus whether or not 
the lis ted  disturbing factors ex is t, a system of firm private rights 
and market prices would provide a basis for optimal resource alloca-
tion--something present water laws cannot accomplish, since they do
1
not allow for transfer from low- to high-valued uses.
^In the case study of the Central and West Basin Water Replen­
ishment D is tr ic t  of Los Angeles, i t  is suggested that private (adjudi­
cated) water rights should be abandoned despite the fact that the law 
does now provide for the sale of rights. For a private rights-market
165
Supplementing Local Water Supplies
Local water project investment decisions may be made by using 
a'model which incorporates benefit-cost analysis. The relevant cost 
is a present value unit cost obtained by discounting costs which are 
to be incurred over time by the community's cost of ca p ita l,  or, 
simply, its  bond rate of in terest. The benefit is the present value 
unit cost of the best alternative to the action being considered, in ­
cluding that of no action. Since private water users may decide to 
augment th e ir  own supplies i t  is useful to trea t the benefit as the 
present value unit cost of the best corporate a lternative . Since cor­
porate cost of capital is not easily measured, however, i t  is neces­
sary to discount the benefit stream by a range of discount rates.
A hypothetical comparison was made between a corporate project 
and a non-profit community project. The results show th a t, assuming 
constant returns to scale and equality of costs of cap ita l,  the 
present value unit cost of water is lower for the corporate than for  
the community project. The divergence is caused by the corporate 
income tax structure. Nevertheless, the a fte r -ta x  unit cost incurred
price system to achieve optimal allocation the market must be strong 
and active. A perfect market depends on perfect knowledge of prices.
-The tradeable ground-water rights system fa i ls  to operate properly, 
because there is much uncertainty surrounding the price of the sup- 
lemental M.W.D. water. I f  the Los Angeles area could count on a firm  
price for i ts  imported water the solution of Chapter IV would give 
way to the tradeable property rights approach.
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by a corporation purchasing water from a community project is less 
than the present value unit cost of the corporate project. Hence the 
benefit-cost ratio  is greater than unity, and the community is well 
advised to undertake the non-profit project. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the differences in the costs of capital that are 
l ik e ly  to exist. Economies of large scale production w il l  also favor 
the community project. On the other hand, diseconomies of scale w il l  
tend to favor the corporate project, although i t  is quite unlikely  
that they w il l  be found strong enough to overcome the other inherent 
advantages of the collective project.
From the viewpoint of national welfare, however, the local 
decision-making process may not be optimal. A project which is optimal 
from the community standpoint may misallocate some of the nation's re­
sources. Correction of this problem can only be accomplished by making 
changes in the primary reason for the misallocation, the corporate 
income tax structure.
A Case Study
A study of the ground water-imported water conjunctive use 
system in the Central and West Basin Replenishment D is tr ic t  of Los 
Angeles discloses a number of economically in e ff ic ie n t  practices. 
•Several ground-water costs are being financed by ad valorem tax. From 
the user's standpoint these costs are fixed in both the short and long 
run, although from the community's standpoint they are variable. This 
results in a portion of ground-water production being applied to
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low-valued uses. At the same time higher-valued uses are going un­
sa tis f ied . The marginal cost of water to users of imported water is 
considerably higher than the marginal cost of ground water. Although 
the D is t r ic t  provides for the sale and leasing of ground-water r ights, 
marginal costs, of imported water and ground water, hence marginal 
values in use, are not equated. Consequently, the allocation of the 
D is tr ic t 's  water supply is not optimal.
Provision fo r the sale of firmly established ground-water 
rights normally provides the basis for an e f f ic ie n t  conjunctive use 
system. Again, such problems as may arise can be corrected by super­
imposing some type o f charge or subsidy upon the firm rights-market 
price system. In the Los Angeles case, however, this procedure cannot 
be adopted because the ground-water rights market is weak and ineffec­
t ive . The problem appears to be one of imperfect knowledge. Neither 
the users of ground water nor the users of imported water can accur­
ately forecast future prices of the Metropolitan Water D is t r ic t ,  the 
en tity  that provides the imported-water alternative to ground water.
A strong rights market requires an adequate knowledge of a l ­
ternative prices. The absence of this condition in the D is tr ic t  sug­
gests that another approach should be used. This approach would 
eliminate individual adjudicated rights, and replace them with the 
r ight of each individual to produce as much water as he desires.
Pumping charges would be assessed to bring the marginal cost of ground 
water to the appropriate leve l--the  marginal cost of the imported
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M.W.D. water.
An Overview
Several important conclusions may be drawn from this disserta­
tion. Existing water laws tend to misallocate water. The trend toward 
increasingly more bureaucratic control of water in the United States 
may only increase the mi sallocation. An improvement would be the es­
tablishment of firm and tradeable water rights. A market in water 
rights would provide the basis for e f f ic ie n t  use of ground-water basin 
production. In the Los Angeles area an existing market does not 
properly allocate water because the area is dependent on an outside 
agency for i ts  supplemental supply, and the outside agency's prices 
are not predictable. A lo ca lity  that provides its  own supplementary 
water supply can make its  pricing policy clear to potential customers, 
thus i t  can establish this necessary condition for a strong market in 
ground-water rights.
A community that undertakes a project to obtain additional 
water supplies may take the steps that are optimal from its  own 
point of view. The result fo r  the nation as a whole, however, may be 
resource misallocation. Any corrective of this situation would depend 
on changes in the corporate income tax structure.
Finally a case study shows that a considerable amount of in e f­
ficiency is present in one local ground water-imported water conjunc­
tive use system. The inefficiency is probably largely due to laws
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which reward the premature appropriation of water. One can therefore 
expect this misallocation of ground water to continue until the in s t i ­
tutional setting is altered.
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APPENDIX
WATER COST CALCULATIONS
Average total water costs presented in Tables 4-1 , 4 -2 , 4-5 
and 4-5 in the text are intended to be representative of unit costs 
paid by industrial firms in the Central and West Basin Water Replenish­
ment D is tr ic t .  Example 1 is a sample calculation for the average cost 
figures presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
Example 1 .
Sample Ground-Water Cost Calculation
Assumptions:
Assessment Ratio - -  45 percent (industrial property)
Plant Valuation - -  $10 million consisting of $7 m illion land
and improvements and $3 m illion "personal" 
property
M.W.D. Tax Rate - -  $0.14 per $100 of assessed valuation on
a l l  property
Cost of Capital - -  7 percent (b efo re -tax )-- This is a conser­
vative figure which would tend to under­
state costs to private firms. However, i t  
is probably somewhat on the high side for 
a municipality, hence costs may be s ligh tly  
overstated when the cost of capital is the
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Water Pumpage Rate 
Life of Wells 
Cost per Well
in terest rate on municipal bonds.
- -  10,000 acre-feet per year 
— 20 years
- -  $10,000 up to 200 g.p.ni. or 322 acre-feet 
per year capacity 
- -  $21,000 up to 500 g.p.ni. or 807 acre-feet 
per year capacity 
- -  $42,000 up to 1,500 g.p.m. or 2,420 acre- 
feet per year capacity
Unit Cost Calculation:
Pumping Cost $7.00
Pumping Assessment (1966-67) 6.20
Ad Valorem Taxes
Assessed Valuation
45% of $7,000,000 = $3,150,000 
45% of $10,000,000 = $4,500,000
Flood Control D is tr ic t  Zone I or I I  
$0.05 x 1/100 x $3,150,000 = $1,575.00
General Fund --F.C.D.
$0.00369 x 1/100 x $3,150,000 = $116.24
M.W.D.
$0.14 x 1/100 x $4,500,000 = $6,300.00
Replenishment D is tr ic t  
$0.0020 x 1/100 x $3,150,000 = $63.00
Total Ad Valorem Taxes = $7,991.24 
v 10,000 = Ad Valorem Taxes/Acre-Foot 0.80
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Capital Recovery Cost
(Capital Recovery Factor— 7%,
20 Year Life = 0.09439)
10,000 Acre-Feet per Year Pumpage Rate Met 
by Use of 1 -  $10,000 and 4 -  $42,000 wells 
$178,000 x 0.09439 = $16,801.42/Year 
v 10,000 = Capital Recovery/Acre-Foot = 1.68
Total Cost/Acre-Foot = $15.68
i
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Example 2
Sample M.W.D. Water Cost Calculation
Assumptions:
Assessment Ratio - -  45%
- -  $10 m ill ion , 30% "personal" property
— $40.00 per acre-foot (1966-67 price for 
softened and f i l te re d  water)
- -  $0.14 per $100 of total assessed value
— 7% before-tax 
- -  10,000 acre-feet per year
Plant Valuation 
M.W.D. Price
M.W.D. Tax Rate 
Cost of Capital 
Water Use
Cost of Connection 
to M.W.D. Feeder — $40,000
Unit Cost Calculation
M.W.D. Rate $40.00
Ad Valorem Taxes (See Example 1 Above) 0.80
Capital Recovery Cost 
Assuming a Perpetual (or long) Life  
= $40,000 x 7% = $2 ,800/year
v 10,000 = Capital Recovery Cost/Acre-Foot = 0.28
Total Cost/Acre-Foot = $41.08
+ $0.50 to West Basin Municipal Water D is tr ic t  = $41.58
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